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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (j) of the Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the Lower Court err in granting Summary Judgment to Defendant (Truck Insurance 
Exchange) by ruling that the comprehensive general liability policy (Business Insurance 
Policy) issued by Truck Insurance Exchange to Climate Source Inc., and Pollard 
Mechanical Inc., did not provide Uninsured Motorist Coverage to Melvin R. Pollard, the 
owner of both Corporations. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error 
State v. Perm, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); United Park City Mines Co., v. Greater Park 
City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993); Jacobson Investment v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1992) 
Issue preserved in Lower Court by Memorandum Decision of the Lower Court, dated 
February 3, 2000. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Title 41-12a-101 UCA (1953) 
Title 31A-22-302 UCA (1953) 
Title 31A-22-305 UCA (1953) § 33(a)(b) 
Title 41-la-102(37) UCA (1953) 
Title 41-22-2(11) UCA (1953) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action by Melvin R. Pollard (Pollard) to determine that he is entitled to 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage (UM) for injuries he received in an auto-motorcycle accident 
that occurred on September 23, 1997, under the terms of a Comprehensive Liability Insurance 
Policy issued by Truck Insurance Exchange (Fanner's) which contains a section providing UM 
Coverage. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Following the Answer filed to Pollard's Complaint, both parties filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Pollard moved for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a declaration as a 
matter of law that he was covered under the UM provision of the policy. Issues of damages 
and UM liability were reserved. Farmers moved for Summary Judgment seeking a declaration 
that Pollard was not covered under the UM provisions of the Policy. 
The matter was briefed by both parties and argued to the Court, 
On the 4th day of February, 2000 the Trial Court rendered a Memorandum decision, 
granting Farmers Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (The Memorandum decision is Appendix 1, R.39) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Pollard is the owner of all of the issued and outstanding stock of two 
corporations, namely Climate Source Inc., and Pollard Mechanical Inc. He has been the sole 
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owner since the two corporations were organized. The business of both corporations is the 
installation and repair of heating and air-conditioning systems. (Affidavit of Pollard, Appendix 
2, R.30) 
2. On or about July 14, 1997, Truck Insurance Exchange, a member of the 
Farmers Insurance Group Companies, (herein "FARMERS") issued its Farmer's Insurance 
Business Policy, policy 06590-13-39, which is a comprehensive liability and property damage 
insurance policy. Among the coverage's contained in the policy is one entitled Business Auto 
Coverage form. Within that coverage is a section called "Utah Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage". This part of the policy is attached hereto in full in Appendix 3. 
3. Pollard has been insured personally and in his businesses by Farmers for many 
years. It is his belief that he was personally covered for all of the coverage's in the Business 
auto policy and all prior policies. This fact was imparted to him by Farmers agents. 
(Affidavit of Pollard, Appendix 2, R.30) 
4. On September 23, 1997, at approximately 8:00 o'clock a.m., Pollard while 
operating a motorcycle, sustained severe disabling injuries in an accident involving an 
uninsured motorist (hit and run) at the 700 East 4500 South intersection in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
5. Following the accident, Pollard claimed coverage under the policy here in 
question as well as a separate policy issued by Farmers covering his motorcycle. The 
motorcycle policy had a limit on One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). The policy 
% 
at issue here has limits of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). Farmers settled and paid the 
$100,000.00 limits under the motorcycle policy but denied coverage under the policy here 
involved. Pollard's damages will likely exceed the $1,000,000.00 policy limit. 
6. In the settlement agreement entered into by the parties when the motorcycle 
policy was paid, it was agreed to that Pollard's rights under the subject policy were reserved 
and not affected by the settlement. 
7. Farmers concedes that Pollard is and insured under the business policy and 
would be covered if he were a pedestrian (more on this important concession, later in the 
brief). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Lower Court based its decision on a provision of the business policy; Title 31A-
22-305 (7)(a) of Utah's Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Statute; and Utah Cases, Clark 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987) and Bear River Mutual v. 
Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1989). 
The argument will show that neither the policy provision or the statutory provision 
limit or deny coverage in this case. The Clark case ruled that a party could not insure one of 
his vehicles for UM coverage and transfer that coverage to his other vehicles that did not have 
UM coverage. That case has no application because Pollard is not seeking to transfer coverage 
to his motorcycle. He insured his motorcycle with Farmers along with 14 business autos, on 
which he paid a premium. Whether he was operating a listed vehicle is not material. 
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The Wright case is important because it holds that a motorcycle is not an automobile, 
under the terms of an exclusion in the policy. It teaches the significance of proper application 
of definitions in the interpretation of insurance contracts. It does not however preclude 
coverage in this case. 
The argument below will show in detail the error committed by the Lower Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
DEFENDANT (TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE) BY RULING THAT THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY (BUSINESS INSURANCE POLICY) 
ISSUED BY TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE TO CLIMATE SOURCE INC., AND 
POLLARD MECHANICAL INC., DID NOT PROVIDE UNINSURED MOTORIST 
COVERAGE TO MELVIN R. POLLARD, THE OWNER OF BOTH CORPORATIONS. 
A. The Terms Of The Policy. 
The Lower Court quoted a provision in the "Auto" portion of the policy, which reads: 
"This policy provides only those coverages where a charge 
is shown in the premium column below. Each of these 
coverages will apply only to those 'autos' shown as covered 
'autos'. 'Autos1 are shown as covered fautosf for a 
particular coverage by the entry of one or more of the 
symbols from the COVERED AUTO section of the Business 
Auto coverage". 
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The Court then held that that provision of the policy prohibits UM coverage in this case 
because the motorcycle operated by Pollard was not listed in the policy and that there was no 
coverage if Pollard was not operating a listed vehicle. In reaching this conclusion the Court 
necessarily had to ignore the language of the UM coverage which reads; 
"A. Coverage 
1. We will pay all sums the 'insured' is legally 
entitled to recover as compensatory damages 
from the owner or driver of an 'uninsured 
motor vehicle'. The damages must result 
from 'bodily injury' sustained by the 
'insured' cause by an 'accident'. The 
owner's and driver's liability for these 
damages must result from the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the 'uninsured motor 
vehicle'. 
2. We will pay only after all liability bonds or 
policies have been exhausted by judgments 
or payments. 
3. Any judgment for damages arising out of 
'suit' brought without our written consent 
is not binding on us. 
B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
1. You 
2. If you are an individual, any 'family member'. 
3. Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 'auto' or a 
temporary substitute for a covered 'auto'. The 
covered 'auto' must be out of service because 
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, 'loss' or 
destruction. 
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to 
recover because of 'bodily injury' sustained 
by another 'insured'." 
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"You" is defined in the Business Auto Coverage (App. 3) as the named insured shown 
in the Declarations. The named insured is shown on the policy to be Climate Source Inc., and 
Pollard Mechanical Inc., both corporations owned by the Plaintiff, Pollard. He is the sole 
shareholder. All fourteen of his company vehicles are covered for UM insurance. 
The Lower Court entirely overlooked the fact that the language of the UM coverage is 
ambiguous. A corporation cannot be injured by a UM and a corporation does not have family 
members. 
The Lower Court ruled that since Pollard's motorcycle is not listed on the policy there 
is no UM coverage for him. The Lower Court analysis of the case is not the correct measure 
of this case. 
The fundamental issue in this case is not whether Pollard was operating a covered 
vehicle, but whether he is an "insured" under the policy. 
The significance of the UM provision quoted above and the point that the Lower Court 
missed is that the policy does not require that an "insured" must be occupying a listed vehicle 
in order to claim UM benefits. The fact that Pollard was riding a motorcycle that was not a 
listed "auto" is immaterial. All that is required is that an "insured" suffer an injury caused by 
an uninsured motorist. Coverage is provided without regard to the operation of any auto, or 
not auto. 
As a subsidiary argument, it was unnecessary to list the motorcycle in order to have 
coverage. 
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Throughout the policy the word "auto" is used frequently. Under section 5 -definitions 
of the auto policy on page 9 of 11 pages, (see appendix 3) "auto" is defined: 
"B.fAutof means a land motor vehicle, trailer or 
semi-trailer designed for travel on public roads but 
does not include 'mobile equipment1." 
Pollard was operating a motorcycle. The case of Bear River Mm. Ins. Co., v. Wright, 
770 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1989) provides guidance in this definitional field. That case 
explicitly held that for the purpose of a policy exclusion in that case, the word automobile as 
used in the exclusion did not include motorcycle. 
We look again at the policy definition, which describes "auto" as a land motor 
vehicle, designed for travel on public roads. The word "auto" in the policy is a shorthand way 
of saying "automobile". Automobile is a four-wheel vehicle designed for use on highways and 
a motorcycle is a two wheeled vehicle and although used on public roads, its primary use is off 
road. This is what gives the motorcycle its primary attraction. The term "motorcycle" is not 
mentioned in the policy. (See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., v. Wright, supra.) 
B. Statutory Provision. 
In support of its conclusion that there is no coverage, the Lower Court quoted Title 
31 A-22-305(7)(a) of the Insurance Code relating to Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage the Section quoted reads: 
"Uninsured motorist coverage under this section 
applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death 
of covered persons while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle as described in the policy under which a 
claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly 
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acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the 
terms of the policy. . . . " 
The Statute has no application for several reasons. The Lower Court failed to discern 
that the Statute does not apply to motorcycles. 
Under part three of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Code, Title 31A-22-301 a definition 
of Motor Vehicle is stated as follows: 
"(1) 'Motor vehicle1 has the same meaning as under 
Subsection 41-12a-103 (4)." 
Quoted section reads: 
"(4) (a) 'Motor vehicle1 means every self-propelled 
vehicle that is designed for use upon a highway, 
including trailers and semi trailers designed for use 
with other motorized vehicles, 
(b) 'Motor vehicle1 does not include traction engines, 
road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, power 
shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle that is 
not propelled by electric power obtained from 
overhead wires but not operated on rails." 
The term "motorcycle" is not mentioned in the above section and the term "motor 
vehicle" refers to self propelled vehicles designed for use upon a highway. It is true that 
motorcycles are frequently seen on highways, but more often they are used as off-highway 
vehicles. 
Even further the UM statute has a specific reference to "motor vehicle". 31A-21-22-
305 (4)(b)(c)(ii) which reads: 
"(4)(c)(ii) 'Motor vehicle' has the same meaning as under 
Section 41-la-102" 
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which reads: 
"(33)(a)'Motor vehicle1 means a self propelled vehicle 
intended primarily for use and operation on the 
highways. 
(b) 'Motor vehicle1 does not include an off-highway 
vehicle." 
Further on in the definitions we find under (37) the following definition: 
" 'Off-highway vehicle1 has the same meaning as 
provided in Section 41-22-2." 
Subsection 11 of that Section reads: 
1,1
 Off-highway vehicle1 means any snowmobile, 
all-terrain type I vehicle, all-terrain type II 
vehicle, or motorcycle." 
When we follow the trail of definitions we find that a motorcycle is not classified as a 
motor vehicle under Utah Statutory definitions. This is one of the reasons (7)(a) has no 
application to this case. 
The Lower Court in its decision made one observation with which we agree: 
"Furthermore, it must be remembered that the policy 
provides the applicable coverage not the statute. (R.)" 
Simply stated Farmers cannot deny coverage based upon a statute that is not contained 
in its policy. 
Furthermore, an insurance company can always provide by contract coverage greater 
than that outlined in a statute. (BearRiverMut. Ins. Co., v. Wright, supra.) 
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The Court should note also the language of 31a-22-305 (1) (Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage) which reads: 
"(1) As used in this section, 'covered persons' includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption or guardianship, who are residents of 
the named insured's household, including those who 
usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages 
against the owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured 
motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or death of persons 
under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).M 
It will be noted that there is no requirement that the insured or his family members be 
operating a vehicle mentioned in the policy or indeed operating any vehicle at all. 
Distinguished from these two classes of insured are other persons who must be operating a 
motor vehicle referred to in the policy. The Farmers UM coverage contains a similar 
provision. (See above quotation). However, the fourteen vehicles listed in the policy are 
company vehicles used in the company business of heating and air conditioning. Most likely 
they would be operated by a company employee who would be acting within the course and 
scope of his employ. This would include Pollard. The policy however, does not provide 
coverage if the loss is covered by Workmens Compensation. (See the policy, appendix , 
SECTION D., LIMIT OF INSURANCE). 
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The Lower Court held that there was no coverage because 305(7)(a) excluded coverage 
unless the claimant was operating a listed vehicle,, The Lower Court necessarily had to ignore 
305 (l)(a)(b). All that is necessary for a covered person to obtain benefits is to be injured or 
killed by an Uninsured Motorist. 
The Court must also consider the terms of the UM coverage under Section E entitled 
Changes in Conditions, it is stated: 
"If there is other applicable insurance 
available under one or more policies or 
provisions of coverage: 
a. The maximum recovery under all 
coverage forms or policies combined 
may equal but not exceed the highest 
applicable limit for any one vehicle 
under any coverage form or policy 
providing coverage on either a primary 
or excess basis." 
The quoted section contemplates the fact that there may be multiple coverages available 
to a covered person. It limits that coverage to the highest limit for any one vehicle under any 
coverage form. When Farmers wrote that language it must have contemplated that multiple 
UM coverage could be available to an insured. It cannot now ask this Court to ignore that 
provision. 
C. The Concession By Farmers. 
In one of the briefs filed by Farmers in the Lower Court it is stated: 
"The Uninsured Motorist Coverage issued on Mr. 
Pollard fs business vehicles was for a very specific 
and meaningful purpose of providing coverage to 
the users of the business vehicles in the event that 
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such person was injured by an uninsured motorist 
in three possible situations: 
(1) While using one of the business vehicles, 
(2) As a pedestrian, or 
(3) While occupying a vehicle not owned or available 
for his regular use." 
Aside from the fact that the terms of the policy contradict the above statement for the 
most part, it is interesting that Farmers would concede that Pollard would be covered if he 
were a pedestrian and struck by an Uninsured vehicle. (R. 92, 93) Farmers does not cite any 
provision of the "auto" policy that mentions the word pedestrian, and we are unable to find 
any such reference. Given the fact that UM coverage is remedial in nature and designed to 
protect families who are injured by Uninsured Motorists it is very clear that Pollard would be 
covered if he were operating a bicycle, a motorized wheelchair, a scooter, or an off road 
vehicle including a motorcycle. 
The admission by Farmers underscores the fact that the policy is ambiguous. That is 
the subject of our final section. 
D. The Policy Is Ambiguous And Should Be Construed To Provide UM Coverage To Pollard. 
This point is best illustrated by reference to the cases from many other jurisdictions that 
have construed family type UM coverage engrafted upon Commercial policies having the same 
or very similar terms as that contained in the Farmers policy.1 The cases have been 
reproduced and are under Appendix 4. 
The Farmers policy form as indicated on the bottom of each page, states "Copyright, Insurance Services 
Office, Inc. 1993". These forms are prepared for and commonly used in the insurance industry throughout the 
United States. 
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One of the leading cases in this field is Hansen v. Ohio Cos. Ins. Co., 687 A.2d 1262 
(Conn. 1996). In this case the corporate owner of a closely held corporation was killed while 
operating a snowmobile by an Uninsured Motorist. Under a commercial policy containing 
UM coverage identical to the Farmers case, the Court held that the policy was ambiguous and 
would therefore be construed as providing coverage for the decedent. 
In a case decided the same day by the Connecticut Court, Agosto v. Aetna Cas. and 
Sur., 687 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), the Court held that coverage would available to the estate 
of a State Trooper, under a State Commercial policy after he had left his vehicle on a traffic 
stop and was killed by a third vehicle. The same ambiguity was found to exist in the State 
Commercial policy providing for UM coverage. 
Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. v. Lambrecht & Sons, 852 P.2d 1317 (Colo. App. 1993), in this 
case Plaintiffs husband owned all of the capital stock of the closely held corporation. Plaintiff 
worked for the corporation and was an officer and director. She was injured while in a vehicle 
owned by the corporation. The Court held that the UM coverage, which is very similar to the 
Farmers policy, if read literally, would provide no coverage at all and would result in the 
insurance company receiving a premium while providing no consideration. It held that the 
language must be interpreted to provide some meaningful coverage and in so doing ruled that, 
Plaintiff was entitled to UM coverage. The concept of "you" being the corporate named 
insured and the term "family member" are thoroughly discussed in arriving at the conclusion 
that no meaningful coverage was provided if the terms are interpreted literally. 
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Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., v. McKee, 911 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App. San Antonio 
1995). McKee's eleven year old daughter was injured in a one car accident in which her 
Underinsured Step-Sister was the driver. The auto was not covered under the corporations 
Business policy. The injured girl was a member of the immediate family of the sole share 
holder of the family owned corporation; the corporate insured. The Court held that the use of 
the term "family members" in the UM-UIM coverage of the corporate policy was ambiguous 
and would be resolved in favor of coverage for the corporate owners daughter. 
Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 640 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1982), the 
decedent died as a result of an accident with an Uninsured Motorist. Decedent was driving a 
tractor trailer unit he owned. Claimants applied for UM coverage under a policy covering a 
Ford pickup truck that decedent owned. The policy had an exclusion similar to an exclusion in 
the policy before this court, eliminating coverage for an insured if occupying and automobile 
owned by the insured but not described in the policy. The Court noted that some courts held 
the exclusion valid and some did not. The Court held that UM coverage represents public 
policy providing coverage for insureds for damages caused by irresponsible drivers who are 
uninsured. The Court held that the exclusion was contrary to the public policy of the State of 
Montana, and that Claimants must be afforded UM coverage. 
Hagerv. American West Ins. Co., 732 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Mont. 1989), Hagers Inc., is 
a closely held family corporation. Plaintiff Hager, was a minority share holder and was 
injured by a hit and run vehicle as she was walking in a parking lot. The Court ruled: 
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"A construction of the term based upon the 
conclusion that a corporation cannot have 
'family members1 in a literal sense: would 
directly contravene the mandate of Montana 
law requiring the ambiguity be construed 
against the Defendant. Consequently, the 
Court finds that coverage under the 
Uninsured Motorist provision of the automobile 
liability policy issued by the Defendant to 
Hagers, Inc., is appropriately extended to the 
Plaintiff, Colleen L. Hager, as a shareholder 
of that closely held corporation for the injuries 
she sustained in the hit and run accident of 
October, 1985." 
Colokathis v. Hartford Ace. and Indent. Co., 244 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal App. 1 Dist. 
1988), the question before the Court was whether the President and sole shareholder of a 
company can recover for injuries under the UM provision of a commercial automobile 
insurance policy, which designates only the company as the named insured. In this case the 
injured party, the president and sole shareholder of the insured corporation was operating a 
rental car in California when injured by an Uninsured Motorist. The Court held that the 
Corporation paid for coverage which it could never hope to collect. The Court held this to be 
a violation of public policy and would not enforce an interpretation which rendered the 
coverage illusory. The Court ruled further that the Plaintiff as the principle officer of the 
company, was the most likely person that should benefit from the paid for coverage and 
accordingly the Court concluded that the policy would interpreted to provide Uninsured 
Motorist coverage for the Plaintiff. 
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Decker v. CNA Ins. Co., 585 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 1990), this case 
involved a policy where the named insured was a corporation. It contained language virtually 
identical to the policy here involved. The decedent, an employee of the corporation was struck 
and killed while jogging by and Underinsured Motorist. The Court citing other Ohio cases, 
found that the Corporation was the named insured and the policy contained "family member" 
coverage. The Court ruled the policy to be ambiguous and that the employee was entitled to 
coverage. 
The above cases provide well reasoned precedent for the conclusion that Pollard is 
insured under the Business Insurance Policy. 
CONCLUSION 
No one will dispute the fact that the policy is ambiguous; if for no other reason than it 
includes "family coverage" in a commercial "auto" policy. 
The named insureds in the policy are two corporations. Corporations cannot be injured 
by an UM and corporations do not have family members. Read literally the policy provides 
no coverage at all. However, Farmers cannot charge a premium for a policy that is illusory 
and does not provide meaningful coverage. 
Actually the concession made by Farmers that Pollard would be covered if he were a 
pedestrian, underscores the fact that Pollard is not required to be occupying a "covered auto" 
or any vehicle to be insured for UM coverage. This is a major concession and should end all 
further argument in this case. 
i? 
Pollard is the owner of both Corporations and insured all 14 of his company vehicles 
for UM coverage. His understanding from Farmers agents was that he would be personally 
covered under all the coverages that he purchased. 
Pollard should be granted Partial Summary Judgment declaring that he is insured under 
the UM provisions of the Business Insurance policy. 
The Summary Judgment granted in favor of Pollard by the Lower Court should be 
reversed and the Motion for Summary Judgment denied. 
Resp^ectfully Submitted, 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
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APPENDIX 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN R. POLLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 990905650 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
February 3, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to these motions on December 10, 1999. Following the 
hearing the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having now considered the motions, memoranda, 
exhibits attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby 
enters the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
1. On July 14, 1997, Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck 
Insurance") issued a Commercial auto Insurance Policy to Climate 
Source and Pollard Mechanical, Inc. 
2. On September 23, 1997, plaintiff, Melvin Pollard 
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("Pollard"), was involved in a motor vehicle accident which was 
allegedly caused by an unidentified driver of a Jeep while Pollard 
was operating a motorcycle. 
3. At the time of the subject accident, Pollard had a 
personal Motor Vehicle Liability insurance policy in effect on the 
motorcycle, providing uninsured motorist coverage for his 
involvement in the accident. He made a claim under that policy and 
the $100,000 limit was paid to or on behalf of Pollard in 
settlement. 
4. With this action, Pollard has asserted a claim for 
uninsured motorist benefits under the Commercial Auto Policy issued 
to Climate Source and Pollard Mechanical, Inc. by Truck Insurance 
Exchange. 
ANALYSIS 
With their motion for summary judgment, Truck Insurance argues 
(1) the insurance contract between Pollard and Truck Insurance does 
not provide uninsured motorist coverage with respecL to the use of 
vehicles not described in the policy, such as Pollard's personal 
motorcycle and 2) the uninsured motorist statutory scheme and case 
law in Utah support this position, and do not allow the additional 
UM coverage claimed by Pollard in this case. 
Pollard in opposition to defendant's motion and in support of 
his own motion for partial summary judgment argues that in 
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accordance with the applicable case law, he is covered under the 
under the Truck Insurance policy regardless of whether he is 
operating a described auto, any other vehicle or no vehicle at all. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In considering a 
summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Cr. App. 
1987) . 
Pursuant to Pollard's policy: 
This policy provides only those coverages 
where a charge is shown in the premium column 
below. Each of these coverages will apply 
only to those "autos" shown as covered 
"autos." "Autos" are shown as covered "autos" 
for a particular coverage by the entry of one 
or more of the symbols from the COVERED AUTO 
section to the Business Auto coverage. 
(Emphasis added). 
The motorcycle which plaintiff was driving at the time of the 
accident is not one of the "autos" described in the relevant 
section. Accordingly, under the clear and unambiguous language of 
the policy, there is no coverage. 
With respect to the coverage under Utah's Uninsured and Under 
Insured Motorist statute, §31A-22-305(7)(a) provides: 
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Uninsured motorist coverage under this section 
applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, 
or death of covered persons while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle only if the motor 
vehicle is described in the policy under which 
a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered 
under the terms of the policy. . . . 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Bear River Mur. Ins. 
Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1989) acknowledged that 
either a motorcycle or an automobile may be considered a "motor 
vehicle" although it is not an automobile. IcL at 1021 Under the 
statute, "motor vehicle" is the term used. This, combined with the 
holding in Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 
(Utah 1987) that "coverage was intended to rest with the vehicle 
and not with the named insured, since owners can opt in favor of 
uninsured motorist coverage on some vehicles and against it on 
others," leads to the conclusion that summary judgment in favor of 
defendant is appropriate. Furthermore, it must be remembered that 
the policy provides the applicable coverage, not the stature. 
As to plaintiff's argument that the statute contains internal 
inconsistencies between its subsections, the Court is not persuaded 
such is the case, and indeed, plaintiff has cited no authority to 
the contrary. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment is respectfully denied. 
DATED this Q -~ day of February 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
MNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
\H1> 
APPENDIX 2 
Edward M. Garrett #1163 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801)581-1144 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVINR. POLLARD, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MELVIN R. POLLARD 
> Civil No: 990905650 
) Judge Anna M. Stirba 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mclvin R. Pollard being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. He is the Plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
2. Climate Source, Inc., is a Utah corporation which was organized in 1989. Affiant is 
the owner of all the issued and outstanding stock of the Company and serves as its President 
and only Director. There are no other officers or directors in the Company. 
3. Pollard Mechanical, Inc., is a Utah corporation which was organized in 1994. Affiant 
is the owner of all the issued and outstanding stock of the Company and serves as its President 
and only Director. There are no other officers or directors in the Company. 
4. The business pf both companies is the installation and repair of heating and air 
conditioning systems,' 
5. Before Climate Source, Inc., was incorporated, Affiant operated ftie"business as a sole 
proprietor. 
6. For many years, both, while acting as a sole proprietor and later under corporate form, 
Affiant purchased all business insurance, including automobile insurance, from Farmers 
Insurance Group of Companies. The only insurance not purchased from Farmers was 
workman's compensation insurance. 
7. All policies were renewed annually. 
8. It is Affiant's belief, gained over the years from conversations with Farmers' agents, 
that Affiant, as the business owner, was personally insured under the Business Owner's Policy 
Coverages whether tfte vehicle he was operating was described in the policy or whether it was 
not. 
9. When Affiant had the motorcycle accident in September 1997, Affiant believed and 
expected that the uninsured motorized section of the Farmers' policy would fully cover 
Affiant's injuries and damages. 
DATED this P day of August, 1999. 
Melvin R. Pollard 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a notary public; this jjj_ day of August, 1999. 
^ ^ t e m x D S | Notary Public 
2855 East 3300 Soutt i J 
to< tf 
sat UJ* aty, Utah 84109! Residing in / / ^ - ° . c ^ c .>w I I 
My Commission E>pir*t • ° — ^ — * * 
Jufy 28, 2001 I 
Stats erf Utah i 
APPENDIX 3 
BUSINESS 
AUTO 
DECLARATIONS 
•POLICY 
S I COVERAGE PART 
\x\ TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE • MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY • FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
•. 
MEMBERS OF FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP OF COMPANIES 
HOME OFFICE: 4680 WILSHIRE BLVD., LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90010 
ITEM ONE 
NAMED 
INSURED 
MAILING 
ADDRESS 
CLIMATE SOURCE 
MECHANICAL INC 
4020 SO 210 W 
SALT LAKE CITY 
& POLLARD 
UT 84107 
3560034 
Prematic Acc't No. 
Agent 
Prod. Count 
( 1 6 5 9 0 - 1 3 - 3 9 
Policy Number 
The named insured is an individual 
unless otherwise stated: 
Policy Period from 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 7 
_ _ Type of 
I I Partnership IXI Corp. Business HEATING & A /C 
n Joint Venture d Organization (Other than Partnership or joint venture) 
(not prior to time applied for) to 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 8 12:01 AM Standard Time 
If this policy replaces other coverages that end at noon standard time on the same day this policy begins, this policy will not take effect until the oth 
coverage ends. This policy will continue for successive policy periods as follows: If we elect to continue this insurance, we will renew this policy if you p 
the required renewal premium for each successive policy period subject to our premiums, rules and forms then in effect. 
ITEM TWO SCHEDULE OF COVERAGES AND COVERED AUTOS 
*This policy provides only those coverages where a charge is shown in the premium column below. Each of these coverages will apply only to those "autos" sho\ 
as coverea autos". "Autos" are shown as covered "autos" for a particular coverage by the entry of one or more of the symbols from the COVERED AUTO Secti 
of the Business Auto Coverage Form next to the name of the coverage. 
COVERAGES 
LIABILITY 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
(or equivalent No- Fault Coveraqe) 
ADDED PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
(or equivalent added no-fault cov.) 
PROPERTY PROTECTION INSURANCE 
(Michigan only) 
AUTO MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
UNINSURED MOTORIST 
UNINSURED MOTORIST 
PROPERTY DAMAGE 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS (When not 
rncl. in Uninsured Motorists Coverage) 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE SPECIFIED 
CAUSES OF LOSS COVERAGE 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COLLISION COVERAGE 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
TOWING AND LABOR 
* COVERED AUTOS 
2 8 9 
5 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
LIMIT 
THE MOST WE WILL PAY FOR 
ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS 
(LIMITS SHOWN IN THOUSANDS) 
$ 1000 
SEPARATELY STATED IN EACH PIP ENDORSEMENT 
SEPARATELY STATED IN EACH ADDED PIP ENDORSEMENT 
SEPARATELY STATED IN THE P.P.I. ENDORSEMENT MINUS 
$ DEDUCTIBLE FOR EACH ACCIDENT 
$ SEE SCHEDULE 
$ 1000 
$ 
$ 1000 
Actual Cash Value or Cost of Repair, whichever is 
less minus $ SEE SCHEDULE Ded. for Each Covered 
Auto. But no Deductible Applies to Loss Caused by Fire or 
Lightning. See Item Four tor hired or borrowed "autos". 
Actual Cash Value or Cost of Repair, whichever is 
Less Minus $25 Ded. for Each Covered Auto for loss 
Caused by Mischief or Vandalism. See Item Four for hired 
or borrowed "Autos". 
Actual Cash Value or Cost of Repair whichever is 
less minus $ SEE SCHEDULE Ded. for Each Covered 
Auto. See item four for hired or borrowed "Autos". 
$ for each disablement of a private passenger 
"auto." (ACTUAL LIMIT) 
PREMIUM FOR ENDORSEMENTS 
ESTIMATED TOTAL PREMIUM 
PREMIUM 
6 , 6 6 2 . 0 0 
8 6 . 0 0 
1 9 5 . 0 0 
1 , 0 9 2 . 0 0 
5 6 9 . 0 0 
8 . 0 0 
9 2 3 . 0 0 
9 , 5 3 5 . 0 0 
56-5190 3RD EDITION 12-91 F-Q9 DAftF i n C I 
06590-13-39 
DECLARATIONS SUPPLEMENTAL 
SCHEDULE OF COVERED AUTOS YOU OWN 
DESCRIPTION TERRITORY 
Covered 
Auto No. 
Year, Model, Trade Name, Body Type 
Serial Number (S) Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN) 
PURCHASED 
Original 
Cost New 
Actual Cost & 
New (N) 
USED (U) 
Town & State where Covered 
Auto will be principally garaged 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
92 DODGE CARAVAN 
1B4GH54R6NX241201 
86 CHEVROLET VAN 
1GCGG35MXG7159648 
86 CHEVROLET VAN 
1GC6635M8G7159616 
90 GMC P/U 
1GTFK24K4L25G5017 
94 PACE TRAILER 
4QL0B1422RP024117 
3/4 T 
CARGO 
16500 
9500 
10000 
10000 
MURRAY UT 
MURRAY UT 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
CLASSIFICATION 
Radius of 
Operation 
Covered 
Auto No. 
Business use 
s - service 
r-retail 
c - commercial! 
Size GVW, 
GCWorVeh 
Seating 
Capacity 
Age 
Group 
Primary 
Rating 
Factor 
Liab. Phy. 
Dam. 
Secondary 
Rating 
Factor 
Code Except for towing, all physical damage 
loss is payable to you and the loss 
payee named below as interests 
may appear at the time of the loss. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
50 
100 
50 
50 
50 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
10000 
10000 
7000 
7000 
5000 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
1.0000 
1.1000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.1500 
0000 
0500 
0000 
0000 
6500 
01499 
01599 
01499 
01499 
68499 
SEE E1112 
a deductible or limit entry in any column below means that the limit 
lies instead) 
COVERAGES-PREMIUMS, LIMITS AND DEDUCTIBLES(Absence of 
or deductible entry in the corresponding ITEM TWO column appl 
LIABILITY PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION ADDED P.I.P. PROP. PROT. (Mich, only) 
Covered 
Auto No. 
'Limit Premium Limit stated in each 
P.I.P. End minus de-
ductible shown below 
Premium Limit stated in each 
Added P.I.P. End. 
Premium 
Limit stated in P.P.I, 
end. minus deduct, 
shown below 
Premium 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
445.Of f 
490 .Od 
4 4 5 . o q 
445 .Od 
64 .Od 
6 .00 
6 .00 
6 .00 
6 .00 
Total 
Premium 1 ,889 .Od 2 4 . 0 0 
COVERAGES-PREMIUMS, LIMITS AND DEDUCTIBLES(Absence of a deductible or limit entry in any column below means that the limit 
or deductible entry in the corresponding ITEM TWO column applies instead) 
Covered 
Auto No. 
AUTO MED. PAY UNINSURED MOTORISTS UNINSURED MOTORIST 
PROPERTY DAMAGE 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
'Limit Premium 'Limit Premium 'Limit Premium 'Limit Premium 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
15 .00 
15 .00 
15 .00 
15 .00 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
8 4 . C 
8 4 . 0 
8 4 . 0 
8 4 . 0 
Total 
Premium 6 0 . 0 0 3 3 6 . 0 
COVERAGES-PREMIUMS, LIMITS AND DEDUCTIBLES!Absence of a deductible or limit entry in any column below means that the limit 
or deductible entry in the corresponding ITEM TWO column applies instead) 
COMPREHENSIVE SPECIFIED CAUSES OF LOSS COLLISION TOWING LABOR 
Covered 
Auto No. 
Limit stated in ITEM 
TWO minus deduc-
tible shown below 
Premium Limit stated in ITEM 
TWO 
Premium 
Limit stated in ITEM 
TWO minus deduct. 
shown below 
Premium Limit Per 
Disablement 
Premium 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
51 .001 
3 1 . 0 0 
3 1 . 0 0 
8.00 
250 
250 
250 
250 
71 .00 
49.00 
46.00 
46.00 
Total 
Premium 113 .00 8 . 0 0 2 1 2 . 0 0 
'(LIMITS SHOWN IN THOUSANDS) 
Sfi.519n 9nH aHitinn 7.19-9.1 
06590-13-39 
DECLARATIONS SUPPLEMENTAL 
SCHEDULE OF COVERED AUTOS YOU OWN 
Covered 
Auto No. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Covered 
Auto No. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Covered 
Auto No. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Total 
Premium 
Covered 
Auto No. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Total 
Premium 
Covered 
Auto No. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Total 
Premium 
DESCRIPTION ! 
Year. Model, Trade Name, Body Type 
Serial Number (S) Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN) 
86 CHEV VAN G20 I 
16CEG25H4G7168513 
91 FORD VAN 2 T 
3FCLF59M8MJA00945 
91 FORD VAN 2 T 
3FCLF59M1MJA00947 
97 JEEP CHEROKEE 
1J4G278Y0VC631483 
PURCHASED I 
Original 
Cost New 
10000 
32000 
32000 
37000 
Actual Cost & 
New (N) 
USED(U) 
CLASSIFICATION 
Radius of 
Operation 
50 
51 
50 
50 
Business use 
s - service 
r - retail 
c - commercial 
S 
C 
c 
s 
Size GVW. 
GCWorVeh. 
Seating 
Capacity 
12000 
18000 
18000 
10000 
Age 
Group 
6 
6 
6 
1 
Primary 
Rating 
Facior 
Liab. 
1 .0500 
1.6000 
1 .3500 
1.0000 
Phy. 
Dam. 
.850 
1.200 
.950 
1.000 
I Seconds 
Rating 
I Factor 
ry 
0 
o 
0 
Code 
21499 
23599 
23499 
01499 
TERRITORY 
Town & State where Covered 
Auto will be principally garaged 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 1 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 1 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 1 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 1 
Except for towing, all physical damage 
loss is payable to you and the loss 
payee named below as interests 
may appear at the time of the loss. 
SEE E1112 
COVERAGES-PREMIUMS. LIMITS AND DEDUCTIBLES(Absence of a deductible or limit entry in any column below means that the limit 
or deductible entry in the corresponding ITEM TWO column applies instead) 
LIABILITY 
l im i t 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
Premium 
468.OC 
712.OC 
601.OC 
4 4 5 . 0 0 
2 , 2 2 6 . 0 0 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
Limit stated in each 
P.I.P. End minus de-
ductible shown below 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Premium 
6 .00 
9 . 0 0 
8 .00 
6 . 0 0 
2 9 . 0 0 
ADDED P.I.P. 
Limit stated in each 
Added P.I.P. End. 
Premium 
I PROP. PROT. ( 
Limit stated in P.P.I. I 
end. minus deduct, 
shown below 
Mich, only) 
Premium 
COVERAGES-PREMIUMS. LIMITS AND DEDUCTIBLES(Absence of a deductible or limit entry in any column below means that the limit 
or deductible entry in the corresponding ITEM TWO column applies instead) 
AUTO MED. PAY 
*Limit Premium 
UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
'Limit 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
Premium 
15.OC 
15.OC 
15.OC 
15.OC 
60.OC 
I UNINSURED MOTORIST I 
PROPERTY DAMAGE | 
'Limit I 
> 
> 
> ) 
) 
Premium I 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
'Limit 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
Premium 
8 4 . 0 
8 4 . 0 
8 4 . 0 
8 4 . 0 
336 .0 
COVERAGES-PREMIUMS, LIMITS AND DEDUCTlBLES(Absence of a deductible or limit entry in any column below means that the limit 
or deductible entry in the corresponding ITEM TWO column applies instead) 
COMPREHENSIVE 
Limit stated in ITEM 
TWO minus deduc-
tible shown below 
0 
50 
50 
50 
Premium 
2 6 . 0 0 
8 7 . 0 0 
6 9 . 0 0 
1 1 0 . 0 0 
2 9 2 . 0 0 
SPECIFIED CAUSES OF LOSS 1 
Limit stated in ITEM 1 
TWO 
Premium 
COLLISION 
Limit stated in ITEM 
TWO minus deduct. 
shown below 
250 
500 
500 
500 
Premium 
3 9 . 0 0 
145 .00 
115 .00 
186 .00 
4 8 5 . 0 0 
I TOW 
I Limit Per 
Disablement 
ING LABOR 
I Premium 
'(LIMITS SHOWN IN THOUSANDS) 
06590-13-39 
Policy Number 
BUSINESS AUTO DECLARATIONS (CONTINUED) 
ITEM FOUR 
SCHEDULE OF HIRED OR BORROWED COVERED AUTO COVERAGE AND PREMIUMS 
LIABILITY COVERAGE RATING BAS 
STATE 
UT 
IS, COST OF HIRE 
ESTIMATED COST OF HIRE 
FOR EACH STATE 
RATE PER EACH $100 
COST OF HIRE 
FACTORflf liab. 
COV. IS PRIMARY) 
PREMIUM 
PREMIUM 
2 4 . 0 0 
Cost of hire means the total amount you incur for the hire of "autos" you don't own(not including "autos" you borrow or rent from your employees or their fami 
members). Cost of hire does not include charges for services performed by motor carriers of property or passengers. 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGE 
COVERAGES 
COMPREHENSIVE 
SPECIFIED 
CAUSES OF LOSS 
COLLISION 
LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
THE MOST WE WILL PAY 
DEDUCTIBLE 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE, COST OF REPAIRS OR 
$ WHICHEVER IS LESS MINUS 
$ DED. FOR EACH COVERED AUTO. 
BUT NO DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TO LOSS CAUSED BY 
FIRE OR LIGHTNING. 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE, COST OF REPAIRS OR 
$ WHICHEVER IS LESS MINUS 
$25 DED. FOR EACH COVERED AUTO FOR LOSS CAUSED 
BY MISCHIEF OR VANDALISM. 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE, COST OF REPAIRS OR 
$ WHICHEVER IS LESS MINUS 
$ DED. FOR EACH COVERED AUTO 
ESTIMATED 
ANNUAL 
COST OF HIRE 
RATES PER 
EACH $100 
COST OF HIRE 
PREMIUM 
PREMIUM 
ITEM FIVE 
SCHEDULE FOR NON-OWNERSHIP LIABILITY 
NAMED INSURED'S BUSINESS 
! Other than a 
Social Service Agency 
Social Service Agency 
RATING BASIS 
Number of Employees 
Number of Partners 
Number of Employees 
Number of Volunteers 
NUMBER 
3 
PREMIUM | 
$ 5 3 . 0 0 | 
$ 
$ 
$ 
IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM, AND SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY, WE AGREE WITH YOU TO PROVIDE 
THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY. 
Premium shown is payable:$ 9 , 5 3 5 . 0 0 at inception. 
ENDORSEMENTS ATTACHED TO THIS POLICY: IL 00 21-Broad form Nuclear Exclusion(Not applicable in New York) 
CA00011293 CA01590394 CA21621095 CA22440394 CA31061095 E0207-ED1 E1112-ED1 
T.L00630689 IL00171185 ILo62l1l9Tr^EL02666287 565236-E&2 
LOSS PAYEE 
COUNTERSIGNED BY 
(Date) Authorized Representative 
COMMERCIAL AUTO 
CA 00 01 12 93 
BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM 
Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. Read the entire policy carefully to determine rights, duties 
and what is and is not covered. 
Throughout this policy the words "you" and " y o u r refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations. The 
words "we", "us" and " o u r refer to the Company providing this insurance. 
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks have special meaning. Refer to SECTION V - DEFI-
NITIONS. 
SECTION I - COVERED AUTOS 
ITEM TWO of the Declarations shows the "autos" 
that are covered "autos" for each of your coverages. 
The following numerical symbols describe the 
"autos" that may be covered "autos". The symbols 
entered next to a coverage on the Declarations 
designate the only "autos" that are covered "autos". 
A. DESCRIPTION OF COVERED AUTO DESIG-
NATTON SYMBOLS 
SYMBOL, DESCRIPTION 
1 = ANY "AUTO". 
2 = OWNED "AUTOS" ONLY. Only those 
"autos" you own (and for Liability Cover-
age any "trai lers" you don't own while at-
tached to power units you own). This 
includes those "autos" you acquire own-
ership of after the policy begins. 
3 = OWNED PRIVATE PASSENGER "AUTOS" 
ONLY. Only the private passenger "autos" 
you own. This includes those private pas-
senger "autos" you acquire ownership of 
after the policy begins. 
4 = OWNED "AUTOS" OTHER THAN PRIVATE 
PASSENGER "AUTOS" ONLY. Only those 
"autos" you own that are not of the private 
Passenger type (and for Liability Coverage 
any "trai lers" you don't own while at-
tached to power units you own). This in-
c\\sdes those "autos" not of the private 
passenger type you acquire ownership of 
after the policy begins. 
5 = OWNED "AUTOS" SUBJECT TO 
NQ-FAULT. Only those "autos" you own 
thgt are required to have No-Fault benefits 
in the state where they are licensed or 
principally garaged. This includes those 
"autos" you acquire ownership of after the 
policy begins provided they are required 
to have No-Fault benefits in the state 
where they are licensed or principally ga-
raged. 
6 *= OWNED "AUTOS" SUBJECT TO A COM-
PULSORY UNINSURED MOTORISTS LAW. 
Only those "autos" you own that because 
of the law in the state where they are l i -
censed or principally garaged are re-
quired to have and cannot reject 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage. This in-
cludes those "autos" you acquire owner-
ship of after the policy begins provided 
they are subject to the same state 
uninsured motorists requirement. 
7 *= SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED "AUTOS". 
Only those "autos" described in ITEM 
THREE of the Declarations for which a 
premium charge is shown (and for Liabil-
ity Coverage any "trai lers" you don't own 
while attached to any power unit de-
scribed in ITEM THREE). 
8 s= HIRED "AUTOS" ONLY. Only those "autos" 
you lease, hire, rent or borrow. This does 
not include any "auto" you lease, hire, 
rent, or borrow from any of your employ-
ees or partners or members of their 
households. 
9 = NONOWNED "AUTOS" ONLY. Only those 
"autos" you do not own, lease, hire, rent 
or borrow that are used in connection with 
your business. This includes "autos" 
owned by your employees or partners or 
members of their households but only 
while used in your business or your per-
sonal affairs. 
OWNED AUTOS YOU ACQUIRE AFTER THE 
POLICY BEGINS 
1. If symbols 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 are entered next 
to a coverage in ITEM TWO of the Declara-
tions, then you have coverage for "autos" that 
you acquire of the type described for the re-
mainder of the policy period. 
*«% * * A* ^ ^ 
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2. But, if symbol 7 is entered next to a coverage 
in ITEM TWO of the Declarations, an "auto* 
you acquire will be a covered "auto* for that 
coverage only if: 
a. We already cover all "autos" that you own 
for that coverage or it replaces an "auto* 
you previously owned that had that cover-
age; and 
b. You tell us within 30 days after you ac-
quire it that you want us to cover it for that 
coverage. 
C. CERTAIN TRAILERS, MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND 
TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE AUTOS 
If Liability Coverage is provided by this Coverage 
Form, the following types of vehicles are also 
covered "autos" for Liability Coverage: 
A. COVERAGE 
We will pay all sums an "insured" legally must 
pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" to which this insurance ap-
plies, caused by an "accident" and resulting from 
the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered 
"auto". 
We will also pay all sums an "insured" legally 
must pay as a "covered pollution cost or ex-
pense" to which this insurance applies, caused 
by an "accident" and resulting from the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of covered "autos". 
However, we will only pay for the "covered pol-
lution cost or expense" if there is either "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" to which this in-
surance applies that is caused by the same "ac-
cident". 
We have the right and duty to defend any "in-
sured" against a "suit" asking for such damages 
or a "covered pollution cost or expense". How-
ever, we have no duty to defend any "insured" 
against a "suit" seeking damages for "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage" to which this insur-
ance does not apply. We may investigate and 
settle any claim or "suit" as we consider appro-
priate. Our duty to defend or settle ends when 
the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has 
been exhausted by payment of judgments or 
settlements. 
1. "Trailers" with a load capacity of 2,000 
pounds or less designed primarily for travel 
on public roads. 
2. "Mobile equipment" while being carried or 
towed by a covered "auto". 
3. Any "auto" you do not own while used with 
the permission of its owner as a temporary 
substitute for a covered "auto" you own that 
is out of service because of its: 
a. Breakdown; 
b. Repair; 
c. Servicing; 
d. "Loss"; or 
e. Destruction. 
1. WHO IS AN INSURED 
The following are "insureds": 
a. You for any covered "auto". 
b. Anyone else while using with your per-
mission a covered "auto" you own, hire 
or borrow except: 
(1) The owner or anyone else from whom 
you hire or borrow a covered "auto". 
This exception does not apply if the 
covered "auto" is a "trailer" connected 
to a covered "auto" you own. 
(2) Your employee if the covered "auto" is 
owned by that employee or a member 
of his or her household. 
(3) Someone using a covered "auto" while 
he or she is working in a business of 
selling, servicing, repairing, parking or 
storing "autos" unless that business is 
yours. 
(4) Anyone other than your employees, 
partners, a lessee or borrower or any 
of their employees, while moving 
property to or from a covered "auto". 
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE 
(5) A partner of yours for a covered "auto" 
owned by him or her or a member of 
his or her household. 
c. Anyone liable for the conduct of an "in-
sured" described above but only to the 
extent of that liability. 
2. COVERAGE EXTENSIONS 
a. Supplementary Payments. In addition to 
the Limit of Insurance, we will pay for the 
"insured": 
(1) All expenses we incur. 
(2) Up to $250 for cost of bail bonds (in-
cluding bonds for related traffic law vi-
olations) required because of an 
"accident" we cover. We do not have 
to furnish these bonds. 
(3) The cost of bonds to release attach-
ments in any "suit" we defend, but only 
for bond amounts within our Limit of 
Insurance. 
(4) All reasonable expenses incurred by 
the "insured" at our request, including 
actual loss of earning up to $100 a day 
because of time off from work. 
(5) All costs taxed against the "insured" in 
any "suit" we defend. 
(6) All interest on the full amount of any 
judgment that accrues after entry of 
the judgment in any "suit" we defend, 
but our duty to pay interest ends when 
we have paid, offered to pay or depos-
ited in court the part of the judgment 
that is within our Limit of Insurance. 
b. Out-of-State Coverage Extensions. 
While a covered "auto" is away from the 
state where it is licensed we will: 
(1) Increase the Limit of Insurance for Li-
ability Coverage to meet the limits 
specified by a compulsory or financial 
responsibility law of the jurisdiction 
where the covered "auto" is being 
used. This extension does not apply to 
the limit or limits specified by any law 
governing motor carriers of passen-
gers or property. 
(2) Provide the minimum amounts and 
types of other coverages, such as no-
fault, required of out-of-state vehicles 
by the jurisdiction where the covered 
"auto" is being used. 
We will not pay anyone more than once for 
the same elements of loss because of 
these extensions. 
B. EXCLUSIONS 
This insurance does not apply to any of the fol-
lowing: 
1. EXPECTED OR INTENDED INJURY 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" ex-
pected or intended from the standpoint of the 
"insured". 
2. CONTRACTUAL 
Liability assumed under any contract or 
agreement. 
But this exclusion does not apply to liability 
for damages: 
a. Assumed in a contract or agreement that 
is an "insured contract" provided the 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" oc-
curs subsequent to the execution of the 
contract or agreement; or 
b. That the "insured" would have in the ab-
sence of the contract or agreement. 
3. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Any obligation for which the "insured" or the 
"insured's" insurer may be held liable under 
any workers' compensation, disability bene-
fits or unemployment compensation law or 
any similar law. 
4. EMPLOYEE INDEMNIFICATION AND EM-
PLOYER'S LIABILITY 
"Bodily injury" to: 
a. An employee of the "insured" arising out 
of and in the course of employment by the 
"insured"; or 
b. The spouse, child, parent, brother or sister 
of that employee as a consequence of 
paragraph a. above. 
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This exclusion applies: 
(1) Whether the "insured" may be liable 
as an employer or in any other capac-
ity; and 
(2) To any obligation to share damages 
with or repay someone else who must 
pay damages because of the injury. 
But this exclusion does not apply to "bodily 
injury" to domestic employees not entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits or to liability 
assumed by the "insured" under an "insured 
contract". 
5. FELLOW EMPLOYEE 
"Bodily injury" to any fellow employee of the 
"insured" arising out of and in the course of 
the fellow employee's employment. 
6. CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL 
"Property damage" to or "covered pollution 
cost or expense" involving property owned 
or transported by the "insured" or in the "in-
sured's" care, custody or control. But this 
exclusion does not apply to liability assumed 
under a sidetrack agreement. 
7. HANDLING OF PROPERTY 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" result-
ing from the handling of property: 
a. Before it is moved from the place where 
it is accepted by the "insured" for move-
ment into or onto the covered "auto"; or 
b. After it is moved from the covered "auto" 
to the place where it is finally delivered 
by the "insured". 
8. MOVEMENT OF PROPERTY BY MECHANICAL 
DEVICE 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" result-
ing from the movement of property by a me-
chanical device (other than a hand truck) 
unless the device is attached to the covered 
"auto". 
9. OPERATIONS 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising 
out of the operation of any equipment listed 
in paragraphs 6.b. and 6.c. of the definition 
of "mobile equipment". 
10. COMPLETED OPERATIONS 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising 
out of your work after that work has been 
completed or abandoned. 
In this exclusion, your work means: 
a. Work or operations performed by you or 
on your behalf; and 
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished in 
connection with such work or operations. 
Your work includes warranties or represen-
tations made at any time with respect to the 
fitness, quality, durability or performance of 
any of the items included in paragraphs a. or 
b. above. 
Your work will be deemed completed at the 
earliest of the following times: 
(1) When all of the work called for in your 
contract has been completed. 
(2) When all of the work to be done at the 
site has been completed if your con-
tract calls for work at more than one 
site. 
(3) When that part of the work done at a 
job site has been put to its intended 
use by any person or organization 
other than another contractor or sub-
contractor working on the same 
project. 
Work that may need service, maintenance, 
correction, repair or replacement, but 
which is otherwise complete, will be 
treated as completed. 
11. POLLUTION 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising 
out of the actual, alleged or threatened dis-
charge, dispersal, seepage, migration, re-
lease or escape of "pollutants": 
a. That are, or that are contained in any 
property that is: 
(1) Being transported or towed by, han-
dled, or handled for movement into, 
onto or from, the covered "auto"; 
(2) Otherwise in the course of transit by 
or on behalf of the "insured"; or 
(3) Being stored, disposed of, treated or 
processed in or upon the covered 
"auto"; 
b. Before the "pollutants" or any property in 
which the "pollutants" are contained are 
moved from the place where they are ac-
cepted by the "insured" for movement into 
or onto the covered "auto"; or 
c. After the "pollutants" or any property in 
which the "pollutants" are contained are 
moved from the covered "auto" to tne 
place where they are finally delivered, 
disposed of or abandoned by the "in-
sured". 
Paragraph a. above does not apply to fu-
els, lubricants, fluids, exhaust gases or 
other similar "pollutants" that are needed 
for or result from the normal electrical, 
hydraulic or mechanical functioning of the 
covered "auto" or its parts, if: 
(1) The "pollutants" escape, seep, mi-
grate, or are discharged, dispersed or 
released directly from an "auto" part 
designed by its manufacturer to hold, 
store, receive or dispose of such 
"pollutants"; and 
(2) The "bodily injury", "property damage" 
or "covered pollution cost or expense" 
does not arise out of the operation of 
any equipment listed in paragraphs 
6.b. and 6.c. of the definition of "mobile 
equipment". 
Paragraphs b. and c. above of this exclu-
sion do not apply to "accidents" that occur 
away from premises owned by or rented 
to an "insured" with respect to "pollutants" 
not in or upon a covered "auto" if: 
(1) The "pollutants" or any property in 
which the "pollutants" are contained 
are upset, overturned or damaged as 
a result of the maintenance or use of 
a covered "auto"; and 
SECTION III-PHYSICAL 
A. COVERAGE 
1. We will pay for "loss" to a covered "auto" or 
its equipment under: 
a. Comprehensive Coverage. From any 
cause except: 
(1) The covered "auto's" collision with an-
other object; or 
(2) The covered "auto's" overturn. 
(2) The discharge, dispersal, seepage, 
migration, release or escape of the 
"pollutants" is caused directly by such 
upset, overturn or damage. 
12. WAR 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" due to 
war, whether or not declared, or any act or 
condition incident to war. War includes civil 
war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution. This 
exclusion applies only to liability assumed 
under a contract or agreement. 
13. RACING 
Covered "autos" while used in any profes-
sional or organized racing or demolition con-
test or stunting activity, or while practicing for 
such contest or activity. This insurance also 
does not apply while that covered "auto" is 
being prepared for such a contest or activity. 
C. LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
Regardless of the number of covered "autos", 
"insureds", premiums paid, claims made or ve-
hicles involved in the "accident", the most we 
will pay for the total of all damages and "covered 
pollution cost or expense" combined, resulting 
from any one "accident" is the Limit of Insurance 
for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations. 
All "bodily injury", "property damage" and "cov-
ered pollution cost or expense" resulting from 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially 
the same conditions will be considered as re-
sulting from one "accident". 
No one will be entitled to receive duplicate pay-
ments for the same elements of "loss" under this 
Coverage Form and any Medical Payments Cov-
erage endorsement, Uninsured Motorists Cover-
age endorsement or Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage endorsement attached to this Cover-
age Part. 
DAMAGE COVERAGE 
b. Specified Causes of Loss Coverage. 
Caused by: 
(1) Fire, lightning or explosion; 
(2) Theft; 
(3) Windstorm, hail or earthquake; 
(4) Flood; 
(5) Mischief or vandalism; or 
O A A A t\A 4o an 
(6) The sinking, burning, collision or 
derailment of any conveyance trans-
porting the covered "auto". 
c. Collision Coverage. Caused by: 
(1) The covered "auto's" collision with an-
other object; or 
(2) The covered "auto's" overturn. 
2. Towing. 
We will pay up to the limit shown in the Dec-
larations for towing and labor costs incurred 
each time a covered "auto" of the private 
passenger type is disabled. However, the la-
bor must be performed at the place of 
disablement. 
3. Glass Breakage - Hitting a Bird or Animal -
Falling Objects or Missiles. 
If you carry Comprehensive Coverage for the 
damaged covered "auto", we will pay for the 
following under Comprehensive Coverage: 
a. Glass breakage; 
b. "Loss" caused by hitting a bird or animal; 
and 
c. "Loss" caused by falling objects or mis-
siles. 
However, you have the option of having glass 
breakage caused by a covered "auto's" colli-
sion or overturn considered a "loss" under 
Collision Coverage. 
4. Coverage Extension. We will pay up to $15 
per day to a maximum of $450 for transporta-
tion expense incurred by you because of the 
total theft of a covered "auto" of the private 
passenger type. We will pay only for those 
covered "autos" for which you carry either 
Comprehensive or Specified Causes of Loss 
Coverage. We will pay for transportation ex-
penses incurred during the period beginning 
48 hours after the theft and ending, regard-
less of the policy's expiration, when the cov-
ered "auto" is returned to use or we pay for 
its "loss". 
B. EXCLUSIONS 
1. We will not pay for "loss" caused by or re-
sulting from any of the following. Such "loss" 
is excluded regardless of any other cause or 
event that contributes concurrently or in any 
sequence to the "loss". 
a. Nuclear Hazard. 
(1) The explosion of any weapon employ-
ing atomic fission or fusion; or 
(2) Nuclear reaction or radiation, or radio-
active contamination, however caused. 
b. War or Military Action. 
(1) War, including undeclared or civil war; 
(2) Warlike action by a military force, in-
cluding action in hindering or defend-
ing against an actual or expected 
attack, by any government, sovereign 
or other authority using military per-
sonnel or other agents; or 
(3) Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, 
usurped power or action taken by gov-
ernmental authority in hindering or 
defending against any of these. 
2. We will not pay for "loss" to any covered 
"auto" while used in any professional or or-
ganized racing or demolition contest or 
stunting activity, or while practicing for such 
contest or activity. We will also not pay for 
"loss" to any covered "auto" while that cov-
ered "auto" is being prepared for such a 
contest or activity. 
3. We will not pay for "loss" caused by or re-
sulting from any of the following unless 
caused by other "loss" that is covered by this 
insurance: 
a. Wear and tear, freezing, mechanical or 
electrical breakdown. 
b. Blowouts, punctures or other road dam-
age to tires. 
4. We will not pay for "loss" to any of the fol-
lowing: 
a. Tapes, records, discs or other similar au-
dio, visual or data electronic devices de-
signed for use with audio, visual or data 
electronic equipment. 
b. Equipment designed or used for the de-
tection or location of radar. 
c. Any electronic equipment, without regard 
to whether this equipment is permanently 
installed, that receives or transmits audio, 
visual or data signals and that is not de-
signed solely for the reproduction of 
sound. 
d. Any accessories used with the electronic 
equipment described in paragraph c. 
above. 
Exclusions 4.c. and 4.d. do not apply to: 
a. Equipment designed solely for the reprod-
uction of sound and accessories used with 
such equipment, provided such equipment 
is permanently installed in the covered 
"auto" at the time of the "loss" or such 
equipment is removable from a housing 
unit which is permanently installed in the 
covered "auto" at the time of the "loss", 
and such equipment is designed to be 
solely operated by use of the power from 
the "auto's" electrical system, in or upon 
the covered "auto"; or 
b. Any other electronic equipment that is: 
(1) Necessary for the normal operation of 
the covered "auto" or the monitoring 
of the covered "auto's" operating sys-
tem; or 
(2) An integral part of the same unit hous-
ing any sound reproducing equipment 
described in a. above and permanently 
installed in the opening of the dash or 
console of the covered "auto" normally 
used by the manufacturer for installa-
tion of a radio. 
C. LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
The most we will pay for "loss" in any one "ac-
cident" is the lesser of: 
1. The actual cash value of the damaged or 
stolen property as of the time of the "loss"; 
or 
2. The cost of repairing or replacing the dam-
aged or stolen property with other property 
of like kind and quality. 
D. DEDUCTIBLE 
For each covered "auto", our obligation to pay 
for, repair, return or replace damaged or stolen 
property will be reduced by the applicable 
deductible shown in the Declarations. Any Com-
prehensive Coverage deductible shown \n the 
Declarations does not apply to "loss" caused by 
fire or lightning. 
SECTION IV - BUSINESS AUTO CONDITIONS 
The following conditions apply in addition to the 
Common Policy Conditions: 
A. LOSS CONDITIONS 
1. APPRAISAL FOR PHYSICAL DAMAGE LOSS 
If you and we disagree on the amount of 
"loss", either may demand an appraisal of the 
"loss". In this event, each party will select a 
competent appraiser. The two appraisers will 
select a competent and impartial umpire. The 
appraisers will state separately the actual 
cash value and amount of "loss". If they fail 
to agree, they will submit their differences to 
the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two 
will be binding. Each party will: 
a. Pay its chosen appraiser; and 
b. Bear thf> other expenses of the appraisal 
ana umpire equally. 
If we submit to an appraisal, v/e will still re-
tain our right to deny the claim. 
2. DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENT, CLAIM, 
SUIT OR LOSS 
a. In the event of "accident", claim, "suit" or 
"loss", you must give us or our authorized 
representative prompt notice of the "acci-
dent" or "loss". Include: 
(1) How, when and where the "accident" 
or "loss" occurred; 
(2) The "insured's" name and address; 
and 
(3) To the extent possible, the names and 
addresses of any injured persons and 
witnesses. 
, Additionally, you and any other involved 
"insured" must: 
(1) Assume no obligation, make no pay-
ment or incur no expense without our 
consent, except at the "insured's" own 
cost. 
(2) Immediately send us copies of any re-
quest, demand, order, notice, sum-
mons or legal paper received 
concerning the claim or "suit". 
(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation, 
settlement or defense of the claim or 
"suit". 
(4) Authorize us to obtain medical records 
or other pertinent information. 
(5) Submit to examination, at our expense, 
by physicians of our choice, as often 
as we reasonably require. 
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c. If there is "loss" to a covered "auto" or its 
equipment you must also do the following: 
(1) Promptly notify the police if the cov-
ered "auto" or any of its equipment is 
stolen. 
(2) Take all reasonable steps to protect 
the covered "auto" from further dam-
age. Also keep a record of your ex-
penses for consideration in the 
settlement of the claim. 
(3) Permit us to inspect the covered "auto" 
and records proving the 'loss" before 
its repair or disposition. 
(4) Agree to examinations under oath at 
our request and give us a signed 
statement of your answers. 
3. LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US 
No one may bring a legal action against us 
under this Coverage Form until: 
a. There has been full compliance with all 
the terms of this Coverage Form; and 
b. Under Liability Coverage, we agree in 
writing that the "insured" has an obli-
gation to pay or until the amount of that 
obligation has finally been determined by 
judgment after trial. No one has the right 
under this policy to bring us into an action 
to determine the "insured's" liability. 
4. LOSS PAYMENT - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COV-
ERAGES 
At our option we may: 
a. Pay for, repair or replace damaged or 
stolen property; 
b. Return the stolen property, at our ex-
pense. We will pay for any damage that 
results to the "auto" from the theft; or 
c. Take all or any part of the damaged or 
stolen property at an agreed or appraised 
value. 
5. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY 
AGAINST OTHERS TO US 
If any person or organization to or for whom 
we make payment under this Coverage Form 
has rights to recover damages from another, 
those rights are transferred to us. That per-
son or organization must do everything nec-
essary to secure our rights and must do 
nothing after "accident'' or "loss" to impair 
them. 
B. GENERAL CONDITIONS 
1. BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the "insured" or 
the "insured's" estate will not relieve us of 
any obligations under this Coverage Form. 
2. CONCEALMENT, MISREPRESENTATION OR 
FRAUD 
This Coverage Form is void in any case of 
fraud by you at any time as it relates to this 
Coverage Form. It is also void if you or any 
other "insured", at any time, intentionally 
conceal or misrepresent a material fact con-
cerning: 
a. This Coverage Form; 
b. The covered "auto"; 
c. Your interest in the covered "auto"; or 
d. A claim under this Coverage Form. 
3. LIBERALIZATION 
If we revise this Coverage Form to provide 
more coverage without additional premium 
charge, your policy will automatically provide 
the additional coverage as of the day the re-
vision is effective in your state. 
4. NO BENEFIT TO BAILEE - PHYSICAL DAM-
AGE COVERAGES 
We will not recognize any assignment or 
grant any coverage for the benefit of any 
person or organization holding, storing or 
transporting property for a fee regardless of 
any other provision of this Coverage Form. 
5. OTHER INSURANCE 
a. For any covered "auto" you own, this 
Coverage Form provides primary insur-
ance. For any covered "auto" you don't 
own, the insurance provided by this Cov-
erage Form is excess over any other 
collectible insurance. However, while a 
covered "auto" which is a "trailer" is con-
nected to another vehicle, the Liability 
Coverage this Coverage Form provides for 
the "trailer" is: 
(1) Excess while it is connected to a motor 
vehicle you do not own. 
(2) Primary while it is connected to a cov-
ered "auto" you own. 
b. For Hired Auto Physical Damage cover-
age, any covered "auto" you lease, hire, 
rent or borrow is deemed to be a covered 
"auto" you own. However, any "auto" that 
is leased, hired, rented or borrowed with 
a driver is not a covered "auto". 
c. Regardless of the provisions of paragraph 
a. above, this Coverage Form's Liability 
Coverage is primary for any liability as-
sumed under an "insured contract*. 
d. When this Coverage Form and any other 
Coverage Form or policy covers on the 
same basis, either excess or primary, we 
will pay only our share. Our share is the 
proportion that the Limit of Insurance of 
our Coverage Form bears to the total of 
the limits of all the Coverage Forms and 
policies covering on the same basis. 
6. PREMIUM AUDIT 
a. The estimated premium for this Coverage 
Form is based on the exposures you told 
us you would have when this policy be-
gan. We will compute the final premium 
due when we determine your actual ex-
posures. The estimated total premium 
will be credited against the final premium 
due and the first Named Insured will be 
billed for the balance, if any. If the esti-
mated total premium exceeds the final 
premium due, the first Named Insured will 
get a refund. 
b. If this policy is issued for more than one 
year, the premium for this Coverage Form 
will be computed annually based on our 
rates or premiums in effect at the begin-
ning of each year of the policy. 
7. POLICY PERIOD, COVERAGE TERRITORY 
Under this Coverage Form, we cover "acci-
dents" and "losses" occurring: 
a. During the policy period shown in the 
Declarations; and 
b. Within the coverage territory. 
The coverage territory is: 
a. The United States of America; 
b. The territories and possessions of the 
United States of America; 
c. Puerto Rico; and 
d. Canada. 
We also cover "loss" to, or "accidents" in-
volving, a covered "auto" while being trans-
ported between any of these places. 
8. TWO OR MORE COVERAGE FORMS OR 
POLICIES ISSUED BY US 
If this Coverage Form and any other Cover-
age Form or policy issued to you by us or any 
company affiliated with us apply to the same 
"accident", the aggregate maximum Limit of 
Insurance under all the Coverage Forms or 
policies shall not exceed the highest applica-
ble Limit of Insurance under any one Cover-
age Form or policy. This condition does not 
apply to any Coverage Form or policy issued 
by us or an affiliated company specifically to 
apply as excess insurance over this Cover-
age Form. 
SECTION V - DEFINITIONS 
A. "Accident" includes continuous or repeated ex-
posure to the same conditions resulting in "bod-
ily injury" or "property damage". 
B. "Auto" means a land motor vehicle, trailer or 
semitrailer designed for travel on public roads 
but does not include "mobile equipment". 
C. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or 
disease sustained by a person including death 
resulting from any of these. 
D. "Covered pollution cost or expense" means any 
cost or expense arising out of: 
1. Any request, demand or order; or 
2. Any claim or "suit" by or on behalf of a gov-
ernmental authority demanding 
that the "insured" or others test for, monitor, 
clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or 
neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess 
the effects of "pollutants". 
"Covered pollution cost or expense" does not 
include any cost or expense arising out of the 
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dis-
persal, seepage, migration, release or escape 
of "pollutants": 
a. That are, or that are contained in any 
property that is: 
(1) Being transported or towed by, han-
dled, or handled for movement into, 
onto or from the covered "auto"; 
(2) Otherwise in the course of transit by 
or on behalf of the "insured"; 
(3) Being stored, disposed of, treated or 
processed in or upon the covered 
"auto"; or 
b. Before the "pollutants" or any property in 
which the "pollutants" are contained are 
moved from the place where they are ac-
cepted by the "insured" for movement into 
or onto the covered "auto"; or 
c. After the "pollutants" or any property in 
which the "pollutants" are contained are 
moved from the covered "auto" to the 
place where they are finally delivered, 
disposed of or abandoned by the "in-
sured". 
Paragraph a. above does not apply to fu-
els, lubricants, fluids, exhaust gases or 
other similar "pollutants" that are needed 
for or result from the normal electrical, 
hydraulic or mechanical functioning of the 
covered "auto" or its parts, if: 
(1) The "pollutants" escape, seep, mi-
grate, or are discharged, dispersed 
or released directly from an "auto" 
part designed by its manufacturer 
to hold, store, receive or dispose of 
such "pollutants"; and 
(2) The "bodily injury", "property dam-
age" or "covered pollution cost or 
expense" does not arise out of the 
operation of any equipment listed in 
paragraphs 6.b. or 6.c. of the defi-
nition of "mobile equipment". 
Paragraphs b. and c. above do not apply 
to "accidents" that occur away from 
premises owned by or rented to an "in-
sured" with respect to "pollutants" not in 
or upon a covered "auto" if: 
(1) The "pollutants" or any property in 
which the "pollutants" are con-
tained are upset, overturned or 
damaged as a result of the mainte-
nance or use of a covered "auto"; 
and 
(2) The discharge, dispersal, seepage, 
migration, release or escape of the 
"pollutants" is caused directly by 
such upset, overturn or damage. 
E. "Insured" means any person or organization 
qualifying as an insured in the Who Is An Insured 
provision of the applicable coverage. Except with 
respect to the Limit of Insurance, the coverage 
afforded applies separately to each insured who 
is seeking coverage cr against when a claim cr 
"suit" is brought. 
F. "Insured contract" means: 
1. A lease of premises; 
2. A sidetrack agreement; 
3. Any easement or license agreement, except 
in connection with construction or demolition 
operations on or within 50 feet of a railroad; 
4. An obligation, as required by ordinance, to 
indemnify a municipality, except in con-
nection with work for a municipality; 
5. That part of any other contract or agreement 
pertaining to your business (including an 
indemnification of a municipality in con-
nection with work performed for a munici-
pality) under which you assume the tort 
liability of another to pay for "bodily injury" 
or "property damage" to a third party or or-
ganization. Tort liability means a liability that 
would be imposed by law in the absence of 
any contract or agreement; 
6. That part of any contract or agreement en-
tered into, as part of your business, pertain-
ing to the rental or lease, by you or any of 
your employees, of any "auto". However, 
such contract or agreement shall not be con-
sidered an "insured contract" to the extent 
that it obligates you or any of your employees 
to pay for "property damage" to any "auto" 
rented or leased by you or any of your em-
ployees. 
An ""insured contract" does not include that 
part of any contract or agreement: 
a. That indemnifies any person or organiza-
tion for "bodily injury" or "property dam-
age" arising out of construction or 
demolition operations, within 50 feet of 
any railroad property and affecting any 
railroad bridge or trestle, tracks, 
roadbeds, tunnel, underpass or crossing; 
or 
b. That pertains to the loan, lease or rental 
of an "auto" to you or any of your em-
ployees, if the "auto" is loaned, leased or 
rented with a driver; or 
c. That holds a person or organization en-
gaged in the business of transporting 
property by "auto" for hire harmless for 
your use of a covered "auto" over a route 
or territory that person or organization is 
authorized to serve by public authority. 
G. "Loss" means direct and accidental loss or 
damage. 
H. "Mobile equipment" means any of the following 
types of land vehicles, including any attached 
machinery or equipment: 
1. Bulldozers, farm machinery, forklifts and 
other vehicles designed for use principally off 
public roads; 
2. Vehicles maintained for use solely on or next 
to premises you own or rent; 
3. Vehicles that travel on crawler treads; 
4. Vehicles, whether self-propelled or not, 
maintained primarily to provide mobility to 
permanently mounted: 
a. Power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers 
or drills; or 
b. Road construction or resurfacing equip-
ment such as graders, scrapers or rollers. 
5. Vehicles not described in paragraphs 1., 2., 
3., or 4. above that are not self-propelled and 
are maintained primarily to provide mobility 
to permanently attached equipment of the 
following types: 
a. Air compressors, pumps and generators, 
including spraying, welding, building 
cleaning, geophysical exploration, lighting 
and well servicing equipment; or 
b. Cherry pickers and similar devices used 
to raise or lower workers. 
6. Vehicles not described in paragraphs 1., 2., 
3. or 4. above maintained primarily for pur-
poses other than the transportation of per-
sons or cargo. However, self-propelled 
vehicles with the following types of perma-
nently attached equipment are not "mobile 
equipment" but will be considered "autos": 
a. Equipment designed primarily for: 
(1) Snow removal; 
(2) Road maintenance, but not con-
struction or resurfacing; or 
(3) Street cleaning; 
b. Cherry pickers and similar devices 
mounted on automobile or truck chassis 
and used to raise or lower workers; and 
c. Air compressors, pumps and generators, 
including spraying, welding, building 
cleaning, geophysical exploration, lighting 
or well servicing equipment. 
I. "Pollutants" means any solid, liquid, gaseous or 
thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, 
reconditioned or reclaimed. 
J. "Property damage" means damage to or loss of 
use of tangible property. 
K. "Suit" means a civil proceeding in which: 
1. Damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage"; or 
2. A "covered pollution cost or expense", 
to which this insurance applies, are alleged. 
"Suit" includes: 
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such 
damages or "covered pollution costs or 
expenses" are claimed and to which the 
"insured" must submit or does submit with 
our consent; or 
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution 
proceeding in which such damages or 
"covered pollution costs or expenses" are 
claimed and to which the insured submits 
with our consent. 
L. "Trailer" includes semitrailer. 
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THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
UTAH CHANGES 
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM 
BUSINESS AUTO PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGE FORM 
GARAGE COVERAGE FORM 
MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE FORM 
TRUCKERS COVERAGE FORM 
With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of the Coverage Form apply unless 
modified by the endorsement. 
For a covered "auto" licensed or principally garaged 
in, or "garage operations" conducted in, Utah, 
CONDITIONS are changed as follows: 
A. The Legal Action Against Us Condition does not 
apply. 
B. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY AGAINST 
OTHERS TO US is changed by adding the fol-
lowing: 
a. We shall be entitled to a recovery only after 
the "insured" has been fully compensated for 
damages. 
b. If we make any payment and the "insured" 
recovers from another party, the "insured" 
shall hold the proceeds in trust for us and pay 
us back the amount we have paid. 
C. The Concealment, Misrepresentation or Fraud 
Condition is replaced by the following: 
FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION 
Subject to Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-21-105, 
this Coverage Form may be voided in the event 
of fraud cr misrepresentation by you or any other 
"insured" relating to: 
a. This Coverage Form; 
b. The covered "auto"; 
c. Your interest in the covered "auto"; or 
d. A claim under this Coverage Form. 
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POLICY NUMBER: 0 6 5 9 0 - 1 3 - 3 9 COMMERCIAL AUTO 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
UTAH PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
For a covered "auto" licensed or principally garaged in, or for "garage operations" conducted in, Utah, this 
endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM 
GARAGE COVERAGE FORM 
MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE FORM 
TRUCKERS COVERAGE FORM 
With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of the Coverage Form apply unless 
modified by the endorsement. 
This endorsement changes the policy effective on the inception date of the policy unless another date is in-
dicated below. 
Endorsement effective 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 7 
1
 Named Insured 
CLIMATE SOURCE & POLLARD 
Countersigned by 1 
SCHEDULE 
(Authorized Representative) 
Benefits 
Medical expenses 
Work loss 
| Funeral expenses 
! Survivor loss 
Limit Per Person 
$3,000 
(a) Eighty-five percent of any 
loss of gross income and earning 
capacity, not to exceed the 
total of $250 per week; 
(b) $20 per day for inability to 
perform services for the 
household; 
$1,500 
$3,000 
(If no entry appears above, information required to complete this endorsement will be shown in the Declara-
tions as applicable to this endorsement.) 
We agree with you, subject to all of the provisions 
in this endorsement and to all of the- provisions of 
the policy except as modified herein, as follows: 
A. COVERAGE 
We will pay Personal Injury Protection benefits 
in accordance with Title 31A, Utah Code Anno-
tated to or for an "insured" who sustains "bodily 
injury" caused by an "accident" arising out of the 
use of an "auto" as an auto. 
Subject to the limits shown in the Schedule, 
these Personal Injury Protection benefits consist 
of: 
1. Medical expenses. Reasonable expenses in-
curred for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, 
dental and rehabilitation services, including 
prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, 
hospital and nursing services, and any non-
medical remedial care and treatment ren-
dered in accordance with a recognized 
religious method of healing; however, it does 
not include expenses in excess of those for a 
semi-private room, unless more intensive 
care is medically required. 
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2. Work loss. 
a. Loss of income and loss of earning ca-
pacity by the "insured" during his or her 
lifetime, from inability to work during a 
period commencing three days after the 
date of the "bodily injury" and continuing 
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks 
thereafter. If such "insured's" inability to 
work continues in excess of a total of two 
consecutive weeks after the date of the 
"bodily injury", this three day elimination 
period shall not be applicable; and 
b. An allowance for services actually ren-
dered or reasonably incurred that, but for 
the "bodily injury" the "insured" would 
have performed during his or her lifetime 
for his or her household commencing 
three days after the date of the "bodily in-
jury" and continuing for a maximum of 365 
consecutive days thereafter. If such "in-
sured's" inability to perform such services 
continues in excess of 14 consecutive 
days after the date of the "bodily injury", 
this three day elimination period shall not 
be applicable. 
3. Funeral expenses. Funeral, burial or 
cremation expenses incurred. 
4. Survivor loss. Compensation on account of 
the death of the "insured" and is payable only 
to natural persons who are the "insured's" 
heirs. 
B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
1. You, unless you are injured in an "accident" 
which resulted from the use or operation of 
any motor vehicle which is owned by you and 
which is not a covered "auto". 
2. If you are an individual, any "family member", 
unless the "family member" is injured in an 
"accident" which resulted from the use or 
operation of any motor vehicle which is 
owned by such "family member" and which 
is not a covered "auto". 
3. Any person while "occupying" a covered 
"auto" with the consent of the "insured". 
4. Any person while "occupying" any other 
"auto" other than a public or livery 
conveyance, operated by you or a "family 
member". 
5. A "pedestrian" if the "accident" involves the 
use of a covered "auto". 
C. EXCLUSIONS 
We will not pay Personal Injury Protection bene-
fits for "bodily injury": 
1. Sustained by the "insured" while "occupying" 
an "auto" owned by, or furnished for the reg-
ular use of, that "insured", or if you are an 
individual, any "family member", that is not a 
covered "auto". 
2. Sustained by any person while operating the 
covered "auto" without the express or implied 
consent of the "insured" or while not in lawful 
possession of the covered "auto". 
3. Sustained by a "pedestrian" if the "accident" 
occurs outside the state of Utah. This exclu-
sion does not apply, if you are an individual, 
to you or any "family member". 
4. Sustained by any person if such person's 
conduct contributed to his injury under either 
of the following circumstances: 
a. Causing injury to himself or herself inten-
tionally, or 
b. While committing a felony. 
5. Sustained by any person arising out of the 
use of any "auto" while located for use as a 
residence or premises. 
6. Due to war, whether or not declared, civil 
war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or 
to any act or condition incident to any of the 
foregoing. 
7. Resulting from the radioactive, toxic, ex-
plosive or other hazardous properties of nu-
clear material. 
D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
1. Regardless of the number of "insureds", poli-
cies or bonds applicable, claims made, pre-
miums paid or covered "autos" to which this 
coverage applies, the most we will pay for 
Personal Injury Protection benefits for "bodily 
injury" sustained by an "insured" in any one 
"accident" is the Limit Per Person amount 
shown in the Schedule. 
2. Any amount payable under this coverage will 
be reduced by the amount paid, payable or 
required to be provided for "bodily injury": 
a. Under any workers' compensation plan or 
any similar statutory plan; 
b. By the United States or any of its agencies 
because of his or her being on active duty 
in the military services; 
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E. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS 
The following is added to the DUTIES IN THE 
EVENT OF ACCIDENT, CLAIM, SUIT OR LOSS 
Condition: 
d. If an "insured" or his or her legal represen-
tative or survivor institutes legal action to re-
cover damages for "bodily injury", he or she 
must promptly give us a copy of the summons 
and complaint or other process served in 
connection with the legal action. 
e. The "insured" or someone on his or her be-
half must promptly give us written proof of 
claim, under oath if required, including: 
(1) Full particulars of the nature and extent 
of the "bodily injury", treatment and reha-
bilitation received and contemplated; and 
(2) Such other information that will help us 
determine the amount due and payable. 
The following CONDITIONS are added: 
REIMBURSEMENT AND TRUST 
1. If we make any payment to any "insured" un-
der this coverage and that person recovers 
from another party, he or she shall hold the 
proceeds in trust for us and pay us back the 
amount we have paid. We will have a lien 
against such payment, and may give notice 
of the lien to the person or organization 
causing "bodily injury", his or her agent or 
insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the 
matter. 
2. Any "insured" receiving payment must hold 
in trust for our benefit all rights of recovery 
he or she has against the party causing 
"bodily injury". 
3. That person must do everything necessary to 
secure such rights and must do nothing to 
impair them. 
4. That person must execute and deliver to us 
instruments and papers that nay be appro-
priate to secure his or her and our rights and 
obligations established by this provision. 
COORDINATION AND NON-DUPLICATION 
1. No "insured" may recover duplicate pay-
ments for the same elements of "loss" under 
this or any other insurance. 
2. This insurance is primary only for "bodily in-
jury" sustained by an "insured" in an "acci-
dent" arising out of the use or operation of a 
covered "auto". 
3. If an "insured" is entitled to Personal Injury 
Protection benefits under more than one pol-
icy, the maximum recovery under all policies 
combined will not exceed the amount payable 
under the policy with the highest dollar limit 
of benefits. Our share is the proportion that 
our Limit of Insurance bears to the total of all 
applicable limits covering on the same basis. 
4. Personal Injury Protection benefits paid or 
payable under this Coverage Form or any 
other Coverage Form or policy providing auto 
insurance because of "bodily injury" sus-
tained by an "insured" shall be primary to any 
Auto Medical Payments Coverage provided 
under this Coverage Form. 
PREMIUM RECOMPUTATION 
The premium for this policy is based on rates 
which have been established in reliance upon 
the limitations on the right to recover for dam-
ages imposed by the provisions of Title 31A, 
Utah Code Annotated. If a court declares any of 
these provisions unenforceable, we have the 
right to recompute the premium, and the pro-
visions of this endorsement are voidable or sub-
ject to amendment at our option. 
F. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
As used in this endorsement: 
1. "Auto" means every self-propelled vehicle 
which is designed for use upon a highway, 
including trailers and semi-trailers designed 
for use with such vehicles, except traction 
engines, road rollers, farm tractors, tractor 
cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and 
every vehicle which is propelled by electric 
power obtained from overhead wires but not 
operated on rails. 
2. "Family member" means a person related to 
you by blood, marriage or adoption, including 
a ward or foster child, who is a resident of 
your household, whether or not temporarily 
residing elsewhere. 
3. "Occupying" means being in or upon an 
"auto" as a passenger or operator or en-
gaged in the immediate acts of entering, 
boarding or alighting from an "auto". 
4. "Pedestrian" means any person not "occupy-
ing" or riding upon an "auto". 
POLICY NUMBER: 0 6 5 9 0 - 1 3 - 3 9 COMMERCIAL AUTO 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
UTAH UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
For a covered "auto" licensed or principally garaged in, or "garage operations" conducted in, Utah, this 
endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM 
GARAGE COVERAGE FORM 
MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE FORM 
TRUCKERS COVERAGE FORM 
With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of the Coverage Form apply unless 
modified by the endorsement. 
This endorsement changes the policy effective on the inception date of the policy unless another date is in-
dicated below: 
I Endorsement effective 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 7 
Named Insured 
CLIMATE SOURCE & POLLARD 
Countersigned by I 
(Authorized Representative) 
LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
SCHEDULE 
Each "Accident" 
(If no entry appears above, information required to complete this endorsement will be shown in the Declara-
tions as applicable to this endorsement.) 
COVERAGE 
1. We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally 
entitled to recover as compensatory damages 
from the owner or driver of an "uninsured 
motor vehicle". The damages must result 
from "bodily injury" sustained by the "in-
sured" caused by an "accident". The owner's 
or driver's liability for these damages must 
result from the ownership, maintenance or 
use of the "uninsured motor vehicle". 
2. We will pay only after all liability bonds or 
policies have been exhausted by judgments 
or payments. 
3. Any judgment for damages arising out of a 
"suit" brought without our written consent is 
not binding on us. 
B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
1. You. 
2. If you are an individual, any "family member". 
3. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or 
a temporary substitute for a covered "auto". 
The covered "auto" must be out of service 
because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, 
"loss" or destruction. 
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to 
recover because of "bodily injury" sustained 
by another "insured". 
C. EXCLUSIONS 
This insurance does not apply to any of the fol-
lowing: 
1. Any claim settled without our consent. 
2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer 
or self-insurer under any workers' compen-
sation, disability benefits or similar law. 
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3. "Bodily injury" sustained by: 
a. You while "occupying" or when struck by 
any vehicle owned by you that is not a 
covered "auto" for Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage under this Coverage Form; 
b. Any "family member" while "occupying" 
or when struck by any vehicle owned by 
that "family member" that is not a covered 
"auto" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage 
under this Coverage Form; or 
c. Any "family member" while "occupying" 
or when struck by any vehicle owned by 
you that is insured for Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage on a primary basis under any 
other Coverage Form or policy. 
4. Anyone using a vehicle without a reasonable 
belief that the person is entitled to do so. 
5. Punitive or exemplary damages. 
D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
1. Regardless of the number of covered "autos", 
"insureds", premiums paid, claims made or 
vehicles involved in the "accident", the most 
we will pay for all damages resulting from 
any one "accident" is the LIMIT OF INSUR-
ANCE for UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVER-
AGE shown in the Schedule or Declarations. 
2. No one will be entitled to receive duplicate 
payments for the same elements of "loss" 
under this Coverage Form and any Liability 
Coverage Form, Medical Payments Coverage 
endorsement or Underinsured Motorists Cov-
erage endorsement attached to this Cover-
age Part. 
We will not make a duplicate payment under 
this Coverage for any element of "loss" for 
which payment has been made by or for 
anyone who is legally responsible. 
We will not pay for any element of "loss" if a 
person is entitled to receive payment for the 
same element of "loss" under any workers' 
compensation, disability benefits or similar 
law. 
E. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS 
The CONDITIONS are changed for UNINSURED 
MOTORISTS COVERAGE as follows: 
1. OTHER INSURANCE in the Business Auto and 
Garage Coverage Forms and OTHER INSUR-
ANCE - PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE 
PROVISIONS in the Truckers and Motor Car-
rier Coverage Forms is replaced by the fol-
lowing: 
If there is other applicable insurance avail-
able under one or more policies or provisions 
of coverage: 
a. The maximum recovery under all cover-
age forms or policies combined may equal 
but not exceed the highest applicable limit 
fcr any one vehicle under any coverage 
fcrm or policy providing coverage on ei-
ther a primary or excess basis. However, 
the maximum recovery for damages sus-
tained by you or any "family member" 
while "occupying" an "auto" you do not 
own under all Coverage Forms or policies 
combined may equal but not exceed the 
sum of: 
(1} The limit of liability for Uninsured Mo-
torists Coverage applicable to the 
'auto" you or any "family member" 
were "occupying" at the time of the 
"accident"; and 
(2) The highest applicable limit of liability 
for Uninsured Motorists Coverage un-
der any Coverage Form or policy that 
provides coverage for you or any 
"family member". 
b. Any insurance we provide with respect to 
a vehicle you do not own shall be excess 
over any other collectible uninsured mo-
torists insurance providing coverage on a 
primary basis. 
c. If the coverage under this coverage form 
is provided: 
(1) On a primary basis, we will pay only 
our share of the loss that must be paid 
under insurance providing coverage on 
a primary basis. Our share is the pro-
portion that our limit of liability bears 
to the total of all applicable limits of li-
ability for coverage on a primary basis. 
/2> On an excess basis, we w)U pay on\y 
our share of the loss that must be paid 
under insurance providing coverage on 
an excess basis. Our share is the 
proportion that our limit of liability 
bears to the total of all applicable lim-
its of liability for coverage on an ex-
cess basis. 
2. DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENT, CLAIM, 
SUIT OR LOSS is changed by adding the fol-
lowing: 
a. Promptly notify the police if a hit-and-run 
driver is involved, and 
b. Promptly send us copies of the legal pa-
pers if a "suit" is brought. 
3. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY 
AGAINST OTHERS TO US is changed by add-
ing the following: 
a. We shall be entitled to a recovery only af-
ter the "insured" has been fully compen-
sated for damapes, 
b. If we make any payment and the "insured" 
recovers from another party, the "insured" 
shall hold the proceeds in trust for us and 
pay us back the amount we have paid. 
4. The following Condition is added. However, 
this Condition does not apply if a small claims 
court having jurisdiction resolves the matter 
or matters upon which we and an "insured" 
do n^t agree. 
ARBITRATION 
a. If we and an "insured" disagree whether 
the "insured" is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the owner or driver of an 
"Uninsured motor vehicle" or do not agree 
afc to the amount of damages that are re-
coverable by that "insured", then the mat-
ter may be arbitrated. However, disputes 
concerning coverage under this endorse-
ment may not be arbitrated. Either party 
may make a written demand for arbi-
fr&tfon. (n this event, eacrt party wYtf setect 
ah arbitrator. The two arbitrators will se-
lect a third. If they cannot agree within 30 
d<ays, either may request that selection be 
made by a judge of a court having juris-
diction. Each party will pay the expenses 
it incurs and bear the expenses of the 
third arbitrator equally. 
b. Unless both parties agree otherwise, ar-
bitration will take place in the county in 
which the "insured" lives. Local rules of 
law as to arbitration procedure and evi-
dence will apply. A decision agreed to by 
two of the arbitrators will be binding. 
F. ADD)T)DHAL DEFIN)T)DNS 
As used in this endorsement: 
1- "Family member" means a person related to 
you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a 
resident of your household, including a ward 
or foster child. 
2. "Occupying" means in, upon, getting in, on, 
out or off. 
3. "Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land mo-
tor vehicle or trailer: 
a. For which no liability bond or policy at the 
time of an "accident" provides at least 
$65,000 for each "accident", which is the 
minimum combined single limit of liability 
specified by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 
31A-22-304. 
b. For which an insuring or bonding company 
denies coverage or is or becomes insol-
vent; or 
c. That is a hit-and-run vehicle whose oper-
ator or owner cannot be identified and that 
hits or causes an "accident" resulting in 
"bodily injury" without hitting: 
(1) You or any "family member"; 
(2) A vehicle that you or any "family 
member" are "occupying"; or 
(3) Your covered "auto". 
If there is no physical contact with the hit-
and-run vehicle the facts of the "accident" 
must be proved. We will only accept clear 
and convincing evidence, which must consist 
of more than the "insured's" testimony. 
However, "uninsured motor vehicle" does not 
include any vehicle: 
a. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under 
any applicable motor vehicle law, other 
than Utah motor vehicle law, except a 
self-insurer who is or becomes insolvent 
and cannot provide the amounts required 
by that motor vehicle law; 
b. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under 
Utah motor vehicle law, except a self-
insurer who is or becomes insolvent and 
cannot provide the applicable minimum 
limit for "bodily injury" liability specified 
by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 31A-22-304. 
The applicable minimum limit is: 
(1) $65,000 for each "accident", if the limit 
of liability is a single limit that applies 
for each "accident"; or 
(2) $25,000 for each person/$50,000 for 
each "accident" if the limit of liability is 
indicated as a split limit; 
c. Owned by a governmental unit or agency; 
or 
d. Designed for use mainly off public roads 
while not on public roads. 
e. For which a bodily injury liability bond or 
policy applies at the time of the 'accident* 
but the amount paid for "bodily injury" 
under that bond or policy to an "insured* 
is not enough to pay the full amount the 
"insured" is legally entitled to recover as 
damages caused by the "accident". 
POLICY NUMBER: 0 6 5 9 0 - 1 3 - 3 9 COMMERCIAL AUTO 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
UTAH UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
For a covered "auto" licensed or principally garaged in, or 'garage operations" conducted in, Utah, this 
endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM 
GARAGE COVERAGE FORM 
MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE FORM 
TRUCKERS COVERAGE FORM 
With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of the Coverage Form apply unless 
modified by the endorsement. 
This endorsement changes the policy effective on the inception date of the policy unless another date is in-
dicated below. 
! Endorsement effective 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 7 
Named Insured 
CLIMATE SOURCE 8c POLLARD 
Countersigned by 
(Authorized Representative) 
LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
SCHEDULE 
Each "Accident" 
(If no entry appears above, information required to complete this endorsement will be shown in the Declara-
tions as applicable to this endorsement.) 
A. COVERAGE 
1. We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally 
entitled to recover as compensatory damages 
from the owner or driver of an "underinsured 
motor vehicle". The damages must result 
from "bodily injury" sustained by the 'In-
sured" caused by an "accident". The owner's 
or driver's liability for these damages must 
result from the ownership, maintenance or 
use of the "underinsured motor vehicle". 
2. We will pay under this coverage only if a. or 
b. below applies: 
a. The limits of any applicable liability bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by judg-
ments or payments; or 
b. A tentative settlement has been made be-
tween an "insured" and the insurer of the 
"underinsured motor vehicle"; and we 
(1) Have been given prompt written notice 
of such tentative settlement; and 
(2) Advance payment to the "insured" in 
an amount equal to the tentative 
settlement within 30 days after receipt 
of notification. 
3. Any judgment for damages arising out of a 
"suit" brought without our written consent is 
not binding on us. 
B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
1. You. 
2. If you are an individual, any "family member". 
3. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or 
a temporary substitute for a covered "auto". 
The covered "auto" must be out of service 
because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, 
"loss" or destruction. 
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to 
recover because of "bodily injury" sustained 
by another "insured". 
C. EXCLUSIONS E. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS 
This insurance does not apply to any of the fol-
lowing: 
1. Any claim settled without our consent. 
2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer 
or self-insurer under any workers' compen-
sation, disability benefits or similar law. 
3. "Bodily injury" sustained by: 
a. You while "occupying" or when struck by 
any vehicle owned by you that is not a 
covered "auto" for Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage under this Coverage Form; 
b. Any "family member" while "occupying" 
or when struck by any vehicle owned by 
that "family member" that is not a covered 
"auto" for Underinsured Motorists Cover-
age under this Coverage Form; or 
c. Any "family member" while "occupying" 
or when struck by any vehicle owned by 
you that is insured for Underinsured Mo-
torists Coverage on a primary basis under 
any other Coverage Form or policy. 
4. Anyone using a vehicle without a reasonable 
belief that the person is entitled to do so. 
5. Punitive or exemplary damages. 
D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
1. Regardless of the number of covered "autos", 
"insureds", premiums paid, claims made or 
vehicles involved in the "accident", the most 
we will pay for all damages resulting from 
any one "accident" is the LIMIT OF INSUR-
ANCE for UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COV-
ERAGE shown in the Schedule or 
Declarations. 
2. No one will be entitled to receive duplicate 
payments for the same elements of "loss" 
under this Coverage Form and any Liability 
Coverage Form, Medical Payments Coverage 
endorsement or Uninsured Motorists Cover-
age endorsement attached to this Coverage 
Part. 
We will not make a duplicate payment under 
this Coverage for any element of "loss" for 
which payment has been made by or for 
anyone who is legally responsible. 
We will not pay for any element of "loss" if a 
person is entitled to receive payment for the 
same element of "loss" under any workers' 
compensation, disability benefits or similar 
law. 
The CONDITIONS are changed for 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE as fol-
lows: 
1. OTHER INSURANCE in the Business Auto and 
Garage Coverage Forms and OTHER INSUR-
ANCE - PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE 
PROVISIONS in the Truckers and Motor Car-
rier Coverage Forms is replaced by: 
a. With respect to coverage we provide when 
a covered "auto" you own is involved in 
an "accident", the LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
for UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVER-
AGE applicable to that "auto" will apply for 
damages for which the owner or operator 
of the "underinsured motor vehicle" is le-
gally responsible. 
b. If there is other applicable insurance 
available under one or more policies or 
provisions of coverage: 
(1) The maximum recovery under all Cov-
erage Forms or policies combined may 
equal but not exceed the highest ap-
plicable limit for any one vehicle under 
any Coverage Form or policy providing 
coverage on either a primary or excess 
basis. However, the maximum recov-
ery for damages sustained by you or 
any "family member" while "occupy-
ing" an "auto" you do not own under 
all Coverage Forms or policies com-
bined may equal but not exceed the 
sum of: 
(a) The limit of liability for 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage 
applicable to the "auto" you or any 
"family member" were "occupying" 
at the time of the "accident"; and 
(b) The highest applicable limit of li-
ability for Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage under any Coverage 
Form or policy that provides cover-
age for you or any "family mem-
ber". 
(2) Any insurance we provide with respect 
to a vehicle you do not own shall be 
excess over any other collectible 
underinsured motorists insurance pro-
viding coverage on a primary basis. 
POLICY NUMBER: 0 6 5 9 0 - 1 3 - 3 9 COMMERCIAL AUTO 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
UTAH UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
For a covered "auto" licensed or principally garaged in, or "garage operations" conducted in, Utah, this 
endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM 
GARAGE COVERAGE FORM 
MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE FORM 
TRUCKERS COVERAGE FORM 
With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of the Coverage Form apply unless 
modified by the endorsement. 
This endorsement changes the policy effective on the inception date of the policy unless another date is in-
dicated below. 
Endorsement effective 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 7 
Named Insured 
CLIMATE SOURCE & POLLARD 
Countersigned by I 
(Authorized Representative) 
LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
SCHEDULE 
Each "Accident" 
(If no entry appears above, information required to complete this endorsement will be shown in the Declara-
tions as applicable to this endorsement.) 
A. COVERAGE 
We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally 
entitled to recover as compensatory damages 
from the owner or driver of an "underinsured 
motor vehicle". The damages must result 
from "bodily injury" sustained by the "in-
sured" caused by an "accident". The owner's 
or driver's liability for these damages must 
result from the ownership, maintenance or 
use of the "underinsured motor vehicle". 
We will pay under this coverage only if a. or 
b. below applies: 
a. The limits of any applicable liability bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by judg-
ments or payments; or 
b. A tentative settlement has been made be-
tween an "insured" and the insurer of the 
"underinsured motor vehicle"; and we 
(1) Have been given prompt written notice 
of such tentative settlement; and 
(2) Advance payment to the "insured" in 
an amount equal to the tentative 
settlement within 30 days after receipt 
of notification. 
3. Any judgment for damages arising out of a 
"suit" brought without our written consent is 
not binding on us. 
B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
1. You. 
2. If you are an individual, any "family member". 
3. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or 
a temporary substitute for a covered "auto". 
The covered "auto" must be out of service 
because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, 
"loss" or destruction. 
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to 
recover because of "bodily injury" sustained 
by another "insured". 
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C. EXCLUSIONS E. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS 
This insurance does not apply to any of the fol-
lowing: 
1. Any claim settled without our consent. 
2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer 
or self-insurer under any workers' compen-
sation, disability benefits or similar law. 
3. "Bodily injury" sustained by: 
a. You while "occupying" or when struck by 
any vehicle owned by you that is not a 
covered "auto" for Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage under this Coverage Form; 
b. Any "family member" while "occupying" 
or when struck by any vehicle owned by 
that "family member" that is not a covered 
"auto" for Underinsured Motorists Cover-
age under this Coverage Form; or 
c. Any "family member" while "occupying" 
or when struck by any vehicle owned by 
you that is insured for Underinsured Mo-
torists Coverage on a primary basis under 
any other Coverage Form or policy. 
4. Anyone using a vehicle without a reasonable 
belief that the person is entitled to do so. 
5. Punitive or exemplary damages. 
D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
1. Regardless of the number of covered "autos", 
"insureds", premiums paid, claims made or 
vehicles involved in the "accident", the most 
we will pay for all damages resulting from 
any one "accident" is the LIMIT OF INSUR-
ANCE for UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COV-
ERAGE shown in the Schedule or 
Declarations. 
2. No one will be entitled to receive duplicate 
payments for the same elements of "Joss" 
under this Coverage Form and any Liability 
Coverage Form, Medical Payments Coverage 
endorsement or Uninsured Motorists Cover-
age endorsement attached to this Coverage 
Part. 
We will not make a duplicate payment under 
this Coverage for any element of "loss" for 
which payment has been made by or for 
anyone who is legally responsible. 
We will not pay for any element of "loss" if a 
person is entitled to receive payment for the 
same element of "loss" under any workers' 
compensation, disability benefits or similar 
law. 
The CONDITIONS are changed for 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE as fol-
lows: 
1. OTHER INSURANCE in the Business Auto and 
Garage Coverage Forms and OTHER INSUR-
ANCE - PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE 
PROVISIONS in the Truckers and Motor Car-
rier Coverage Forms is replaced by: 
a. With respect to coverage we provide when 
a covered "auto" you own is involved in 
an "accident", the LIMIT OF INSURANCE 
for UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVER-
AGE applicable to that "auto" will apply for 
damages for which the owner or operator 
of the "underinsured motor vehicle" is le-
gally responsible. 
b. If there is other applicable insurance 
available under one or more policies or 
provisions of coverage: 
(1) The maximum recovery under all Cov-
erage Forms or policies combined may 
equal but not exceed the highest ap-
plicable limit for any one vehicle under 
any Coverage Form or policy providing 
coverage on either a primary or excess 
basis. However, the maximum recov-
ery for damages sustained by you or 
any "family member" while "occupy-
ing" an "auto" you do not own under 
all Coverage Forms or policies com-
bined may equal but not exceed the 
sum of: 
(a) The limit of liability for 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage 
applicable to the "auto" you or any 
"family member" were "occupying" 
at the time of the "accident"; and 
(b) The highest applicable limit of li-
ability for Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage under any Coverage 
Form or policy that provides cover-
age for you or any "family mem-
ber". 
(2) Any insurance we provide with respect 
to a vehicle you do not own shall be 
excess over any other collectible 
underinsured motorists insurance pro-
viding coverage on a primary basis. 
(3) If the coverage under this Coverage 
Form is provided: 
(a) On a primary basis, we will pay 
only our share of the loss that must 
be paid under insurance providing 
coverage on a primary basis. Our 
share is the proportion that our limit 
of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits of liability for cov-
erage on a primary basis. 
(b) On an excess basis, we will pay 
only our share of the loss that must 
be paid under insurance providing 
coverage on an excess basis. Our 
share is the proportion that our limit 
of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits of liability for cov-
erage on an excess basis. 
2. DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENT, CLAIM, 
SUIT OR LOSS is changed by adding the fol-
lowing: 
A person seeking Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage must also promptly notify us in 
writing of a tentative settlement between the 
"insured" and the insurer of the 
"underinsured motor vehicle" and allow us 30 
days to advance payment to that "insured" in 
an amount equal to the tentative settlement 
to preserve our rights against the insurer, 
owner or operator of such "underinsured 
motor vehicle". 
3. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY 
AGAINST OTHERS TO US is changed by add-
ing the following: 
Our rights do not apply under this provision 
with respect to Underinsured Motorists Cov-
erage if we: 
a. Have been given prompt written notice of 
a tentative settlement between an "in-
sured" and the insurer of an 
"underinsured motor vehicle"; and 
b. Fail to advance payment to the "insured" 
in an amount equal to the tentative settle-
ment within 30 days after receipt of notifi-
cation. 
If we advance payment to the "insured" in an 
amount equal to the tentative settlement 
within 30 days after receipt of notification: 
a. That payment will be separate from any 
amount the "insured" is entitled to recover 
under the provisions of Underinsured Mo-
torists Coverage; and 
b. We also have a right to recover the ad-
vance payment. 
4. The following Condition is added. However, 
this Condition does not apply if a small claims 
court having jurisdiction resolves the matter 
or matters upon which we and an "insured" 
do not agree. 
ARBITRATION 
a. If we and an "insured" disagree whether 
the "insured" is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the owner or driver of an 
"underinsured motor vehicle" or do not 
agree as to the amount of damages that 
are recoverable by that "insured", then the 
matter may be arbitrated. However, dis-
putes concerning coverage under this 
endorsement may not be arbitrated. Either 
party may make a written demand for ar-
bitration. In this event, each party will se-
lect an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will 
select a third. If they cannot agree within 
30 days, either may request that selection 
be made by a judge of a court having ju-
risdiction. Each party will pay the ex-
penses it incurs and bear the expenses of 
the third arbitrator equally. 
b. Unless both parties agree otherwise, ar-
bitration will take place in the county in 
which the "insured" lives. Local rules of 
law as to arbitration procedure and evi-
dence will apply. A decision agreed to by 
two of the arbitrators will be binding. 
F. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
As used in this endorsement: 
1. "Family member" means a person related to 
you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a 
resident of your household, including a ward 
or foster child. 
2. "Occupying" means in, upon, getting in, on, 
out or off. 
3. "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land 
motor vehicle or trailer for which a bodily in-
jury liability bond or policy applies at the time 
of the "accident" but the amount paid for 
"bodily injury" under that bond or policy to an 
"insured" is not enough to pay the full amount 
the "insured" is legally entitled to recover as 
damages caused by the "accident". 
However, "underinsured motor vehicle" does 
not include any vehicle: 
a. Owned by a governmental unit or agency; 
or 
b. Designed for use mainly off public roads 
while not on public roads. 
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c. For which no liability bond or policy at the 
time of the "'accident" provides at least 
$65,000 for each "accident", which is the 
minimum combined single limit for "bodily 
injury" liability specified by UTAH CODE 
ANN. Section 31A-22-304. 
d. For which an insuring or bonding company 
denies coverage or is or becomes insol-
vent; or 
e. That is a hit-and-run vehicle whose oper-
ator or owner cannot be identified and that 
hits or causes an "accident" resulting in 
"bodily injury" without hitting: 
(1) You or any "family member"; 
(2) A vehicle that you or any "family 
member" are "occupying"; or 
(3) Your covered "auto". 
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E0207 
1st Edition 
PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT 
Regardless of any other provision, this policy does not cover punitive or exemplary damages or the cost of defense 
related to such damages. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise subject 
to all other terms of the policy. 
91-0207 1ST EDITION 9-88 
\x\ TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE • FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
• MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY 
4680 WILSHIRE BLVD., LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90010 
LOSS PAYABLE ENDORSEMENT 
1. Named 
Insured 
Mailing 
Address 
CLIMATE SOURCE & POLLARD 
MECHANICAL INC 
4020 SO 210 W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 7 
Effective from 0 7 / 1 4 / 9 7 
to "Continuous until cancelled" 
3 5 6 0 0 3 4 
Prematic Acc't No. 
7 6 - 1 3 - 3 5 R 
Agent 
E1112 
1st Edition 
Qfi5Qn-13 -3Q 
Policy Number 
(not prior to time applied for) 
12:01 a.m. Standard Time 
KIND OF INSURANCE 
AUTOMOBILE PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
Comprehensive Coverage 
Specified Causes of Loss 
Collision Coverage 
ACTUAL 
CASH 
VALUE > 
LESS 
DED. 
ACV LESS DEDUCTIBLE SHOWN BELOW 
ALL UNITS UNIT# 14 
50 
500 
UNIT# UNIT# 
! YEAR TRADE NAME BODY TYPE AND MODEL I.D. NUMBER 
j 97 JEEP CHEROKEE 1J4G278Y0VC631483 
Loss under Automobile Physical Damage coverage is payable as interests may appear to the Named Insured and the 
Lienholder named below in accordance with Loss Payable Endorsement on reverse side. 
Unit # 14 Unit # Unit# 
This policy shall not be cancelled nor reduced in coverage until after 10 days written notice of such cancellation 
or reduction of coverage shall have been mailed to this lienholder. 
MORTGAGEE 
Name: BANK OF AMERICA 
Address: P0 BOX 7400 
PHOENIX 
COUNTERSIGNED 
AZ 85011 
BY 
(Date) (Authorized Representative) 
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LOSS PAYABLE ENDORSEMENT 
It is agreed that any payment for loss or damage to the vehicle described in this policy shall be made on the following 
basis: 
(1) At our option, loss or damage shall be paid as interest may appear to the policyholder and the lienholder 
shown in the Declarations, or by repair of the damaged vehicle. 
(2) Any act or neglect of the policyholder or a person acting on his/her behalf shall not void coverage afforded 
to the lienholder. 
(3) Change in title or ownership of the vehicle, or error in its description, shall not void coverage afforded to 
the lienholder. 
The policy does not cover conversion, embezzlement or secretion of the vehicle by the policyholder or anyone acting 
in his/her behalf while in possession under a contract with the lienholder. 
A payment may be made to the lienholder which we would not have been obligated to make except for the terms of this 
endorsement. In such event, we are entitled to all the rights of the lienholder to the extent of such payment. The 
lienholder shall do whatever is necessary to secure such rights. No subrogation shall impair the right of the lienholder 
to recover the full amount of its claim. 
We reserve the right to cancel this policy at any time as provided by its terms. In case of cancellation or lapse we will 
notify the lienholder at the address shown in the Declarations. We will give the lienholder advance notice of not less 
than 10 days before the effective date of such cancellation or lapse as respects his/her interest. 
This endorsement becomes part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is subject to all 
other terms of the policy. 
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THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
NUCLEAR ENERGY LIABILITY EXCLUSION 
ENDORSEMENT 
(Broad Form) 
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
BUSINESSOWNERS POLICY 
COMMERCIAL AUTO COVERAGE PART 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
FARM COVERAGE PART 
PRODUCTS/COMPLETED OPERATIONS LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
LIQUOR LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
POLLUTION LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
OWNERS AND CONTRACTORS PROTECTIVE LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
RAILROAD PROTECTIVE LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
SPECIAL PROTECTIVE AND HIGHWAY LIABILITY POLICY NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK POLICY 
1. The insurance does not apply: 
A. Under any Liability Coverage, to "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage": 
(1) With respect to which an "insured" under 
the policy is also an insured under a nu-
clear energy liability policy issued by Nu-
clear Energy Liability Insurance 
Association, Mutual Atomic Energy Liabil-
ity Underwriters, Nuclear Insurance Asso-
ciation of Canada or any of their 
successors, or would be an insured under 
any such policy but for its termination 
upon exhaustion of its limit of liability; or 
(2) Resulting from the "hazardous properties" 
of "nuclear material" and with respect to 
which (a) any person or organization is 
required to maintain financial protection 
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
or any law amendatory thereof, or (b) the 
"insured" is, or had this policy not been 
issued would be, entitled to indemnity 
from the United States of America, or any 
agency thereof, under any agreement en-
tered into by the United Stales of America, 
or any agency thereof, with any person or 
organization. 
B. Under any Medical Payments coverage, to 
expenses incurred with respect to "bodily in-
jury" resulting from the "hazardous proper-
ties" of "nuclear material" and arising out of 
the operation of a "nuclear facility" by any 
person or organization. 
C. Under any Liability Coverage, to "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage" resulting from 
"hazardous properties" of "nuclear material", 
if: 
(1) The "nuclear material" (a) is at any "nu-
clear facility" owned by, or operated by or 
on behalf of, an "insured" or (b) has been 
discharged or dispersed therefrom; 
(2) The "nuclear material" is contained in 
"spent fuel" or "waste" at any time pos-
sessed, handled, used, processed, stored, 
transported or disposed of, by or on behalf 
of an "insured"; or 
(3) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
arises out of the furnishing by an "in-
sured" of services, materials, parts or 
equipment in connection with the plan-
ning, construction, maintenance, opera-
tion or use of any "nuclear facility", but if 
such facility is located within the United 
States of America, its territories or pos-
sessions or Canada, this exclusion (3) ap-
plies only to "property damage" to such 
"nuclear facility" and any property thereat. 
As used in this endorsement: 
"Hazardous properties" includes radioactive, 
toxic or explosive properties. 
"Nuclear material" means "source material", 
"Special nuclear material" or "by-product mate-
rial". 
"Source material", "special nuclear material", 
and "by-product material" have the meanings 
given them in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or 
in any law amendatory thereof. 
"Spent fuel" means any fuel element or fuel 
component, solid or liquid, which has been used 
or exposed to radiation in a "nuclear reactor". 
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"Waste" means any waste material (a) contain-
ing "by-product material" other than the tailings 
or wastes produced by the extraction or concen-
tration of uranium or thorium from any ore proc-
essed primarily for its "source material" content, 
and (b) resulting from the operation by any per-
son or organization of any "nuclear facility" in-
cluded under the first two paragraphs of the 
definition of "nuclear facility". 
"Nuclear facility" means: 
(a) Any "nuclear reactor"; 
(b) Any equipment or device designed or used 
for (1) separating the isotopes of uranium or 
Plutonium, (2) processing or utilizing "spent 
fuel", or (3) handling, processing or packag-
ing "waste"; 
(c) Any equipment or device used for the proc-
essing, fabricating or alloying of "special nu-
clear material" if at any time the total amount 
of such material in the custody of the "in-
sured" at the premises where such equip-
ment or device is located consists of or 
contains more than 25 grams of plutonium or 
uranium 233 or any combination thereof, or 
more than 250 grams of uranium 235; 
(d) Any structure, basin, excavation, premises or 
place prepared or used for the storage or 
disposal of "waste"; 
and includes the site on which any of the fore-
going is located, all operations conducted on 
such site and all premises used for such oper-
ations. 
"Nuclear reactor" means any apparatus de-
signed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a 
self-supporting chain reaction or to contain a 
critical mass of fissionable material. 
"Property damage" includes all forms of radio-
active contamination of property. 
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THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
UTAH CHANGES - CANCELLATION 
AND NONRENEWAL 
endorsement modifies Insurance provided under the following: 
BOILER AND MACHINERY COVERAGE PART 
BUSINESSOWNERS POLICY 
COMMERCIAL AUTOMOTIVE COVERAGE PART 
COMMERCIAL CRIME COVERAGE PART 
COMMERCIAL INLAND MARINE COVERAGE PART 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY COVERAGE PART 
FARM COVERAGE PART 
LIQUOR LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
POLLUTION LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
PRODUCTS/COMPLETED OPERATIONS COVERAGE PART 
A. The following is added to the CANCELLATION 
Common Policy Condition: 
7. If this policy has been in effect for more than 
60 days or if this is a renewal of a policy we 
issued, we may cancel this policy only for one 
or more of the following reasons: 
(1) Nonpayment of premium; 
(2) Material misrepresentation: 
(3) Substantial change in the risk assumed 
unless we should reasonably have fore-
seen the change or contemplated the risk 
when entering the contract; or 
(4) Substantial breaches of contractual du-
ties, conditions or warranties. 
If we cancel for nonpayment of premium, no-
tice of cancellation must state the reason for 
cancellation. 
8. Notice of cancellation must be delivered or 
mailed by first class mail. 
B. The following is added and supersedes any pro-
visions to the contrary: 
NONRENEWAL 
1. If we elect to not renew this policy, we will 
mail, by first class mail, written notice of 
nonrenewal to the first Named Insured, at the 
last mailing address known to us, at least 30 
days before the expiration or anniversary 
date of this policy. 
2. We need not mail this notice if: 
a. You have accepted replacement cover-
age; 
b. You have requested or agreed to 
nonrenewal; or 
c. This policy is expressly designated as 
nonrenewable. 
3. If notice is mailed, proof of mailing is suffi-
cient proof of notice. 
IL 02 66 02 87 Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1986 • 
Copyright, ISO Commercial Risk Services, Inc., 1986 
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l^Colleen HANSEN, Executrix (ESTATE 
of Richard P. HANSEN), et al. 
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
No. 15535. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Argued Nov. 5, 1996. 
Decided Dec. 31, 1996. 
2. Insurance <S=>146.7(1) 
If insurer uses language that is ambf 
ous, any uncertainty caused by that ambi~ 
ty will be resolved against insurer. 
3. Insurance <®=*467.51(3) 
Uninsured motorist (UM) endorsem 
of garage insurance policy issued to clo 
held corporation should not have contain 
in definition of "insured," language orien 
toward individuals and family members, sin 
named insured was corporation. 
Named insured's shareholder brought 
action against garage insurer to vacate arbi-
tration award and recover underinsured mo-
torist (UIM) benefits as individual and execu-
trix of estate of fellow shareholder. The 
Superior Court, Judicial District of New Ha-
ven, Frank S. Meadow, judge trial referee, 
vacated decision. Insurer appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Berdon, J., held that share-
holders were insureds entitled to UIM bene-
fits. 
Affirmed. 
1538Daniel P. Scapellati, with whom, on 
brief, was John W. Lemega, Hartford, 
appellant (defendant). 
Susan M. Cormier, Hartford, with who 
were Louise R. Zito, New Haven, Kenneth' 
Bartschi and, on the brief, Wesley W. Hot 
ton, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff). 
Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOi 
PALMER and McDONALD, JJ. 
1. Insurance <®=>467.51(3) 
Shareholders and employees of closely 
held corporation were "insureds" entitled to 
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under 
uninsured motorist (UM) endorsement of ga-
rage insurance policy issued to corporation; 
definition of "insured" as "you" or "any fami-
ly member," if named insured is individual, 
was ambiguous and had to be construed 
against insurer, and designation of "you" as 
insured was nonsensical since corporation 
could not be compensated for bodily injury, 
and individual-oriented language combined 
with family-oriented language injected confu-
sion and uncertainty. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
1. See footnote 3. 
2. Because of the resolution of this appeal, we 
need not address the plaintiffs additional argu-
ment that the arbitrators improperly failed to 
allow evidence to be admitted regarding the cir-
BERDON, Associate Justice. 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether 
under the facts of this case, the estate of the 
decedent, Richard P. Hansen,1 is entitled to 
underinsured motorist benefits, as a covere 
insured, pursuant to a garage insurance po1' 
cy (policy) issued by the defendant insurer 
to a closely held corporation owned and op-
erated by the decedent and his wife.2 The 
plaintiff, Colleen Hansen, as executrix of th 
estate of her deceased husband, and in her 
individual capacity,3 sought to recover 
derinsured motorist benefits as a result 
the death of her husband under the poli 
issued by the defendant, Ohio Casualty In-
surance Company, to West WTiarf Garag~ 
Inc., the corporation owned by the plain" 
and the decedent. In accordance with th 
cumstances surrounding the purchase of the pol 
icy and of the plaintiff's expectations. 
3. The plaintiff's claim, in her individual capaci 
for bystander emotional distress; see Clohessy. 
Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 675 A.2d 852 (1996); * 
HANSEN v. OHIO CAS. INS. CO. 
Cite as 687 A.2d 1262 (Conn. 1996) 
Conn. 1263 
-rms of the pohcy, the parties submitted to 
arbitration. They agreed to have the arbi-
trators first determine the threshold issue of 
Average. A majority of the panel of three 
arbitrators determined that the plaintiffs 
'ecedent was not j .^covered under the un-
"erinsured motorist endorsement to the poli-
Upon application of the plaintiff,4 the trial 
court concluded that there was coverage and 
vacated5 the arbitration panel's decision. 
"ie trial court relied heavily on the reason-
--g of our previous decision in Ceci v. Na-
tional Indemnity Co., 225 Conn. 165, 622 
2d 545 (1993). In short, the trial court 
Concluded that "any reference to family 
lembers in a business pohcy issued to a 
-orporation is ambiguous in light of the Ceci 
^decision...." The defendant appealed from 
•the judgment of the trial court to the Appel-
ate Court, and we transferred the appeal to 
this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 
Sand General Statutes § 51-199(c). We now 
a^ffirm the judgment of the trial court. 
The undisputed facts are as follows. The 
.plaintiff and the decedent were the sole 
shareholders of West Wharf Garage, Inc., a 
jcjosely held corporation (corporation). The 
^corporation was an automobile repair busi-
ness operated by the plaintiff and the dece-
1
 dent. The decedent was the president and 
fele paid employee of the corporation, work-
ing as a mechanic and the manager of the 
"'Sr ' 
based on § B.4 of the uninsured motorist en-
it dorsement of the policy, which provides that an 
^'insured includes "[a]nyone for damages he or 
4ishe is entitled to recover because of 'bodily inju-
ivcry' sustained by another 'insured.' " Apparently, 
the plaintiff brought this claim under the theory 
''that if her decedent fell within the coverage 
Q under die uninsured motorist endorsement as an 
; insured, then she could also pursue her deriva-
tive claim. The arbitration panel and the trial 
:court addressed the two claims together, with no 
^separate analysis of the plaintiff's derivative 
claim. We do likewise. 
fl> 
.'•& • The plaintiff's application was made both in 
•^ her individual capacity and as executrix of the 
" estate of the decedent. 
,.! 
5. General Statutes § 52—418 provides in perti-
nent part: "Vacating award, (a) Upon the appli-
» cation of any party to an arbitration, the superior 
garage. The plaintiff was the secretary and 
treaj5urer54Q of the corporation, and she also 
worked, without salary, as the corporation's 
bookkeeper. The plaintiff also participated 
in the management of the daily affairs of the 
corporation. The defendant issued to the 
corporation a business automobile insurance 
policy, otherwise known as a garage pohcy, 
to cover its automobile repair business. The 
pohcy covered two wreckers owned by the 
corporation and three vehicle registration re-
pair plates. The policy also contained an 
uninsured/underinsured motorist endorse-
ment (uninsured motorist endorsement). On 
February 27, 1993, the decedent, while vaca-
tioning in Vermont with the plaintiff, was 
killed while riding a snowmobile that collided 
with an underinsured motor vehicle. The 
decedent and the plaintiff had traveled on 
their vacation to Vermont in a vehicle utiliz-
ing one of the repair plates. Following the 
accident, the estate of the decedent recov-
ered the pohcy limits of the tortfeasor's mo-
tor vehicle insurance, thereby satisfying the 
exhaustion of liability coverage requirements. 
See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 
221 Conn. 206, 603 A.2d 385 (1992). Subse-
quently, through the arbitration proceeding, 
the plaintiff, individually and in her capacity 
as executrix of the decedent's estate, sought 
underinsured motorist benefits from the de-
fendant. 
[1] The pohcy issued to the corporation 
by the defendant provided in pertinent part: 
"GARAGE COVERAGE FORM.. . . 
"Throughout this policy the words 'y°u ' 
and 'your' refer to the Named Insured shown 
in the Declarations.... 
court for the judicial district in which one of the 
parties resides or, in a controversy concerning 
land, for the judicial district in which the land is 
situated or, when the court is not in session, any 
judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the 
award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) 
If the award has been procured by corruption, 
fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been 
evident partiality or corruption on the part of any 
arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty 
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy or of any other action by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) 
if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or 
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final 
and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made " 
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"SECTION VI—DEFINITIONS.. . . 
"C. 'Bodily injury means bodily injury, 
sickness or disease sustained by a person 
including death resulting from any of 
t h e s e . . . . " 
The uninsured motorists endorsement of 
the policy provided in pertinent part: 
^ " C O N N E C T I C U T UNINSURED MO-
TORISTS COVERAGE... . 
"For a covered 'auto' licensed or principal-
ly garaged, or 'garage operations' conducted 
in, Connecticut, this endorsement modifies 
insurance provided under the following.... 
"GARAGE COVERAGE FORM.... 
"A. COVERAGE 
" 1 . We will pay all sums the 'insured' is 
legally entitled to recover as compensatory 
damages from the owner or driver of an 
'uninsured motor vehicle.' The damages 
must result from 'bodily injury* sustained by 
the 'insured1 caused by an 'accident' ... 
"B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
"1 . You 
"2. If you are an individual, any family 
member.' 
"3. Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 
'auto' or a temporary substitute for a covered 
'auto.' The covered 'auto' must be out of 
service because of its breakdown, repair, ser-
vicing, loss or destruction. 
"4. Anyone for damages he or she is enti-
tled to recover because of 'bodily injury* sus-
tained by another 'insured.' 
"C. EXCLUSIONS 
"This insurance does not apply to any of 
the following . . . 
"3. 'Bodily injury' sustained by you or 
any family member' while 'occupying' or 
struck as a pedestrian by an 'uninsured mo-
tor vehicle' that you own 
"F. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS. . . . 
1542**1- 'Family member' means a person 
related to you by blood, marriage or adop-
tion who is a resident of your household, 
including a ward or foster child. 
"2. 'Occupying' means in, upon, getting 
in, on, out or off " (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the named insured in the 
declarations of the basic policy was the cor-
poration. Therefore, the plaintiffs decedent 
technically did not fall within § B.l of the 
uninsured motorist endorsement referring to 
"You," if read solely in relation to who is the 
named insured in the basic policy. See Te-
stone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 126, 129-
30, 328 A.2d 686 (1973). It is undisputed 
that the plaintiffs decedent did not fall with-
in the provisions of § B.3 of the uninsured 
motorist endorsement as a designated in-
sured because he was not "occupying," as 
that term is defined in § F.2 of the policy, a 
covered auto at the time of his fatal accident. 
The plaintiff essentially argues that the indi-
vidual oriented and family oriented language 
throughout the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, and elsewhere in the policy, renders 
the policy ambiguous and creates uncertainty 
about who constitutes the "You" covered as 
an insured under the uninsured motorist en-
dorsement. Therefore, the plaintiff argues 
that because the policy is ambiguous, it 
should be construed against the insurer and 
in favor of coverage for the plaintiffs dece-
dent. We agree. 
"An insurance policy is to be interpreted 
by the same general rules that govern the 
construction of any written contract and en-
forced in accordance with the real intent of 
the parties as expressed in the language 
employed in the policy. Schultz v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 696, 702, 569 A.2d 
1131 (1990). The policy words must be ac-
corded their natural and ordinary meaning. 
Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 35, 610 
A.2d 1296 (1992). Under well established 
rules of construction, 1543any ambiguity in the 
terms of an insurance policy must be con-
strued in favor of the insured because the 
insurance company drafted the policy. Stre-
itweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 
219 Conn. 371, 375, 593 A.2d 498 (1991). 
This rule of construction may not be applied, 
HANSEN v. OHIO CAS. INS. CO. 
Cite as 687 A.2d 1262 (Conn. 1996) 
Conn. 1265 
however, unless the policy terms are indeed 
ambiguous. Kelly v. Figueiredo, supra, [at] 
37[, 610 A.2d 1296]. Moreover, the mere fact 
that the parties advance different interpreta-
tions of the language in question does not 
necessitate a conclusion that the language is 
ambiguous. Id." (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.) Stephan v. Pennsylvania General 
Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 758, 763-64, 621 A.2d 258 
(1993). "[C]onstruction of a contract of in-
surance presents a question of law for the 
court which this court reviews de novo." 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Bulaong, 218 
Conn. 51, 58, 588 A.2d 138 (1991). 
We view this case as a sequel to Ceci v. 
National Indemnity Co., supra, 225 Conn, at 
173, 622 A.2d 545, in which we considered 
the effect of a "family member" clause in an 
uninsured motorist endorsement issued to a 
corporation on the coverage for the plaintiff, 
where the plaintiff could not be a family 
member of the corporation. Although the 
issue in this case does not solely revolve 
around family member language, we believe 
that the starting point here is that "[be-
cause corporations do not have families, 
uninsured motorist endorsements containing 
family member language should not be ap-
pended to business automobile liability insur-
ance policies. If they are, then, in keeping 
with the consumer oriented spirit of the 
rules of insurance policy construction, the 
claimed ambiguity should be construed from 
the standpoint of the reasonable layperson in 
the position of the insured and not according 
to the interpretation of trained underwrit-
ers." Id., at 174-75, 622 A.2d 545. We 
believe that the same approach is warranted 
for language oriented toward individuals. 
IfvuAs we indicated in Ceci "[i]t is a basic 
principle of insurance law that policy lan-
guage will be construed as laymen would 
understand it and not according to the inter-
pretation of sophisticated underwriters, and 
that ambiguities in contract documents are 
resolved against the party responsible for its 
drafting; the policyholder's expectations 
should be protected as long as they are ob-
jectively reasonable from the layman's point 
of v iew. . . . The premise behind the rule is 
simple. The party who actually does the 
writing of an instrument will presumably be 
guided by his own interests and goals in the 
transaction. He may choose shadings of ex-
pression, words more specific or more impre-
cise, according to the dictates of these inter-
ests A further, related rationale for the 
rule is that [s]ince one who speaks or writes, 
can by exactness of expression more easily 
prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with 
whom he is dealing, doubts arising from am-
biguity are resolved in favor of the latter." 
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks 
omitted.) Id., at 173-74, 622 A.2d 545; see 
also B. Ostrager & T. Newman, Insurance 
Coverage Disputes (8th Ed.1995) 
§ 1.03[b][l], p. 13 ("[t]he insurer 'has the 
responsibility of making its intention clearly 
known'"). "In general, courts will protect 
the reasonable expectations of applicants, in-
sureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding 
the coverage afforded by insurance con-
tracts " R. Keeton & A. Widiss, Insur-
ance Law (1988) § 6.3(a)(3), p. 633. "[E]ven 
though not often expressed, there has always 
been an implicit understanding that ambigui-
ties, which in most cases might be resolved in 
more than just one or the other of two ways, 
would be resolved favorably to the insured's 
claim only if a reasonable person in his posi-
tion would have expected coverage." R. 
Keeton, Insurance Law (1971) § 6.3(a), p. 
352. 
This rule of insurance construction dictat-
ing that ambiguities be resolved in favor of 
the insured is sorne|times545 referred to as the 
contra-insurer rule. See B. Ostrager & T. 
Newman, supra, § 1.03[b][l], pp. 13-14. 
"[T]he contra-insurer rule is based upon the 
doctrine of contra proferentem, which literal-
ly means 'against the offeror' or drafter of 
the language. See generally Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981). . . . " B. 
Ostrager & T. Newman, supra, p. 14; see 
also Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.), cert, 
denied, 331 U.S. 849, 67 S.Ct. 1736, 91 L.Ed. 
1858 (1947) (in Connecticut, as elsewhere, 
"the canon contra proferentem is more rigor-
ously applied in insurance than in other con-
tracts"). 
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In the present case, it is obvious that the 
defendant utilized an endorsement that was 
designed to cover individuals as well as cor-
porations. "Such endorsements are worded 
in terms of 'family member,' 'spouses' and 
'relatives,' which language may have little 
applicability in the business auto policy con-
text, wherein the named insured is often a 
corporate business entity." J. Berk & M. 
Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage (1993) 
§ 2.10, pp. 97-98. 
Here, in § B.l, under the caption "WHO 
IS AN INSURED," the defendant provided 
that "You" are an insured. In addition, the 
defendant also provided in § B.2, under the 
caption "WHO IS AN INSURED," that "[i]f 
you are an individual, any 'family member.'" 
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs de-
cedent did not fall within those two types of 
insureds because the policy clearly and un-
ambiguously provided that "You" referred 
only to the corporation and, since it was not 
an individual, the corporation could not have 
family members. We do not agree that the 
policy was clear and unambiguous. 
"When interpreting [an insurance policy], 
we must look at the [policy] as a whole, 
consider all relevant ^po r t i ons together 
and, if possible, give operative effect to every 
provision in order to reach a reasonable over-
all result." O'Brien v. United States Fideli-
ty & Guaranty Co., 235 Conn. 837, 842-43, 
669 A.2d 1221 (1996). Using this approach, 
we find several clauses to be ambiguous and, 
therefore, potentially misleading and confus-
ing. First, the designation of "You" as the 
insured in § B.l of the uninsured motorist 
endorsement is nonsensical because a corpo-
ration cannot be compensated for "bodily 
injury," which is the subject matter of the 
coverage. Laypersons reading the coverage 
in relationship to the bodily injury coverage 
could have concluded that the "You" in the 
policy was referring to the shareholders of 
this small family owned and operated corpo-
ration. This is further highlighted by § C.3 
of the endorsement, the "EXCLUSIONS" 
section, which provides that "[t]his insurance 
does not apply to any of the following . . . 
'[bjodily injury' sustained by you or any 
'family member' while 'occupying* or struck 
as a pedestrian by an 'uninsured motor vehi-
cle' that you own." (Emphasis added.) In 
addition, § F.l of the endorsement specifical-
ly provides that " '[fjamily member' means a 
person related to you by blood, marriage or 
adoption who is a resident of your household, 
including a ward or foster child." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The uninsured motorist coverage under 
both §§ B.l and B.2 are inapposite to the 
situation in which a corporation is issued an 
uninsured motorist endorsement, but, rather, 
are consistent with one seeking coverage for 
shareholders of a family corporation. Al-
though "many insurers have revised both the 
format and the wording of insurance policies 
with a view to making them significantly 
more understandable to the consumer"; R. 
Keeton & A. Widiss, supra, § 6.3(a)(4), p. 
634; leaving a layperson to sort out the 
ambiguities and misleading inconsistencies in 
the present policy "is precisely the problem 
that the rules of insurance policy construc-
tion 1547were designed to avoid. See General 
Statutes §§ 38a-297 through 38a-299 (insur-
ance coverage shall be 'readily understanda-
ble')." Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., su-
pra, 225 Conn, at 175, 622 A.2d 545. As a 
matter of law, we hold that the interplay 
between the provisions in the uninsured mo-
torist endorsement created a situation too 
misleading to be anything other than ambig-
uous. 
"[I]n some of the coverage disputes in-
volving underinsured motorist insurance, 
claims have been sustained for individuals 
on the rationale that when an insurance 
company elects to use 'family-oriented lan-
guage' in insurance policies issued to part-
nerships and corporations, such coverage 
terms are reasonably susceptible of more 
than one interpretation and, therefore, they 
will be construed strictly against the insurer 
and liberally in favor of the insured." (In-
ternal quotation marks omitted.) 3 A. Wid-
iss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Insurance (2d Ed.1995) § 33.3, p. 69. "In 
effect, when a corporate or governmental 
AGOSTO v. AETNA 
Cite as 687 A.2d 
entity is identified as the named insured in 
an insurance policy that uses coverage terms 
appropriate for coverage issued to individu-
als, courts chastise insurers for employing 
those forms rather than using coverage 
terms that are appropriate for insurance 
policies issued to various types of businesses 
or governmental entities." (Emphasis add-
ed.) Id., p. 70. We adhere to this reason-
ing. 
Furthermore, if we read the "[i]f you are 
an individual" language in § B.2 as being 
unambiguous, as the defendant would have 
us do, then the provision 'You" in § B.l 
would be superfluous. This construction, 
however, would conflict with the canon of 
construction of insurance policies that "a poli-
cy should not be interpreted so as to render 
any part of it superfluous." Ceci v. National 
Indemnity Co., supra, 225 Conn, at 176, 622 
A.2d 545 (Borden, J., concurring). As noted 
in Ceci "we have consistently stated that [i]f 
it is reasonably possible to do so, every provi-
sion of an insurance policy must be given 
operative ^effect ; Kelly v. Figueiredo, [su-
pra, 223 Conn, at 36, 610 A.2d 1296] . . . 
because parties ordinarily do not insert 
meaningless provisions in their agreements. 
Connecticut Co. v. Division 1>25, 147 Conn. 
608, 617, 164 A.2d 413 (1960); AM. Larson 
Co. v. Lawlor Ins. Agency, Inc., 153 Conn. 
618, 622, 220 A.2d 32 (1966)." (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ceci 
v. National Indemnity Co., supra, at 175-76, 
622 A.2d 545. "[E]ach and every sentence, 
clause, and word of a contract of insurance 
should be given operative effect. Since it 
must be assumed that each word contained in 
an insurance policy is intended to serve a 
purpose, every term will be given effect if 
that can be done by any reasonable construc-
tion . . . . A construction of an insurance pol-
icy which entirely neutralizes one provision 
should not be adopted if the contract is sus-
ceptible of another construction which gives 
effect to all of its provisions and is consistent 
with the general intent." 2 L. Russ & T. 
Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3d Ed.1995) c. 
22, § 22.43, pp. 22-90 through 22-93. Be-
cause the policy must be construed against 
CAS. AND SUR. CO. Conn. 1 2 6 7 
1267 (Conn. 1996) 
the defendant, the superfluous provisions 
cannot be read out of the policy. Therefore, 
we must conclude that the two clauses are 
clearly irreconcilable and, therefore, render 
the uninsured motorist endorsement ambigu-
ous. See Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., 
supra, at 176-77, 622 A.2d 545. 
[2, 3] We conclude that the individual ori-
ented language, combined with the family 
oriented language, interspersed throughout 
the uninsured motorist endorsement provid-
ed to the corporation injected confusion and 
uncertainty into the coverage afforded by the 
policy. If an insurer uses language that is 
ambiguous, any uncertainty caused by that 
ambiguity will be resolved against the insur-
er. See Cody v. Remington Electric Shav-
ers, 179 Conn. 494, 497, 427 A.2d 810 (1980). 
Put simply, the defendant should not have 
used an uninsured motorist endorsement 
containing language oriented toward individ-
uals and family membersjs^when the named 
insured was a corporation. The plaintiff, 
individually and as executrix of the dece-
dent's estate, is entitled to coverage under 
the uninsured motorist endorsement. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
In this opinion the other justices con-
curred. 
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Administratrix of estate of state trooper 
brought action to recover underinsured mo-
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In the present case, it is obvious that the 
defendant utilized an endorsement that was 
designed to cover individuals as well as cor-
porations. "Such endorsements are worded 
in terms of 'family member/ 'spouses' and 
'relatives,' which language may have little 
applicability in the business auto policy con-
text, wherein the named insured is often a 
corporate business entity." J. Berk & M. 
Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage (1993) 
§ 2.10, pp. 97-98. 
Here, in § B.l, under the caption "WHO 
IS AN INSURED," the defendant provided 
that "You" are an insured. In addition, the 
defendant also provided in § B.2, under the 
caption "WHO IS AN INSURED," that "[i]f 
you are an individual, any 'family member.'" 
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs de-
cedent did not fall within those two types of 
insureds because the policy clearly and un-
ambiguously provided that "You" referred 
only to the corporation and, since it was not 
an individual, the corporation could not have 
family members. We do not agree that the 
policy was clear and unambiguous. 
"When interpreting [an insurance policy], 
we must look at the [policy] as a whole, 
consider all relevant ^ p o r t i o n s together 
and, if possible, give operative effect to every 
provision in order to reach a reasonable over-
all result." O'Brien v. United States Fideli-
ty & Guaranty Co., 235 Conn. 837, 842-43, 
669 A.2d 1221 (1996). Using this approach, 
we find several clauses to be ambiguous and, 
therefore, potentially misleading and confus-
ing. First, the designation of "You" as the 
insured in § B.l of the uninsured motorist 
endorsement is nonsensical because a corpo-
ration cannot be compensated for "bodily 
injury," which is the subject matter of the 
coverage. Laypersons reading the coverage 
in relationship to the bodily injury coverage 
could have concluded that the "You" in the 
policy was referring to the shareholders of 
this small family owned and operated corpo-
ration. This is further highlighted by § C.3 
of the endorsement, the "EXCLUSIONS" 
section, which provides that "[t]his insurance 
does not apply to any of the following . . . 
'fbjodily injury' sustained by you or any 
family member' while 'occupying' or struck 
as a pedestrian by an 'uninsured motor vehi-
cle' that you own." (Emphasis added.) In 
addition, § F.l of the endorsement specifical-
ly provides that " '[fjamily member' means a 
person related to you by blood, marriage or 
adoption who is a resident of your household, 
including a ward or foster child." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The uninsured motorist coverage under 
both §§ B.l and B.2 are inapposite to the 
situation in which a corporation is issued an 
uninsured motorist endorsement, but, rather, 
are consistent with one seeking coverage for 
shareholders of a family corporation. Al-
though "many insurers have revised both the 
format and the wording of insurance policies 
with a view to making them significantly 
more understandable to the consumer"; R. 
Keeton & A. Widiss, supra, § 6.3(a)(4), p. 
634; leaving a layperson to sort out the 
ambiguities and misleading inconsistencies in 
the present policy "is precisely the problem 
that the rules of insurance policy construc-
tion 1547were designed to avoid. See General 
Statutes §§ 38a-297 through 38a-299 (insur-
ance coverage shall be 'readily understanda-
ble')." Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., su-
pra, 225 Conn, at 175, 622 A.2d 545. As a 
matter of law, we hold that the interplay 
between the provisions in the uninsured mo-
torist endorsement created a situation too 
misleading to be anything other than ambig-
uous. 
"[I]n some of the coverage disputes in-
volving underinsured motorist insurance, 
claims have been sustained for individuals 
on the rationale that when an insurance 
company elects to use 'family-oriented lan-
guage' in insurance policies issued to part-
nerships and corporations, such coverage 
terms are reasonably susceptible of more 
than one interpretation and, therefore, they 
will be construed strictly against the insurer 
and liberally in favor of the insured." (In-
ternal quotation marks omitted.) 3 A. Wid-
iss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Insurance (2d Ed.1995) § 33.3, p. 69. "In 
effect, when a corporate or governmental 
AGOSTO v. AETNA CAS. AND SUR. CO. 
Cite as 687 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) 
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entity is identified as the named insured in 
an insurance policy that uses coverage terms 
appropriate for coverage issued to individu-
als, courts chastise insurers for employing 
those forms rather than using coverage 
terms that are appropriate for insurance 
policies issued to various types of businesses 
or governmental entities." (Emphasis add-
ed.) Id., p. 70. We adhere to this reason-
ing. 
Furthermore, if we read the "[i]f you are 
an individual" language in § B.2 as being 
unambiguous, as the defendant would have 
us do, then the provision "You" in § B.l 
would be superfluous. This construction, 
however, would conflict with the canon of 
construction of insurance policies that "a poli-
cy should not be interpreted so as to render 
any part of it superfluous." Ceci v. National 
Indemnity Co., supra, 225 Conn, at 176, 622 
A.2d 545 (Borden, J., concurring). As noted 
in Ceci "we have consistently stated that [i]f 
it is reasonably possible to do so, every provi-
sion of an insurance policy must be given 
operative | .^effect; Kelly v. Figueiredo, [su-
pra, 223 Conn, at 36, 610 A.2d 1296] . . . 
because parties ordinarily do not insert 
meaningless provisions in their agreements. 
Connecticut Co. v. Division 4.25, 147 Conn. 
608, 617, 164 A.2d 413 (1960); AM. Larson 
Co. v. Lawlor Ins. Agency, Inc., 153 Conn. 
618, 622, 220 A.2d 32 (1966)." (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ceci 
v. National Indemnity Co., supra, at 175-76, 
622 A.2d 545. "[E]ach and every sentence, 
the defendant, the superfluous provisions 
cannot be read out of the policy. Therefore, 
we must conclude that the two clauses are 
clearly irreconcilable and, therefore, render 
the uninsured motorist endorsement ambigu-
ous. See Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., 
supra, at 176-77, 622 A.2d 545. 
[2, 3] We conclude that the individual ori-
ented language, combined with the family 
oriented language, interspersed throughout 
the uninsured motorist endorsement provid-
ed to the corporation injected confusion and 
uncertainty into the coverage afforded by the 
policy. If an insurer uses language that is 
ambiguous, any uncertainty caused by that 
ambiguity will be resolved against the insur-
er. See Cody v. Remington Electric Shav-
ers, 179 Conn. 494, 497, 427 A.2d 810 (1980). 
Put simply, the defendant should not have 
used an uninsured motorist endorsement 
containing language oriented toward individ-
uals and family members | ^ gwhen the named 
insured was a corporation. The plaintiff, 
individually and as executrix of the dece-
dent's estate, is entitled to coverage under 
the uninsured motorist endorsement. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
In this opinion the other justices con-
curred. 
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clause, and word of a contract of insurance j ^ e b r a Ann P. AGOSTO, Administratrix 
should be given operative effect. Since it 
must be assumed that each word contained in 
an insurance policy is intended to serve a 
purpose, every term will be given effect if 
that can be done by any reasonable construc-
tion . . . . A construction of an insurance pol-
icy which entirely neutralizes one provision 
should not be adopted if the contract is sus-
ceptible of another construction which gives 
effect to all of its provisions and is consistent 
with the general intent." 2 L. Russ & T. 
Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3d Ed.1995) c. 
22, § 22.43, pp. 22-90 through 22-93. Be-
cause the policy must be construed against 
(ESTATE OF Jorge A. AGOSTO) 
v. 
AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY 
COMPANY. 
No. 15537. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Argued Nov. 5, 1996. 
Decided Dec. 31, 1996. 
Administratrix of estate of state trooper 
brought action to recover underinsured mo-
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torist (UIM) benefits under policy issued to 
state. The Superior Court, Judicial District 
of Litchfield, Pickett, J., 1996 WL 56997 en-
tered summary judgment in favor of insurer. 
Administratrix appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Berdon, J., held that: (1) trooper was 
insured under policy issued to state, and (2) 
administratrix' reasonable expectation of cov-
erage was relevant. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance ^467.51(3) 
State trooper who was killed by underin-
sured motorist while approaching stopped ve-
hicle was "insured" entitled to underinsured 
motorist (UIM) benefits under policy issued 
to state employer, even though trooper was 
not occupying covered auto at time of acci-
dent; definition of "insured" as named in-
sured and any family member, if named in-
sured was individual, was ambiguous as to 
coverage of state employee, and insurer 
should not have issued uninsured motorist 
(UM) endorsement containing language re-
ferring to individuals and family members 
since named insured was governmental enti-
ty. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
2. Insurance <3=>156(1), 467.52 
State trooper's surviving spouse, as ad-
ministratrix of his estate, was third-party 
beneficiary of automobile insurance policy is-
sued to state employer and, therefore, was 
entitled to stand in shoes of state with re-
spect to reasonable expectations; surviving 
spouse's reasonable expectations of underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage for injury to 
trooper while approaching stopped vehicle 
were thus relevant. 
Eugene P. Falco, New Hartford, with 
whom were Dennis A. Santore, Torrington, 
and, on the brief, Ann Marie Groppo, Tor-
rington, for the appellant (plaintiff). 
| fispLouis B. Blumenfeld, Hartford, with 
whom was Lorinda S. Coon, for the appellee 
(defendant). 
Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, 
PALMER and McDONALD, JJ. 
BERDON, Associate Justice. 
This appeal presents nearly the same is-
sue, with a slightly different factual basis, 
that we decided today in the companion case 
of Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 239 
Conn. 537, 687 A.2d 1262 (1996). Specifical-
ly, the sole issue in this appeal is whether, 
under the facts of this case, the estate of the 
decedent, Jorge A. Agosto, is entitled to un-
derinsured motorist benefits, as a covered 
insured, pursuant to the automobile liability 
insurance policy (policy) issued to the dece-
dent's employer, the state of Connecticut 
(state). The policy was issued to the state in 
order to insure the fleet of state police and 
division of criminal justice vehicles, as well as 
various other state vehicles. This policy also 
contained an uninsured/underinsured motor-
ist endorsement (uninsured motorist en-
dorsement). The plaintiff, Debra Ann P. 
Agosto, as administratrix of the estate of her 
husband, brought an action to recover under-
insured motorist benefits, as a result of his 
death, under the policy issued by the defen-
dant, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. 
The defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment claiming that the decedent was not 
a covered insured under the uninsured mo-
torist endorsement issued to the state. The 
trial court granted the motion and rendered 
summary judgment for the defendant. The 
plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the 
trial court to the Appellate Court, and we 
transferred the appeal to this court pursuant 
to Practice Book § 4023 and General Stat-
utes § 51-199(c). We now reverse. 
The undisputed facts are as follows. The 
decedent, in his official capacity as a state 
trooper, effected a traffic stop of a vehicle on 
the highway. The decedent exited his police 
cruiser and proceeded to approach the 
stopped vehicle at the side of the road when 
a third vehicle struck and killed him. After 
AGOSTO v. AETNA 
Cite as 687 A.2d 
exhausting the tortfeasor's motor vehicle lia-
bility policy, the plaintiff 1551 brought an action 
against the defendant for underinsured mo-
torist benefits. The trial court granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment issued to the state was not ambiguous, 
and that the decedent did not fall within the 
definitions of an insured. The trial court 
found that the only way that the decedent 
could have been an insured covered by the 
uninsured motorist endorsement was if he 
was "occupying" ! his vehicle, as defined by 
the uninsured motorist endorsement, at the 
time of his fatal accident. 
[1, 2] The plaintiff claims that the trial 
court improperly concluded that the unin-
sured motorist endorsement was unambigu-
ous. The plaintiff essentially argues that the 
policy was ambiguous because it contained 
language oriented toward both individuals 
and family members and, therefore, it should 
be construed in favor of coverage for the 
1. "Occupying," according to the definition in the 
policy's uninsured motorist endorsement, 
"means in, upon, getting in, on, out or off" a 
covered auto. 
2. The uninsured motorist endorsement of the 
policy issued to the state provided in relevant 
part: 
"A. COVERAGE 
" 1 . We will pay all sums the 'insured' is legal-
ly entitled to recover as compensatory damages 
from the owner or driver of an 'uninsured motor 
vehicle.' The damages must result from 'bodily 
injury' sustained by the 'insured' caused by an 
'accident.'... 
"B. WHO IS AN INSURED 
" 1 . You. 
"2. If you are an individual, any 'family mem-
ber. ' 
"3 . Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 'auto' 
or a temporary substitute for a covered 'auto.' 
The covered 'auto' must be out of service because 
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or de-
struction. 
"4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled 
to recover because of 'bodily injury' sustained by 
another 'insured.' 
"C. EXCLUSIONS 
"This insurance does not apply to any of the 
following . . . 
"3 . 'Bodily injury' sustained by you or any 
'family member' while 'occupying' or struck by 
any vehicle owned by you or any 'family mem-
ber' that is not a covered 'auto.' . . . 
CAS. AND SUR. CO. Conn. J269 
1267 (Conn. 1996) 
plaintiffs decedent. Within the context of an 
uninsured motorist endorsement issued to a 
corporation, we addressed this very same 
policy language in Hansen v. Ohio Casualty 
Ins. Co., supra, 239 Conn. 537, 687 A.2d 1262, 
and, for the reasons set forth therein, we 
reverse the judgment of the trial court in this 
case. Because the uninsured motorist en-
dorsements are practically identical,2 we see 
no reason to distinguish this Incase from 
Hansen on the ground that this policy was 
issued to a governmental entity, the state, as 
opposed to a corporation. The same proble-
matic language exists here.3 On the basis of 
our reasoning in Hansen, the defendant in 
the present case should not have issued an 
uninsured motorist endorsement containing 
language referring to individuals and family 
members when the named insured was a 
governmental entity. The plaintiffs dece-
dent is entitled to coverage under the unin-
sured motorist endorsement. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings according to law. 
"F. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS... . 
" 1 . 'Family member' means a person related to 
you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a 
resident of your household, including a ward or 
foster child. 
"2. 'Occupying' means in, upon, getting in, 
on, out or off...." (Emphasis added.) 
3. Although the plaintiff's decedent was not the 
purchaser of the policy; see Ceci v. National 
Indemnity Co., 225 Conn. 165, 175 n. 6, 622 A.2d 
545 (1993); the reasonable expectations of the 
intended beneficiaries, such as the decedent in 
this case, are relevant. "In general, courts will 
protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, 
insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the 
coverage afforded by insurance contracts . . . . " 
(Emphasis added.) R. Keeton & A. Widiss, In-
surance Law (1988) § 6.3(a)(3), p. 633. The 
plaintiff's decedent was in essence a third party 
beneficiary of the insurance policy between the 
state and the defendant and, therefore, is entitled 
to stand in the shoes of the state with respect to 
reasonable expectations. Moreover, "when a 
corporate or governmental entity is identified as 
the named insured in an insurance policy that 
uses coverage terms appropriate for coverage 
issued to individuals, courts chastise insurers for 
employing those forms rather than using cover-
age terms that are appropriate for insurance 
policies issued to various types of businesses or 
governmental entities." (Emphasis added.) 3 A. 
Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Insurance (2d Ed. 1995) § 33.3, p. 70. 
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including estoppel, and she counterclaimed 
for title. 
Upon counter-motions for summary judg-
ment, the trial court concluded that the 
Tuttle trust should be awarded title. The 
trial court found, in essence, that the quit-
claim deed by the Tuttles to the Farm 
conveyed only the surface estate because 
the Tuttles, at the time of its execution, 
had no title to the mineral estate. It held 
that since the mineral deed was then being 
held in escrow, pending the completion of 
sale, it did not inure to the Tuttles until it 
w^s released some four months thereafter. 
Consequently, the quitclaim deed was inef-
fective to transfer a title not vested in the 
Tuttles at the time of its execution. 
On appeal, defendant repeats her argu-
ments madeyln the trial court, contending, 
inter alia, that the trust, as successor to 
the Tuttles/ is estopped from denying that 
title to t W minerals passed to Farm under 
the quitclaim deed. We agree, as do the 
parties and as did the trial court, that the 
single operative issue on appeal is the ef-
fect of the quitclaim deed. And, under the 
circumstances demonstrated by this record, 
we determine that the quitclaim deed here 
did not operate to convey the mineral es-
tate to Farm. 
We initially note that, if the evidence 
consists solely of documents, and if the 
determinative question concerns the inter-
pretation of those documents, then the is-
sue raised is one of law. Sentinel Accep-
tance Corp. v. Colgate, 162 Colo. 64, 424 
P.2d 380 (1967); Gilpin Investment Co. v. 
Blake, 712 P.2d 1051 (Colo.App. 1985). 
[1] It is the rule, as the trust asserts 
and the trial court found, that a quitclaim 
deed does not convey land, but only the 
grantor's present interest in the land, if 
any. In other words, a quitclaim deed does 
not represent that a grantor possesses any 
interest at all, and it is ineffectual to pass 
to the grantee any title or right acquired 
by the grantor subsequent to execution. 
Compare § 38-30-116, C.R.S. (1982 Repl. 
Vol. 16A) with § 38-30-115, C.R.S. (1982 
Repl.Vol. 16A). Consequently, it does not 
estop the grantor from asserting a title 
thereafter acquired. H. Fusilier, Real Es-
tate Law § 5.12 (1977). See also Rocky 
Mountain Fuel Co. v. Clayton Coal Co., 
110 Colo. 334, 134 P.2d 1062 (1943). 
It is undisputed that at the time of the 
execution and recordation of the quitclaim 
deed, the mineral deed to Tuttles remained 
in escrow pending satisfaction of the 
agreed purchase price. The mineral deed 
was thus held in escrow upon a condition 
which might, or might not, be performed, 
and it cannot be said that payment of the 
full purchase price was an event certain to 
occur. The mineral deed thus did not con-
vey title when deposited. See Book v. 
Book, 71 Colo. 502, 208 P. 474 (1922). 
[2,3] In order to pass title by deed, the 
instrument must.be delivered to and ac-
cepted by the grantee. Larison v. Taylor, 
83 Colo. 430, 266 P. 217 (1928). A deed in 
escrow, conditioned upon satisfaction or 
completion of some specified event, conse-
quently cannot be delivered or become op-
erative until the condition has been per-
formed, and no title or estate passes until 
rightful delivery is made. 
[41 Consequently, no delivery of the 
mineral deed occurred here until August 
14, 1974, when the balance of the price was 
paid and it was released from escrow and 
recorded. By this delivery, the Tuttles 
then became owners of the minerals, and 
the Farm, a separate entity, remained the 
owner of the Tuttles' former interest in the 
surface estate. 
[5] We recognize that when a deed is 
properly recorded, it is presumed that due 
delivery was made which relates back to 
the date of execution of the deed. Section 
38-35-101(4), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A). 
However, the presumption is rebuttable, 
and it may, upon proper proof, be shown 
that delivery did not occur or occurred at 
some other point in time. See Jacquez v. 
Jacquez, 694 P.2d 1292 (Colo.App.1984). 
Here, it is undisputed that the mineral deed 
was held in escrow pending full payment 
not made until August 14, 1974. Thus, 
there can be no earlier delivery than the 
date the deed was released from escrow. 
HAWKEYE-SEC. INS. v. LAMBRECHT & SONS 
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Burrows, in support of her arguments 
relying upon equitable principles, argues 
that the Tuttles held equitable rights in the 
minerals when the contract with the Curtis-
es was made and the escrow opened, which 
preceded the date of the Tuttle quitclaim 
deed. Citing Kauffman v. Kauffman, 130 
Colo. 583, 278 P.2d 179 (1954), she contends 
that once the escrow was discharged, these 
equitable rights merged with the legal title 
in Tuttles, which merger must be deemed 
to relate back to the date of the mineral 
deed. We do not agree. 
While it may be true that delivery of the 
deed to escrow by Curtis was irrevocable 
under the terms of the contract, delivery 
was still subject to Tuttles' potential de-
fault, in which case the deed would be 
withdrawn and returned to the Curtises, no 
conveyance having been effected. Thus, 
the deed, when placed in escrow, did not 
operate as an in praesenti transfer. 
Finally, we agree with the trial court's 
observation that to adopt Burrows' argu-
ments would inevitably weaken the reliabil-
ity of record titles. 
The purpose of the recording statute is 
to make titles to real property more secure, 
so that purchasers and encumbrances may 
safely rely upon the titles as they are dis-
played by record. Section 38-34-101, 
C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A) and § 38-35-
109 (1992 Cum.Supp.). 
In the case before us, an examination of 
the real property records on August 13, 
1974, would have revealed that the Tuttles 
had no interest in the minerals at all. An 
examination of the title thereafter would 
have revealed the mineral deed to the 
Tuttles (and their later grantees), but not 
to the Farm, a wholly separate entity. The 
position urged by Burrows would render 
the title shown by the public records ex-
tremely questionable and make that title 
vulnerable to proof of the existence of in-
terests variously effective notwithstanding 
recordation date. 
Accordingly, we conclude, as did the trial 
court, that the quitclaim deed did not oper-
ate ' to convey an inchoate title in escrow 
and that the mineral estate by subsequent 
conveyance is now owned by the Tuttle 
trust. 
The judgment is affirmed, and both par-
ties' requests for sanctions on appeal are 
denied. 
PIERCE and RULAND, JJ., concur. 
HAWKEYE-SECURITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
LAMBRECHT & SONS, INC. 
and Paulette Lambrecht, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 91CA1707. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. III. 
Jan. 28, 1993. 
Rehearing Denied April 15, 1993. 
Corporation's automobile insurer 
brought action against corporation and 
spouse of sole shareholder for declaratory 
judgment that spouse was not entitled to 
uninsured motorist benefits. The District 
Court, El Paso County, Michael J. Heydt, 
J., entered summary judgment in favor of 
insurer. Corporation and spouse appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Criswell, J., held 
that spouse was family member and, there-
fore, was entitled to uninsured motorist 
benefits. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance <s=3467.51(3) 
Public policy would be violated by the 
literal interpretation of definition of "in-
sured" and "family member" in corpora-
tion's automobile policy; literal interpreta-
tion would preclude uninsured motorist 
coverage since damages had to result from 
bodily injury sustained by insured and in-
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sured was defined as the corporation or 
family member who is related by blood, 
marriage, or adoption and is resident of 
corporation's household. 
2. Insurance <£=>467.51(3) 
Terms "insured" and "family member" 
in corporation's automobile policy had to be 
considered within context of particular cir-
cumstances that surrounded issuance of 
policy and purposes that it was intended to 
fulfill. 
3. Insurance «=>467.51(3) 
Spouse of insured corporation's sole 
shareholder was "family member" within 
meaning of corporation's automobile policy 
and, therefore, was entitled to uninsured 
motorist benefits; corporation was small 
and closely held, and spouse was active 
officer and, designated driver listed on ap-
plication mide to insurer. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for otHer judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Kane, Donley & Shaffer, William A. 
Palmer, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-ap-
pellee. 
William J. Mcllwain, Colorado Springs, 
for defendants-appellants. 
Opinion by Judge CRISWELL. 
Defendants, Paulette Lambrecht (Lam-
brecht) and Lambrecht & Sons, Inc. (the 
corporation), appeal from a declaratory 
judgment entered pursuant to the sum-
mary judgment motion of plaintiff, Hawk-
eye-Security Insurance Co., decreeing that 
a policy of insurance issued by plaintiff 
provided no coverage for the personal inju-
ries received by Lambrecht. We reverse 
and remand for further proceedings. 
Plaintiff issued the insurance policy to 
the corporation, all of the capital stock of 
which is owned by Lambrecht's husband. 
Both Lambrecht and her husband are em-
ployed by the corporation, and Lambrecht 
is also an officer and director thereof. 
Lambrecht received personal injuries while 
in a vehicle not owned by the corporation. 
The policy in question was a general 
automobile policy. It provided liability, 
personal injury protection, medical pay-
ments, uninsured motorist, comprehensive, 
and collision coverages. For each of these 
coverages, a separate premium was 
charged. 
Several automobiles owned by the corpo-
ration were described in an endorsement to 
this policy. In addition, the application re-
quired by plaintiff to be filed to obtain the 
policy's issuance listed Lambrecht and sev-
eral others as drivers of the vehicles de-
scribed. 
According to the general declarations of 
this policy, the terms "you" or "your," as 
used in the policy, refer to "the person or 
organization shown as the named insured 
in ITEM ONE of the declaration." The 
name insured was, of course, the corpora-
tion. 
There are, however, special provisions 
applying only to the uninsured motorist 
coverage. Those special provisions make 
"any family member" an additional "in-
sured" for purposes of this coverage, and 
they define a "family member" to include 
"a person related to you by blood, mar-
riage or adoption who is a resident of your 
household " (original emphasis) 
Under this coverage, plaintiff has agreed 
to pay: 
all sums the insured is legally entitled to 
recover as damages from the owner or 
driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. 
The damages must result from bodily 
injury sustained by the insured caused 
by an accident. The owner's or driver's 
liability for these damages must result 
from the ownership, maintenance or use 
of the uninsured motor vehicle, (origi-
nal emphasis) 
There is no requirement that either the 
insured or any family member be driving 
one of the vehicles designated in the policy 
at the time of the injury in order to recover 
under this uninsured motorist coverage. 
If these insuring provisions were to be 
interpreted literally, there could never be 
any coverage afforded under the uninsured 
motorist provisions of this policy. This is 
so because plaintiff has agreed to pay only 
for damages resulting from "bodily inju-
HAWKEYE-SEC. INS. v. LAMBRECHT & SONS 
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ry," and only the corporation ("you") or a 
person who is "related" to the corporation 
by "blood, marriage or adoption," and is a 
resident of the corporation's "household," 
may recover such damages under these 
provisions. A corporation can itself never 
sustain "bodily injury," and since it also 
can have no relatives by "blood, marriage 
or adoption," no other person could ever be 
considered a "family member" so as to be 
entitled to coverage. 
Hence, if read literally, these provisions 
would result in plaintiff receiving a mone-v 
tary premium for such uninsured motorist 
coverage, while providing no consideration 
of any type for such premium. See Dixon 
v. Gunter, 636 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.App.1982) 
(because insured corporation can have no 
family members, similar provision consti-
tutes a patent ambiguity which must be 
treated as surplusage and is ineffective in 
providing any coverage). 
However, at least two courts, when faced 
with a similar absurdity, have concluded 
that the insuring language must be inter-
preted to provide some meaningful cover-
age. 
In King v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 
35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380 (1988), 
the court concluded that substantially simi-
lar language was required to be interpreted 
within the context of the particular purpose 
for which the coverage was obtained. 
When considered in such context, the term 
"family member" can reasonably be con-
strued to include either all of the corpora-
tion's employees, certain key employees, or 
the drivers specifically designated in the 
application. 
Likewise, in Colokathis v. Hartford Ac-
cident & Indemnity Co., 199 Cal.App.3d 
264, 244 Cal.Rptr. 779 (1988), the court 
concluded that to limit the term "family 
member" to the literal definition contained 
in the uninsured motorist policy issued to a 
corporation would result in a lack of any 
coverage. Such a result would violate pub-
lic policy. Hence, it concluded that the 
term "family member" should be interpret-
ed to include the individual who, in that 
case, was the corporation's principal officer 
and sole stockholder. 
[1] We agree with the conclusion that 
the relevant terms used in this policy can-
not be interpreted literally without violat-
ing public policy. See Barnett v. Ameri-
can Family Mutual Insurance Co., 843 
P.2d 1302 (Colo.1993). 
121 We also agree that the terms used 
must be considered within the context of 
the particular circumstances that surround-
ed the issuance of the policy and the pur-
poses the insuring agreements were intend-
ed to fulfill. Thus, we do not determine 
the identity of all of the persons to whom 
the pertinent term might be extended in all 
cases. That determination must be guided 
by the relevant circumstances. 
[3] However, we conclude that Lam-
brecht must be considered to be a "family 
member" for purposes of the uninsured 
motorist coverage contained within the in-
stant policy. 
Here, the corporation was a small, close-
ly-held, family business enterprise. As not-
ed, Lambrecht was the wife of the corpora-
tion's sole stockholder; she was herself an 
active officer of the corporation; and she 
was one of the designated drivers listed on 
the application that was made to plaintiff. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the purpose 
to be fulfilled by providing uninsured mo-
torist coverage in this policy was to protect 
the family members who were engaged in 
the corporation's business. Given these 
circumstances, we hold that Lambrecht 
was a "family member" of the corporation 
and, as such, was entitled to the benefits of 
the uninsured motorist coverage provided 
in plaintiff's policy. 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed, and the cause is remanded to that 
court for further proceedings consistent 
with the views set forth in this opinion. 
SMITH and ROTHENBERG, JJ., concur. 
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scheme and, thus, was governed by law in 
existence at time of offense, even though 
defendant was not actually convicted until 
after date of amendment, and (2) equal pro-
tection did not require that defendant be 
sentenced under reduced punishment 
scheme. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s»1206.4 
Offense of conviction, unauthorized use 
of vehicle, was committed prior to effective 
date of Penal Code amendment effecting re-
duced punishment scheme and, thus, was 
governed by law in existence at time of of-
fense, even though defendant was not actual-
ly convicted until after date of amendment; 
defendant's citations to general code con-
struction provisions, public policy and gener-
al statement of law were defeated in light of 
specific, unambiguous and express intent of 
legislature that amendment apply only to 
offenses committed after its effective date. 
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., p. 3705, ch. 900, § 1.18. 
2. Criminal Law €=>1130(5) 
Merely calling matter of purported con-
stitutional violation in trial court's failure to 
apply reduced punishment scheme to atten-
tion of appellate court was insufficient to 
present error for review; defendant did not 
raise purported constitutional violation in 
separate point of error and had completely 
failed to offer any analysis or authority to 
support his contention. 
3. Constitutional Law <3=>250.3(1) 
Criminal Law <s=>1206.4 
There was no equal protection violation 
in trial court's refusal to apply reduced pun-
ishment scheme to defendant whose offense 
was committed prior to effective date of 
amendment effecting reduced scheme, de-
spite defendant's claim that it was unconsti-
tutional "for two citizens in the same court-
room charged with the very same offense to 
be subject to differing ranges of punishment 
merely because one of the defendants com-
mitted the offense before [specified date]"; 
defendant failed to demonstrate that he was 
treated in any manner differently from all 
other criminal defendants who committed un-
authorized use of vehicle prior to effective 
date of amendment. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 
14; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., p. 3705, ch. 900, 
§ 1.18. 
Allen F. Cazier, Law Offices of Allen Cazi-
er, San Antonio, for Appellant. 
Steven C. Hilbig, Criminal District Attor-
ney, Edward F. Shaughnessy, III, Assistant 
Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, for 
Appellee. 
Before RICKHOFF, L. LOPEZ and 
HARDBERGER, JJ. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM. 
[1] Appellant entered a plea of guilty to a 
charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle and 
received deferred adjudication. Appellant 
thereafter entered a plea of true to a viola-
tion of probation. The trial court adjudicat-
ed his guilt and sentenced him to ten years 
confinement. In a single point of error, ap-
pellant contends that the court erred in de-
nying appellant's election to be sentenced 
under the amended penal code because his 
guilt had not been adjudicated before the 
amendment took effect. We affirm. 
The date of the offense to which appellant 
pleaded guilty was January 22, 1993. At that 
time, unauthorized use of a vehicle was a 
third degree felony subject to a term of 
imprisonment of not more than ten years or 
less than two years. See Act approved June 
19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, sec. 1.01, 
1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 3586, 3603, 3640 (illus-
trating prior classification of offense as third 
degree felony). Effective September 1, 1994, 
this offense became a state jail felony, sub-
ject to a term of confinement of not more 
than two years or less than 180 days. Act 
approved June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 
900, sec. 1.01, 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 3586, 3603, 
3640. The legislature, in amending the penal 
code and creating state jail felonies, specifi-
cally provided: 
(a) The change in law made by this article 
applies only to an offense committed on or 
after the effective date of this article. For 
purposes of this section, an offense is com-
mitted before the effective date of this 
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article if any element of the offense occurs 
before the effective date, 
(b) An offense committed before the effec-
tive date of this article is covered by the 
law in effect when the offense was commit-
ted, and the former law is continued in 
effect for that purpose. 
Act approved June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., 
ch. 900, sec. 1.18, 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 3586, 
3705. The effective date of the amendment 
was September 1, 1994. Act approved June 
19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, sec. 1.19(a), 
1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 3586, 3705. 
There is no dispute that the offense for 
which appellant was convicted was committed 
prior to the effective date of the relevant 
amendment to the penal code. Thus, it is 
governed by the law in existence at that 
time. The fact that appellant was not actual-
ly convicted prior to the date of the amend-
ment is irrelevant. Also, appellant's citations 
to general code construction provisions, pub-
lic policy, and a "general statement of law," 
are defeated in light of the specific, unambig-
uous, and express intent of the legislature 
that the amendment apply only to offenses 
committed after its effective date. The trial 
court did not err in sentencing appellant for 
commission of a third degree felony rather 
than a state jail felony. See Perry v. State, 
902 S.W.2d 162 (TexApp.—Houston [1st 
Disk] 1995, review refused) (possession of 
controlled substance prior to amendment of 
Health & Safety Code subject to sentencing 
as second degree felony not state jail felony); 
Wilson v. State, 899 S.W.2d 36 (TexApp.— 
Amarillo 1995, review refused) (possession of 
controlled substance prior to amendment of 
Health & Safety Code subject to sentencing 
as first degree felony not state jail felony). 
[2,3] Appellant also urges that equal 
protection requires that he be sentenced un-
der the reduced punishment scheme. His 
argument, in its entirety, is that "[i]t is un-
constitutional for two citizens in the same 
courtroom charged with the very same of-
fense to be subjected to differing ranges of 
punishment merely because one of the defen-
dants committed the offense before midnight 
on August 31, 1994." We first note that 
appellant did not raise this purported consti-
tutional violation in a separate point of error 
and that he has completely failed to offer any 
analysis or authority to support his conten-
tion. Merely calling the matter to our atten-
tion is not sufficient to present error for 
review. McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531, 
536 (Tex.CrimA.pp.1980); see also Burks v. 
State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 910 (Tex.Crim.App. 
1994), cert, denied, — U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 
909, 130 L.Ed.2d 791 (1995). 
In any event, appellant's contention lacks 
merit. The exact same argument (differing 
only in two words) was rejected by the 
Amarillo Court of Appeals in Wilson v. State, 
899 S.W.2d 36 (TexApp.—Amarillo 1995, pet. 
filed July 19, 1995). That court noted that 
the argument "implicates neither a denial of 
equal protection nor any class discrimina-
tion." Id. at 39. Appellant has not demon-
strated that he was treated in any manner 
different from all other criminal defendants 
who committed unauthorized use of a vehicle 
prior to the effective date of the amendment 
to the penal code. See id. The sentencing 
scheme utilized by the trial court does not 
violate equal protection. 
For all the foregoing reasons, appellant's 
sole point of error is overruled. The judg-
ment is affirmed. 
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Michelle McKee, Individually and as 
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6. Judgment <2>186 
When counter-motions for summary 
judgment are properly before trial court at 
time judgment is rendered, all evidence ac-
companying both motions should be consid-
ered in deciding whether to grant either 
party's motion; trial court is not limited to 
considering only evidence filed in support of 
party's motion, but can look to other mov-
ant's proof as well when granting first par-
ty's motion. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 166a(c). 
7. Appeal and Error <3=»863 
When both parties file motions for sum-
mary judgment and one is granted and one is 
denied, Court of Appeals reviews all ques-
tions presented. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 166a(c). 
8. Appeal and Error @=»854(1) 
When trial court enters summary judg-
ment order that does not specify particular 
ground on which it is based, party appealing 
must show that each independent argument 
alleged in motion for summary judgment is 
insufficient to support trial court's order. 
Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
166a(c). 
9. Appeal and Error <S=>852 
When trial court's summary judgment 
order does not specify grounds relied on for 
its ruling, judgment will be affirmed if any of 
theories advanced are meritorious. Vernon's 
Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 166a(c). 
10. Insurance ^467.51(3), 467.61(2.1) 
Ambiguity requiring construction in fa-
vor of coverage existed as to whether daugh-
ter of president and sole shareholder of cor-
poration qualified as "insured" under en-
dorsement to business auto policy that pro-
vided iminsured/underinsured motorist 
(UM/UIM) protection and personal injury 
uuiociiiciiL a& piuvuixug UiVjyuiiVi aim nr 
coverage for members of president and sole 
shareholder's family. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
11. Contracts <3=>143(2) 
Court may conclude that contract is am-
biguous even in absence of such pleading by 
either party. 
12. Contracts <s=>176(2) 
Whether contract is ambiguous is ques-
tion of law for the court. 
13. Insurance <£=>146.8 
In event court finds insurance policy 
ambiguous, it must necessarily find in favor 
of coverage. 
14. Insurance <&=>146 
Insurance policies are controlled by 
rules of construction which are applicable to 
contracts generally. 
15. Insurance <^146.7(1, 6) 
Court must interpret and construe in-
surance policies liberally in favor of insured 
and strictly against insurer, especially when 
dealing with exceptions and words of limita-
tion. 
16. Insurance <^146.7(1), 146.8 
When language of insurance policy is 
susceptible of more than one reasonable con-
struction, courts will apply construction that 
favors insured and permits recovery. 
17. Insurance <3=>146.7(6) 
Where disputed insurance policy clause 
involves exceptions or limitations on insurer's 
liability under policy, even more stringent 
construction than usual is required, even if 
construction urged by insurer appears more 
reasonable or more accurate reflection of 
parties' intent. 
18. Insurance ^146.7(8) 
Rules of policy construction favoring in-
sured do not apply if term in question is 
susceptible of only one reasonable construc-
tion. 
initions. 
20. Courts <&=>95(1) 
Insurance <3=>146.10 
When insurance policy language has not 
been previously interpreted by state courts, 
Court of Appeals looks to other jurisdictions 
in which courts have interpreted same lan-
guage. 
21. Insurance <3=>146.1(2) 
Differing conclusions in decisions from 
other jurisdictions concerning insurance poli-
cy language may be considered further evi-
dence that language at issue is susceptible of 
two reasonable conclusions. 
22. Insurance <3=>602.2(1) 
Statute entitling insured to recover 
twelve percent penalty when personal injury 
protection (PIP) benefits are not paid within 
thirty days provides no exception for good 
faith withholding of benefits pending resolu-
tion of coverage dispute. V.A.T.S. Insurance 
Code, art. 5.06-3(d)(3). 
23. Judgment <^181(14) 
Summary judgment order granting in-
sured declaratory relief on coverage issue 
was interlocutory until balance of suit against 
insurer was severed. 
24. Costs <2>199 
Where summary judgment order grant-
ing insured declaratory relief on coverage 
issue also included grant of attorney fees, but 
remainder of insured's action against insurer 
was severed and abated, amount of fees 
awarded was issue to be determined when 
severed cause was heard, especially since no 
competent proof on the issue had been pre-
sented. 
Edward C. Mainz, Jr., Thornton, Sum-
mers, Biechlin, Dunham & Brown, L.C., San 
Antonio, for Appellant. 
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Malcolm C. Halbardier, San Antonio, for 
Appellees. 
Before CHAPA, C.J., and RICKHOFF 
and STONE, JJ. 
OPINION 
CHAPA, Chief Justice. 
Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. ap-
peals from a summary judgment. This case 
reviews a business auto insurance contract in 
which the named insured is a corporation, 
but which includes uninsured/underinsured 
and personal injury protection endorsements 
that provide coverage to "you or any family 
member." Because this family-oriented lan-
guage caused an ambiguity, we find that the 
corporation's sole shareholder could reason-
ably understand that his family members 
were covered. We affirm the summary judg-
ment which so held. 
Procedural and Factual Background 
[1-3] The appellant insurance company 
issued a Business Auto Coverage policy for 
Future Investments, Inc. d/b/a/ DK & M 
Construction, of which Gerald McKee is pres-
ident and sole shareholder.1 The policy in-
cludes Personal Injury Protection (PIP) and 
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist protection, 
and additional premiums were paid for this 
coverage. McKee's eleven-year-old daugh-
ter, Kelly, was seriously injured in a one-car 
auto accident in which her stepsister was the 
driver. The parties stipulated that the car 
involved in the accident was not covered 
1. The parties stipulated that McKee was the pres-
ident oi the corporation. Appellant contends, 
however, that there is no competent summary 
judgment proof that McKee was the sole share-
holder of the corporation. Part of appellees' 
summary judgment evidence as designated in 
their motion, and of which the court took judicial 
notice, is appellant's Response to a Request for 
Production, filed in the trial court a month be-
fore the hearing. In response to the request for 
letters concerning coverage, appellant produced 
an opinion letter from attorney Scott Patrick 
Stolley, of Dallas, Texas, in which he states, "I 
understand that Future Investments, was incor-
porated on May 1, 1992, and that Mr. Gerald 
Wayne McKee is the president and sole share-
holder.'' The opinion letter is written from the 
perspective "of whether a family member' is 
covered when a family-owned corporation is the 
named insured." Responses to requests for pro-
duction can be considered as summary judgment 
under the policy, the stepsister was not cov 
ered, and the accident occurred on a purelj 
personal outing, which was not made in con-
nection with any business pursuit of the cor-
porate named insured. Both the stepsister's 
policy and the McKees' personal policy paid 
off to their maximum limits. When McKe€ 
filed claims against his corporation's business 
policy, the appellant refused to pay on the 
grounds that Kelly was not an insured. Ap-
pellees filed suit alleging breach of contract, 
negligence, bad faith, and deceptive trade 
practices. The parties agreed to submit the 
issue of coverage to the trial court by way of 
counter-motions for summary judgment to 
avoid delay and expense in the event the 
court determined that coverage was not ap-
plicable. The remaining causes of action 
were severed and abated pending resolution 
of the coverage issue. The trial court grant-
ed a general summary judgment to appellees 
finding in favor of coverage. Thus, the ap-
peal before us presents the single issue of 
whether, as a matter of law, the Dolicy's 
UM/UIM and PIP endorsements provide 
coverage to Kelly. Appellant brings this ap-
peal on four points of error, all asserting that 
the trial court erred in granting appellees' 
summary judgment and in denying appel-
lant's summary judgment. 
Standard of Review 
[4-7] The standard of review in a sum-
mary judgment case is whether the movant 
met its burden for summary judgment by 
establishing there exists no genuine issue of 
evidence. See Waddy v. City of Houston, 834 
S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.J 
1992, writ denied); Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. 
Brite Day Constr., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283, 286 
(Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ de-
nied). Moreover, a "statement made by a per-
son, authorized by a party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, . . . is considered an ad-
mission by that party. Tex.R.Evid. 801." Port-
land Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 
532, 540 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ 
refd n.r.e.), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 
1200, 89 L.Ed.2d 313 (1986). An admission is 
" 'any statement made or act done by one of the 
parties to any action or on his behalf which 
amounts to a prior acknowledgement by such 
party that one of the facts relevant to the issues is 
not as he now claims.' " Hartford Accident & 
Indent. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 337 
(Tex. 1963) (quoting 2 MCCORMICK & RAY, 
TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1121). 
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that it is entitled to a Rogers v. Ricane Enters., material fact and 
judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. 
Property Management Co., 690 S.W^d 546, 
548 (Tex.1985); City of Houston v. Clear 
Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 
1979); TEX-R.Crv.P. 166a(c). When both par-
ties move for summary judgment, each party 
must carry its own burden of establishing a 
right to judgment. State Farm Lloyds, Inc. 
v. Williams, 791 S.W.2d 542, 549-50 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied). Neither 
can prevail solely because of the failure of 
the other party to discharge its burden. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Attayi 745 
S.W.2d 939, 948 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.1 1988, no writ); see The Atrium v. 
Kenurin Shops of Crockett, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 
315, 318 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 
1984, writ refd n.r.e.). When counter-mo-
tions for summary judgment are properly 
before the trial court at the time judgment is 
rendered, all the evidence accompanying 
both motions should be considered in decid-
ing whether to grant either party's motion. 
Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Institute 
for Aerobics Research, 766 S.W.2d 318, 319 
(TexApp.—Dallas 1989, writ denied). The 
trial court is not limited to considering only 
the evidence filed in support of a party's 
motion, but can look to the other movant's 
proof as well when granting the first party's 
motion. Farm Credit Bank v. Snyder Nat'l 
Bank, 802 S.W.2d 709, 712 (TexApp.—East-
land 1990, writ denied). Thus, when both 
parties file motions for summary judgment 
and one is granted and one is denied, we 
review all questions presented. Nationwide 
Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McFarland, 
887 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, 
writ denied). 
[8,9] When a trial court enters a sum-
mary judgment order that does not specify 
the particular ground on which it is based, 
he party appealing must show that each 
ndependent argument alleged in the motion 
or summary judgment is insufficient to sup-
port the trial court's order. McCrea v. Cu-
rilla Condominium Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755, 
f57 (TexjVpp.—Houston [1st Dist] 1985, writ 
•efd n.r.e.). When the trial court's order 
loes not specify the grounds relied on for its 
tiling, summary judgment will be affirmed if 
uiy of the theories advanced are meritorious. 
Inc., 
Tex. 779 
772 S.W.2d 
76, 79 (Tex.1989). 
The Insurance Policy 
In the disputed policy, the "named in-
sured" in the declarations page is the corpo-
ration. The corporation is also the named 
insured on the UM/UIM and PIP endorse-
ments. On the UM/UIM endorsement, a 
space for a "Designated person" has been 
left blank. The business auto coverage page 
provides that throughout the policy the 
words "you" and "your" refer to the named 
insured on the declarations page. There is 
also a definitions section, but the word "you" 
does not appear there. 
The UM/UIM lists three categories of "in-
sured." The policy provides UM/UIM cover-
age to: 
1. You and any designated person and 
any family member of either. 
2. Any other person occupying a covered 
auto. 
3. Any person or organization for dam-
ages that person or organization is entitled 
to recover because of bodily injury sus-
tained by a person described in 1. or 2. 
above. 
The PIP has two categories of insured: 
1. You or any family member while occu-
pying or when struck by any auto. 
2. Anyone else occupying a covered auto 
with your permission. 
(emphasis in original to denote specially de-
fined terms deleted). Both parties agree 
that Kelly must fit into the first category as a 
family member in each instance to receive 
coverage. 
"Family member" is defined in both en-
dorsements as "a person related to you by 
blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident 
of your household, including a ward or foster 
child." It is undisputed that Kelly is the 
appellees' daughter residing in their house-
hold. 
Analysis 
[10] The sole issue before us is whether a 
family member of the president and sole 
shareholder of a family-owned corporation is 
covered under family-oriented language in an 
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insurance policy in which only the corpora-
tion is the named insured. This is a case of 
first impression in Texas, although courts in 
other jurisdictions have both approved and 
disapproved coverage in comparable circum-
stances. In a similar claim, one Texas court 
of appeals has found that a corporation's 
employee is not covered as a "family mem-
ber" under an identical policy in which the 
entity is the named insured. Webster v. U.S. 
Fire Ins. Co., 882 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.App.— 
Houston [1st Dist] 1994, writ denied). In 
Webster, an employee of a car dealership 
sought to recover under the corporation's 
uninsured motorist coverage for injuries in-
curred while he and his wife were test driv-
ing a customer's car by contending they were 
"family members" of the corporation. We 
agree with the Houston court's conclusion 
that it is "not reasonable to interpret the 
family-oriented language in a policy issued to 
a corporation to extend to employees,'1 and 
that the contract is not ambiguous in this 
regard. Id. at 573 (emphasis added). In the 
instant case, however, we are confronted 
with a situation in which the injured is a 
member of the immediate family of the sole 
shareholder of a family-owned corporation. 
Thus, we must determine whether a reason-
able interpretation of the policy could encom-
pass actual family members. 
[11-13] Appellant contends that the con-
tract is not ambiguous, and also contends 
that appellees did not move for summary 
judgment on the basis of ambiguity, although 
they pleaded it in the alternative in their 
Second Amended Original Petition. Howev-
er, a court may conclude that a contract is 
ambiguous even in the absence of such plead-
ing by either party. Sage Street Assocs. v. 
Northdale Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438, 445 
(Tex.1993); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 
394 (Tex. 1983). Whether a contract is am-
biguous is a question of law for the court. 
Yancey v. Floyd West & Co., 755 S.W.2d 914, 
917 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ de-
nied). The parties agree that specific 
grounds alleged in the appellees' motion 
were (1) that the Grain Dealer's policy clear-
ly covered the McKees as insureds, and (2) 
that the McKees were clearly covered under 
Grain Dealer's policy by virtue of articles 
5.06-1 and 5.06-3 of the insurance code, 
which mandate UM/UIM and PIP coverage. 
See TEX.INS.CODE ANN. arts. 5.06-1, 5.06-3 
(Vernon 1981). Nonetheless, in the event a 
court finds an insurance policy ambiguous, it 
must necessarily find in favor of coverage. 
Ramsay v. Maryland Am, Gen. Ins. Co., 533 
S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex.1976); see State Farm 
Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430, 438 
(Tex.1995) (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting he would af-
firm trial court's directed verdict in favor of 
insured because under an ambiguous con-
tract an insurance company owes "the pro-
ceeds of the policy as a matter of law"). We 
conclude that appellees' motion sufficiently 
stated a ground upon which the summary 
judgment could be granted by asserting that 
Kelly was covered as an insured as a matter 
of law. 
[14-17] It is fundamental that insurance 
policies are controlled by rules of construc-
tion which are applicable to contracts gener-
ally. Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 
S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.1987). The determina-
tion of whether a contract is ambiguous in 
light of its wording and the surrounding cir-
cumstances is a question of law. Coker, 650 
S.W.2d at 394; Yancey, 755 S.W.2d at 917. 
We must interpret and construe insurance 
policies liberally in favor of the insured and 
strictly against the insurer, especially when 
dealing with exceptions and words of limita-
tion. Kelly Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., 681 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 
1984); Blaylock v. American Guar. Bank 
Liability Ins. Co., 632 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. 
1982); Ramsay, 533 S.W.2d at 349. When 
the language of a policy is susceptible of 
more than one reasonable construction, 
courts will apply a construction that favors 
the insured and permits recovery. Barnett, 
723 S.W.2d at 666; Kelly, 681 S.W.2d at 596; 
Glover v. National Ins. Underwriters, 545 
S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex.1977); Ramsay, 533 
S.W.2d at 349. Where the clause of the 
insurance policy subject to dispute involves 
exceptions or limitations on the insurer's lia-
bility under the policy, even more stringent 
construction than usual is required. Glover, 
545 S.W.2d at 761; Adrian Assocs., Gen. 
Contractors v. National Surety Corp., 638 
S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex.App.—Dalias 1982, writ 
refd n.r.e.). This is true even if the con-
struction urged by the insurer appears to be 
more reasonable or a more accurate reflec-
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tion of the parties' intent National Union 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 
S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.1991). 
[18,19] These special rules favoring the 
insured are only applicable when there is an 
ambiguity in the policy; if the term in ques-
tion is susceptible of only one reasonable 
construction, then these rules do not apply. 
Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 
938 (Tex.1984); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bowie, 
574 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.1978). However, 
when the language of the policy is susceptible 
to more than one reasonable construction, it 
is patently ambiguous. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 
at 665. 
In the instant case the "named insured" is 
unequivocally the corporation. The policy 
also clearly defines "you" and "your" as used 
throughout the policy as the "named in-
sured." These terms are unambiguous. On 
the other hand, the UM/UIM and PIP en-
dorsements2 indicate that the "insured" are 
"you or any family member." It is uncon-
tested that a corporation cannot have family 
members. However, a "family member" is 
defined as "a person related to you . . . who 
is a resident in your household." (emphasis 
added). When the contract is considered in 
the surrounding circumstances, namely, pro-
viding insurance coverage to a sole share-
holder corporation, it is entirely reasonable 
that "[a]n endorsement that specifically add-
ed coverage for 'family members,' as did this 
one, would reasonably be understood as pro-
viding [underinsured] motorist insurance for 
members of the [McKee] family independent 
of whether they were occupying a covered 
automobile at the time of the injury." Ceci v. 
National Indem. Co., 225 Conn. 165, 622 
A.2d 545, 549 (1993). Therefore, we conclude 
that the combination of the family-oriented 
language in a policy insuring a family-owned 
business, appearing in an endorsement that 
expands coverage to insure family members 
when the balance of the policy does not, 
creates an ambiguity. See Barnett, 723 
2. On the endorsement form, the purchaser is 
told, "This endorsement changes the policy.. . ." 
3. Several of the cases cited by appellant deal 
solely with employees seeking coverage under 
their employers' corporate policies. See, e.g., 
Huebner v. MSI Ins. Co., 506 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 
1993); Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 407 
S.W.2d at 665 (while language used is defi-
nite, meaning and scope of the language is 
ambiguous). "Thus, once the insured pres-
ents a reasonable construction of the terms 
of the policy at issue, any ambiguity must be 
resolved, as a matter of law, against the 
insurer and in favor of coverage." Pioneer 
Chlm Alkali v. Royal Indent. Co., 879 S.W.2d 
920, 929 (TexApp.—Houston Ll4th Dist.] 
1994, no writ) (citing Balderama v. Western 
Casualty Life Ins. Co., 825 S.W.2d 432, 434 
(Tex.1991); see State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. 
Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430, 438 (Tex.1995) 
(Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
[20,21] As noted above, other jurisdic-
tions addressing this policy language have 
variously found for or against coverage. For 
example, in Ceci v. National Indent. Co., 225 
Conn. 165, 622 A.2d 545, 549 (1993), the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the 
family-oriented language in a policy insuring 
a family-owned and operated corporation 
provided coverage to the brother of the cor-
poration's sole stockholder. The court found 
the policy ambiguous and noted: 
By inserting a family member provision 
in the business policy, the defendant has 
left the [appellants] in the unenviable posi-
tion of having to divine the meaning and 
purpose of the family member language in 
the context of the policy The defen-
dant could have clarified or omitted the 
problematic language to provide notice to 
the [appellants] of the precise nature of the 
coverage that was being purchased. It 
failed to do so, . . . thereby creating the 
ambiguity in the policy. 
Id at 550; see Hager v. American West Ins. 
Co., 732 F.Supp. 1072, 1075 (D.Mont.1989) 
(ambiguity is created by utilizing term "fami-
ly member" in a policy issued to a closely 
held family corporation). Appellant contends 
that this is a minority position and that a 
majority of courts do not find ambiguity or 
coverage under similar wording.3 However, 
S.E.2d 497 (N.C. 1991); see also Peterson v. Uni-
versal Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 1309 
(Ind.Ct.App.1991) (majority shareholder, who 
was also an officer and employee, not covered 
under corporate policy). Indeed, Sproles and 
Huebner were relied upon by the First Court of 
Appeals in Webster to determine that employees 
are not covered. But. as previously explained, 
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as noted in Pioneer Chlor Alkali when insur-
ance policy language has not been previously 
interpreted by Texas courts, we look to other 
jurisdictions in which the courts have inter-
preted the same language. Pioneer Chlor 
Alkali 879 S.W.2d at 929. While we recog-
nize that decisions in other jurisdictions are 
merely persuasive authority, when those 
cases have reached differing conclusions we 
may certainly consider this to be further 
evidence that the language at issue is "sus-
ceptible of two reasonable conclusions." Id. 
In such a circumstance, following the dictates 
of the supreme court, we necessarily must 
adopt the construction that most favors the 
insured and must, as a matter of law, find in 
favor of coverage. Balderama, 825 S.W.2d 
at 434; Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d at 
555; Ramsay, 533 S.W.2d at 349. We con-
clude that the trial court did not err in 
finding, as a matter of law, that Kelly McKee 
was covered as a "family member" under the 
UM/UIM and PIP endorsements of the poli-
cy at issue. 
Penalty under Article 5.06-3 
[22] Appellees contend that they are also 
entitled to a twelve percent penalty under 
article 5.06-3 of the insurance code. TEXINS. 
CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon 1981). This 
provision entitles an insured to recover a 
twelve percent penalty when PIP proceeds 
are not paid within thirty days. The wording 
of the statute is mandatory: 
In the event the insurer fails to pay such 
benefits when due, the person entitled to 
such benefits may bring an action in con-
tract to recover the same; and, in the 
event the insurer is required to pay such 
benefits, the person entitled to such bene-
fits shall be entitled to recover . . . 12% 
penalty, plus interest thereon[.l 
Id. art. 5.06-3(d)(3). The statute provides no 
exception for the withholding of benefits in 
good faith pending resolution of a dispute. 
We therefore affirm the granting of the 
twelve percent penalty. 
Attorney Fees 
[23,24] Appellees contend that they are 
entitled to attorney fees for the prosecution 
of this declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine coverage because they requested the 
we find the si tuation in which an employee seeks 
fees in their motion for summary judgment 
and the court granted their motion "in all 
things." The order granting the motion does 
not mention attorney fees. Appellees ask 
that this court remand to the trial court for a 
determination of fees, because no proof was 
proffered as to the amount of reasonable 
attorney fees, nor were they mentioned at 
the hearing on the summary judgment. Al-
though appellant did not challenge an award 
of attorney fees on appeal, it challenged ap-
pellees' right to attorney fees in its motion 
for new trial, and it contends that the trial 
court's order severing the declaratory judg-
ment cause of action from the rest of appel-
lees' suit clearly severed the issue of attorney 
fees. The Agreed Order on Severance and 
Abatement, signed February 1, 1995, stated: 
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DE-
CREED that all of Plaintiffs' claims and/or 
causes of action, including all Plaintiffs' 
claims for attorney's fees, against Grain 
Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, ex-
cept Plaintiffs' cause of action for declara-
tory judgment on the coverage issue and 
the counterclaim of Grain Dealers Mutual 
Insurance Company for declaratory judg-
ment on the coverage issue, are nearby 
severed from the above-styled and num-
bered suit [and] that all such severed 
claims and causes of action . . . are hearby 
abated. . . . (emphasis added). 
Appellees point out that the severance order 
was signed after the order entering summary 
judgment, and thereby contend that the 
grant of all relief prayed for in their motion, 
including attorney fees, is not covered by the 
subsequent severance order. However, until 
the coverage issue was severed from the 
balance of the suit by the February 1, 1995, 
order, the summary judgment order was in-
terlocutory. See City of Beaumont v. Guillo-
ry, 751 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex.1988) (summary 
judgment on some issues in pending suit is 
interlocutory until severed by trial court); 
see also McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450, 
452-53 (Tex. 1993) (order severing part of a 
cause of action is effective when signed). 
Nonetheless, we agree with appellees that 
the summary judgment order on the declara-
tory judgment action included a grant of 
coverage dist inguishable from the case before us. 
LAUREL LAND MEM. PARK v. 
Cite as 911 S.W^d 783 
attorney fees for the declaratory judgment 
portion only. However, the trial court's sev-
erance order clearly severed and abated any 
determination of attorney fees until the cov-
erage issue was settled. Further, no compe-
tent proof of the amount of attorney fees was 
presented to the trial court in the declaratory 
judgment action. We conclude that the 
amount of attorney's fees for the declaratory 
judgment action, which fees are granted to 
appellees by the summary judgment, is to be 
determined when the severed cause is heard. 
The judgment of the trial court is AF-
FIRMED. 
O | HYMJMBtR SYSTEM V 
LAUREL LAND MEMORIAL PARK, 
INC., Little Bethel Memorial Park, Inc., 
Restland of Dallas, Inc., and Roselawn 
Memorial Gardens, Inc., Appellants, 
v. 
DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DIS-
TRICT, Dallas Central Appraisal Dis-
trict Appraisal Review Board, and Foy 
Mitchell, Jr., Appellees. 
No. 05-94-41668-CV. 
Court of Appeals of Texas, 
Dallas. 
Oct. 20, 1995. 
Taxpayers filed suit to challenge ap-
praisal district's decision to assess ad valo-
rem taxes on taxpayers' publicly dedicated 
cemetery property. The 160th Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Dallas County, granted summary 
judgment to appraisal district, and taxpayers 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Morris, J., 
held that publicly dedicated cemetery prop-
erty was statutorily exempt from ad valorem 
taxation. 
Reversed. 
1. Judgment <^185(2) 
When both parties move for summary 
judgment, each must carry its own burden of 
proof to show entitlement to summary judg-
ment as matter of law by conclusively prov-
ing all elements of cause of action or defense. 
DALLAS CENT. APPRAISAL Tex. 783 
(TejeApp.—Dallas 1995) 
2. Taxation <3=>245 
Under Tax Code, property qualifies for 
tax exemption as cemetery if it is used exclu-
sively for human burial, and not held for 
profit. V.T.C.A., Tax Code § 11.17. 
3. Taxation <3=>245 
Taxpayer's publicly dedicated cemetery 
property was exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion as matter of law, regardless of taxpay-
er's corporate character, as once cemetery 
property was dedicated as required by 
Health and Safety Code, it was no longer 
held for profit and could only be used for 
human burial. V.T.C.A., Tax Code § 11.17; 
V.T.C.A., Health & Safety Code § 711.035. 
4. Dedication <§»57 
Effect of publicly dedicating cemetery 
property is to commit land to public purpose 
different from any other land. V.T.CA, 
Health & Safety Code § 711.035. 
5. Taxation <3=>245 
Once property is publicly dedicated for 
cemetery, property not only must be used 
exclusively for cemetery purposes as re-
quired by Health and Safety Code, but also 
must be used exclusively for human burial as 
contemplated by Tax Code, to qualify for 
exemption from ad valorem taxation. 
V.T.C.A., Tax Code § 11.17; V.T.C.A., 
Health & Safety Code § 711.035. 
6. Taxation <3=>245 
Once public dedication fixes property's 
use as cemetery, dedication also causes prop-
erty not to be held for profit, for purposes of 
exemption from ad valorem taxes, as public 
dedication of land for burial purposes effects 
abandonment of land's use and possession for 
all purposes other than burial. V.T.C.A., Tax 
Code § 11.17; V.T.C.A., Health & Safety 
Code § 711.035. 
7. Dedication <3=>53 
Once property is dedicated for use as 
cemetery, it cannot be sold or otherwise dis-
posed of for any purpose other than burial. 
V.T.C.A., Health & Safety Code § 711.035. 
8. Dedication §=53 
Property dedicated as cemetery can no 
longer be subject of any conveyance or inher-
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amination. This Court held that such rules 
were invalid because they exceeded the ex-
press grant of rulemaking authority con-
ferred upon the board by statute. "Admin-
istrative agencies, of course, have only 
those powers specifically conferred upon 
them by the legislature." 594 P.2d at 332. 
Any rule promulgated by an administrative 
agency that is "out of harmony" with the 
enabling statute will be void. In Bell, wc 
said: 
"The courts have uniformly held that ad-
ministrative regulations are 'out of har-
mony' with legislative guidelines if they: 
(1) 'engraft additional and contradictory 
requirements on the statute* (citing 
cases); or (2) 4if they engraft additional, 
noncontradictory requirements on the 
statute which were not envisioned by the 
legislature.' (citing cases)." 594 P.2d at 
333. 
In Brd. of Barbers, we considered a factu-
al situation somewhat similar to the present 
case. In that case, the statute provided 
that an applicant serve a one-year appren-
ticeship before being eligible for licensure 
as a barber. By rule, the board added to 
this statutory condition a requirement that 
the one year apprenticeship must include at 
least six months in a "commercial barber-
shop." We held that the rule imposed an 
additional requirement not envisioned by 
the legislature and was invalid. 
Similarly, courts in other states have 
stricken administrative rules which have 
added conditions for licensure under grand-
father clauses. See Bloom v. Texas State 
Bd. of Exam, of Psychologists (Tex.1973), 
492 S.W.2d 460; and Whittle v. St. Bd. of 
Examiners of Psychologists (Okla.1971), 483 
P.2d 328. 
The board here has promulgated a rule 
clearly imposing an additional requirement 
not envisioned by the legislature. The stat-
ute requires a master's degree and five 
years of professional experience, and pre-
scribes no chronological order in which 
these requirements must be met. The leg-
islature knew how to prescribe such a 
chronological order. In section 37-17-
302(2Ke), which deals with the qualifica-
tions of applicants not within the grandfa-
ther clause, the statute requires two years 
of professional experience and that "One 
year of this experience shall be post doctor-
al." The legislature clearly chose not to 
impose a chronological requirement in the 
grandfather clause. 
The board is statutorily charged with re-
viewing the character of an applicants pro-
fessional experience. In its reliance upon 
this rule, the board failed to examine the 
character of McPhail's experience. Instead, 
it denied him a license by promulgation of a 
rule "out of harmony" with the grandfather 
clause. 
We reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and order that the case be remanded 
to the board so that it may consider 
McPhail's application on the merits of his 
professional experience both before and af-
ter he received his master's degree. 
HASWELL, C.J., and DALY, SHEEHY 
and WEBER, JJ., concur. 
'o | KEVNUMICRSVSUM; 
Helen JACOBSON and Elva J. Dike, Per-
sonal Representatives of the Estate of 
Sammy D. Harlan, Plaintiff and Respon-
dent, 
v. 
IMPLEMENT DEALERS MUTUAL IN-
SURANCE CO. and Kenneth Heimer, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 81-226. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted Dec. 1, 1981. 
Decided Feb. 17, 1982. 
Personal representatives of estate of 
deceased insured brought action against in-
surer to enforce uninsured motorist cover-
JACOBSON v. IMPLEMENT 
Cite at, Mont., 
age of automobile liability insurance policy 
issued by insurer. The District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, 
James B. Wheelis, P. J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defend-
ant insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Daly, J., held that policy's exclusion, which 
provided that policy did not apply to bodily 
injury to insured while occupying automo-
bile, other than insured automobile, owned 
by named insured, was invalidated by Mon-
tana's mandatory uninsured motorist cover-
age statute. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance <8=>467.51 (3) 
Automobile liability insurance policy's 
exclusion, which provided that policy did 
not apply to bodily injury to insured while 
occupying automobile, other than insured 
automobile, owned by named insured, was 
invalidated by Montana's mandatory unin-
sured motorist coverage statute, as such 
exclusion was violation of public policy be-
hind such statute of protecting policyhold-
ers from uninsured motorists in all instanc-
es and tned to limit scope of coverage man-
dated by such statute. MCA 33-23-201. 
2. Insurance «=>467.51(2) 
All waivers of uninsured motorist cov-
erage are not improper, but waiver must be 
expressed by insured in manner that is 
clear, concise and equitable to both parties 
involved in insurance contract. 
3. Insurance «=>467.51(3) 
Where automobile liability insurance 
policy's exclusion clause, which provided 
that policy did not apply to bodily injury to 
insured while occupying automobile, other 
than insured automobile, owned by named 
insured, was lost in myriad of verbiage that 
made up insurance contract, and would be 
unnoticeable by average policyholder, such 
exclusion clause could never constitute ex-
press waiver of uninsured motorist cover-
age. 
Worden, Thane & Haines, Robert J. Phil-
lips, Missoula, for defendant and appellant. 
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Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Paul C. 
Meismer, argued, Missoula, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
DALY, Justice. 
This is an appeal from the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Montana, in and for the County of Mis-
soula, the Honorable James B. Wheelis pre-
siding. Plaintiffs are the personal repre-
sentatives of the estate of Sammy D. Har-
lan, deceased. They commenced this action 
in District Court to enforce the uninsured 
motorist coverage of an insurance policy 
issued by defendant and appellant, Imple-
ment Dealers Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter I DM), to the plaintiffs' dece-
dent (Harlan). Both parties moved for a 
summary judgment on the issue of the 
availability of uninsured motorist coverage. 
The District Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs. IDM ap-
peals from the summary judgment and re-
quests that this Court reverse the District 
Court and grant judgment in its favor on 
the basis that there is no coverage available 
in this case. 
Sammy D. Harlan died as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident two and one-half 
miles east of Big Timber, Montana, on June 
20, 1978, when the 1974 Peterbilt tractor-
trailer unit which he owned and was driv-
ing was involved in a collision with a motor 
vehicle driven by Kenneth Heimer. By 
stipulation of counsel, Heimer is deemed to 
be at fault in Sammy D. Harlan's death. 
Heimer had no liability insurance coverage 
at the time of the accident. 
Harlan had purchased a policy of automo-
bile liability insurance from IDM on a 1971 
Ford pickup truck which he owned. This 
policy provided for uninsured motorist cov-
erage in the amount of $25,000. The policy 
of insurance issued by IDM on the Ford 
pickup truck contained an exclusion which 
read: 
"This policy does not apply under Part 
IV: 
"(a) to bodily injury to an insured while 
occupying an automobile (other than an 
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insured automobile) owned by the named 
insured or a relative, or through being 
struck by such an automobile . . . " 
Montana's mandatory uninsured motorist 
coverage statute, section 33-23-201, MCA, 
requires all motor vehicle liability insurance 
policies issued in this state to include unin-
sured motorist coverage unless the named 
insured rejects such coverage. 
The statute in question, section 33-23-
201, MCA, provides: 
"Motor vehicle liability policies to include 
uninsured motorist coverage—rejection 
by insured. (1) No automobile liability or 
motor vehicle liability policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability im-
posed by law for bodily injury or death 
suffered by any person arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a mo-
tor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for 
delivery in this state, with respect to any 
motor vehicle registered or principally ga-
raged in this state, unless coverage is 
provided therein or supplemental thereto, 
in limits for bodily injury or death set 
forth in 61-6-103, under provisions filed 
with and approved by the commissioner, 
for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or opera-
tors of uninsured motor vehicles because 
of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, in-
cluding death, resulting therefrom. 
"(2) The named insured shall'have the 
right to reject such coverage. Unless the 
named insured requests such coverage in 
writing, such coverage need not be pro-
vided in or supplemental to a renewal 
policy where the named insured had re-
jected the coverage in connection with 
the policy previously issued to hint by the 
same insurer." 
[1] One issue is presented to this Court 
on appeal: Did the District Court err in 
holding that the insurance policy's exclusion 
(a) was not a permissible limitation under 
Montana insurance law? 
Appellant contends exclusion (a) is not 
invalidate1 " section 33-23-201, MCA. 
More sr ~dy, appellant argues that be-
causr re is no express provision in the 
statute which prohibits this type of exclu-
sion, it is thereby valid. Further, it is ar-
gued that if the legislature wished to pro-
scribe this type of exclusion, it would have 
done so. Finally, appellant contends that in 
the interest of public policy, the exclusion 
should be held to be valid. 
While it is true that courts in several 
states have upheld the validity of exclusion 
clauses similar to exclusion (a), the majority 
of courts have held similar exclusion clauses 
are in conflict with the uninsured motorist 
statutes. See, State Farm Automobile In-
surance Co. v. Reaves (1974), 292 Ala. 218, 
292 So.2d 95; Mullis v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. (Fla.1971), 2^2 So.2d 
229; Bass v. State Farm Mut. Auto: Ins. Co. 
(1973), 128 Ga.App. 285, 196 S.E.2d 485, 
modified, 231 Ga. 269, 201 S.E.2d 444; Dox-
tuter v. Statu Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 547, 290 
N.E.2d 284; State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Ins. Co. v. Robertson (1973), 156 Ind. 
App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626; Cannon v. Amer-
ican Underwriters, Inc. (1971), 150 Ind. A pp. 
21, 275 N.E.2d 567; Elleilge v. Warren (La. 
App.1972), 263 So.2d 912; Nygaard v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1974), 
301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151; State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hinkel 
(1971), 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151; Bell v. 
State Farm Mut. Adto. Ins. Co. (1974), 157 
W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147; Widiss, A Guide 
To Uninsured Motorist Coverage, § 2.9 at 
31 (1981). 
The discussions upholding the validity of 
exclusion clauses do so on the grounds that 
if a statute is silent there is no reason to 
prevent the withholding of coverage by the 
insurer. Widiss, supra, at 30; see also, Rod-
riquez v. Maryland Indemnity Insurance 
Co. (1975), 24 Ariz.App. 392, 539 P.2d 196; 
Barton v. American Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co. (Mo.App.1972), 485 S.W.2d 628. 
Regardless of this rationale, this Court 
elects to follow the majority position. 
There are two equally sound positions 
adopted by the majority of courts holding 
this type of exclusion clause to be invalid-
First, the exclusionary clause is ineffective 
because it reduces the scope of coverage 
JACOBSON v. IMPLEMENT 
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required by the statutory mandate. Mullis 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. (Fla.1971), 252 So.2d 229; Allstate 
Insurance Company v. Meeks (1967), 207 
Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222; Federated Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Raynes (1977), 88 Wash.2d 
439, 563 P.2d 815. In Mullis, the court 
stated: 
"The public policy of the uninsured mo-
torist statute (Section 627.0851) is to pro-
vide uniform and specific insurance bene-
fits to members of the public to cover 
damages for bodily injury caused by the 
negligence of insolvent or uninsured mo-
torists and such statutorily fixed and pre-
scribed protection is not reducible by in-
surers' policy exclusions and exceptions 
any more than are the benefits provided 
for persons protected by automobile lia-
bility insurance secured in compliance 
with the Financial Responsibility Law. 
"Insurers or carriers writing automobile 
liability insurance and reciprocal unin-
sured motorist insurance are not permit-
ted by law to insert provisions in the 
policies they issue that exclude or reduce 
the liability coverage prescribed by law 
for the class of persons insured thereun-
der who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of mo-
tor vehicles because of bodily injury." 
252 So.2d at 233-234. 
The second, and equally sound, rationale 
is that the clause is contrary to the public 
policy embodied in the statute. Phillips v. 
Midwest Mutual Insurance Company (1971), 
329 F.Supp. 853. The policy behind the 
statute is to protect the policyholders from 
uninsured motorists in all instances. 
In this case, when exclusion (a) is ana-
lyzed under either or both of the above 
rationales, it is clear that the exclusion is a 
violation of public policy and Montana in-
surance law, and that it tries to limit the 
scope of coverage mandated by section 32-
23-201, MCA. 
Appellant alleges that there is a connec-
tion between the automobile which is in-
sured and the uninsured motorist coverage. 
It is contended that the connection is based 
upon the additional risk which the insur-
DEALERS MUT. INS. CO. Mont. 9 H 
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ance company incurs by the operation of 
the insured vehicle. Also, it is contended 
that the risk of a party being injured by an 
uninsured motorist increases when a person 
is operating a motor vehicle. Therefore, 
appellant concludes that an insurer must 
attempt to exclude from its coverage any 
activity involving a risk for which it cannot 
collect a premium or for which the premium 
cannot be calculated. 
The arguments made by appellant may 
be true, and they are certainly reflective of 
sound business judgment. However, they 
fail to address the underlying purpose and 
scope of the uninsured motorist statute. 
The court in Elledge v. Warren (La.App. 
1972), 263 So.2d 912, when discussing the 
purpose of its uninsured motorist statute, 
stated: 
"The purpose of the statute is to protect 
completely, those willing to accept its 
protection, /rom all harm, whatever their 
status—passenger, driver, pedestrian—at 
the time of injury, produced by uninsured 
motorists. The only restrictions are that 
the plaintiff must be an insured, the de-
fendant motorist uninsured, and that 
plaintiff be legally entitled to recover. 
We will not enlarge upon these qualifica-
tions and restrict the coverage of such a 
socially desirable policy by allowing insur-
ance companies to pursue alleged 'busi-
ness interests.' 
" . . . An insurance company may not cre-
ate irrational and illusory 'business inter-
ests' and interpose them as a bar to the 
comprehensive coverage required by our 
statute." 263 So.2d at 918-919. 
Appellant's argument that premiums for 
uninsured motorist coverage are somehow 
risk-related is unfounded. The type of pre-
mium charged for uninsured motorist pro-
tection illustrates the coverage afforded. 
The rate is a flat rate, and coverage is 
available to everyone at the same rate. 
The rate is not related to risk. In this 
instance, the fact that Harlan had pur-
chased uninsured motorist coverage for only 
one vehicle and paid a premium on this 
vehicle does not give rise to the exclusion of 
coverage on any other owned vehicles. In 
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ither words, the importance or value of the 
mputed business purpose for this exclusion 
eems tenuous as applied to the purchaser 
vho owns more than one vehicle. Acquisi-
ion of insurance for a second vehicle, espe-
ially with premiums that are not risk-relat-
;d, is relatively inexpensive; therefore, per-
nitting the insurer to withhold coverage 
or the small return seems of dubious merit. 
Widiss, supra, § 2.9 at 29. 
There is no requirement that the insured 
)e occupying an insured vehicle. There-
Tore, there is no connection between the 
nsured and the automobile listed on the 
)olicy. The named automobile merely illus-
rates that the person has satisfied the legal 
•equirement of purchasing insurance and 
lias uninsured motorist coverage unless ex-
pressly waived. Montana's uninsured mo-
torist coverage is personal and portable. 
This point was exemplified by the court in 
Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (1980), 409 
Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141, when it held: 
"We conclude that once uninsured motor-
ist coverage is purchased, the insured and 
his relatives insured for liability have un-
insured motorist protection under all cir-
cumstances. Uninsured motorist cover-
age, like no-fault coverage, is personal 
and portable. 
" . . . They are insured when injured in an 
owned vehicle named in the policy, in an 
owned vehicle not named in the policy, in 
an unowned vehicle, on a motorcycle, on a 
bicycle, whether afoot or on horseback or 
even on a pogo stick." 294 N.W.2d at 
152. 
[2,3] It must be emphasized that all 
waivers of uninsured motorist coverage are 
not improper. The waiver must be ex-
pressed by the insured in a manner that is 
clear, concise and equitable to both parties 
involved in the insurance contract. The 
exclusion clause in question in this case does 
not satisfy this requirement. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court, in Federated Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Raynes (1977), 88 Wash.2d 
439, 563 P.2d 815, when discussing an exclu-
sion clause similar to that presented here, 
stated: 
" . . . R.C"' 48.22.030 mandates unin-
sured ..at coverage 'for the protec-
tion of -^arsons insured' under the policy, 
unless the named insured rejects such 
coverage . . . the parties may agree to a 
narrow definition of insured so long as 
that definition is applied consistently 
throughout the policy, but once it is de-
termined that a person is an insured un-
der the policy, that person is entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage. Respon-
dent is a named insured in F.A.I.'s policy. 
Exclusion (b) does not narrow the defini-
tion of insured so as to exclude from 
being an insured under the policy. Rath-
er, the exclusion merely excludes cover-
age when the insured is injured in a 
certain situation, i.e., occupying a car 
owned by him but not insured by F.A.I. 
This attempt to exclude coverage for an 
insured is impermissible under R.C.W. 
48.22.030." 563 P.2d at 818. 
See also, Chnffec v. USF&G (1979), 181 
Mont. 1, 591 P.2d 1102, 36 St.Hep. 398. 
The exclusion clause in the TDM policy is 
lost in the myriad of verbiage that makes 
up the insurance contract. This particular 
exclusion clause would be unnoticeable by 
the average policyholder and can, therefore, 
never constitute an express waiver. 
The judgment of the District tyurt is 
affirmed. 
HASWELL, C. J., and HARfllSON, 
SHEA, SHEEHY, MORRISON and WEB-
ER, JJ., concur. 
Fred REED, Petitioner, 
v. 
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., 
Respondent. 
No. 81-288. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted Dec. 7, 1981. 
Decided Feb. 18, 1982. 
Case was certified from United States 
District Court for the District of Montana 
REED v. AMERICAN AIRLINES. INC. 
Cite as. Mont.. 040 P.2d 912 
Mont. 913 
to the Montana Supreme Court for purposes 
of determining whether airline, defendant 
in a negligence action, was found in Mon-
tana. The Supreme Court, Morrison, J., 
held that where airline solicited business in 
Montana by listings in 19 Montana tele-
phone directories, by television advertising 
broadcasts in Montana, and by furnishing 
material to travel agents in Montana, air-
line personnel occasionally came to Montana 
to instruct Montana travel agents, and air-
line had provided a service enabling Mon-
tana residents to call toll free, scheduling 
flights on airline, airline was "found within 
Montana," and thus there was in personam 
jurisdiction in United States District Court 
for the District of Montana. 
Order accordingly. 
Daly, J., dissented and filed opinion, in 
which Haswell, ('. J., joined. 
1. Federal Courts «=>81 
Where airline solicited business in Mon-
tana by listings in 19 Montana telephone 
directories, by television advertising broad-
cast in Montana, and by furnishing material 
to travel agents in Montana, airline person-
nel occasionally came to Montana to in-
struct Montana travel agents, and airline 
provided service enabling Montana resi-
dents to call toll free, scheduling flights on 
airline, airline was "found within Mon-
tana," and thus there was in personam jur-
isdiction in the United States District Court 
for the District of Montana. 
2. Corporations «*=» 642(6) 
Before activities of a foreign corpora-
tion can create a physical presence within 
state for purposes of in personam jurisdic-
tion, those activities must be substantial, 
continuous, and systematic as opposed to 
isolated, casual, or incidental; the activities 
must comprise a significant component of 
the comimny's business, although percent-
age as related to total business may be 
small. 
William Boggs, argued, Missoula, for pe-
titioner. 
Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Sternhagen & 
Johnson, Helena, Kieth Keller, argued, Hel-
ena, for respondent. 
MORRISON, Justice. 
This case is certified from U.S. District 
Court, the District of Montana, Missoula 
Division. Petitioner had filed a diversity 
action based upon the alleged negligence of 
American Airlines, Inc., in the handling and 
subsequent loss of petitioner's luggage in 
New York City. In that complaint, plain-
tiff Reed affirmatively alleged that the de-
fendant corporation was "found within 
Montana." Defendant, American Airlines, 
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 
the reason that the United States District 
Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. The certification followed. 
•» Certification presents the following is-
sues; 
"(1) Was the defendant American Air-
lines found in Montana? 
"(2) If not, do the lettered subdivisions of 
Rule 4B(1) extend that jurisdiction to 
cases where the claim does not arise out 
of the doing of the acts mentioned in the 
lettered subdivisions?" 
We find issue 1 to be dispositive. 
Resolution of the first issue depends upon 
the facts found in this record. We there-
fore set them forth in detail. 
Plaintiff traveled to New York City from 
Missoula, Montana, via Northwest Airlines 
on December 5, 1978. Plaintiff intended to 
transfer flights and continue to Nepal on 
British Airways. During the process of 
transfer, the plaintiff lost a case containing 
in excess of $2,000 worth of professional 
camera equipment. The case ultimately ar-
rived in Nepal several weeks later but was 
found to be empty. The damages attend-
ant this loss formed the basis of plaintiff's 
claim. 
Except for an infrequent charter flight, 
American Airlines does not fly into or out 
of Montana. It has no property nor person-
nel in Montana. It pays no taxes in Mon-
tana. American Airlines does solicit busi-
ness in Montana by listings in 19 Montana 
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In light of the Ninth Circuit's ruling de-
nying Defendant's petition it is no longer 
necessary to reach the merits of Plaintiff 
Lum's motion. "A case is 'moot' . . . 'when 
a determination is sought on a matter 
which, when rendered, cannot have any 
practical effect on the existing controver-
sy.' " Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. 
Director of Revenue, 650 F.Supp. 1217, 
1220 (N.D.I11.1986), quoting, Leonhart v. 
McCormick, 395 F.Supp. 1073, 1076 (W.D. 
Pa. 1975). Since a determination on Plain-
tiff Lum's motion cannot have any practical 
effect on the existing controversy this mo-
tion must be dismissed as moot. By deny-
ing Defendant's petition the Ninth Circuit, 
in effect, upheld this court's ruling limiting 
Caldeira to affording full faith and credit 
only where there has been a review on the 
merits of an arbitrator's decision. More-
over, since the Ninth Circuit apparently 
agreed with this Court that Caldeira is not 
controlling under the facts of this case; the 
Ninth Circuit had no need to address the 
Supreme Court's aforesaid concern that an 
arbitration proceeding is not an appropriate 
forum to decide federal statutory and con-
stitutional rights. 
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that 
Plaintiff Lum's Motion for Reconsideration 
be DISMISSED as moot 
Colleen L. HAGER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
AMERICAN WEST INSURANCE COM-
PANY (formerly known as Implement 
Dealers Mutual Insurance Company), 
Defendant. 
No. CV-88-185-GF. 
United States District Court, 
D. Montana, 
Great Falls Division. 
Oct. 11, 1989. 
Injured shareholder brought diversity 
action seeking compensatory damages un-
der uninsured motorist provision of general 
liability automobile policy issued to closely 
held family corporation. On cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the District Court, 
Hatfield, Chief Judge, held that under Mon-
tana law, shareholder was an additional 
insured entitled to uninsured motorist cov-
erage under provisions defining insured as 
"You or any family memberT 
Plaintiff's motion granted and defen-
dant's motion denied. 
1. Insurance <s=>467.51(4) 
Members of class of insureds under 
automobile policy consisting of named in-
sured and relatives of named insured while 
resident in the same household need not be 
occupying an automobile in order to be 
afforded coverage under the uninsured mo-
torist provisions, under Montana law. 
2. Insurance <s=>467.51(3) 
Any attempt to exclude from coverage 
under uninsured motorist provisions those 
persons falling within the purview of the 
insured class created by the liability provi-
sions of the automobile policy are appropri-
ately rejected in favor of a construction of 
policy provisions consistent with remedial 
nature of uninsured motorist statutes. 
MCA 33-23-201. 
3. Insurance ®=>467.51(3) 
Intent of parties to insurance contract 
is of paramount significance in determining 
whether uninsured motorist provision is 
properly extended to a particular individu-
al. 
4. Insurance <s=>467.51(3) 
As a general rule, employees or offi-
cers of a corporate entity are not entitled 
to claim coverage under uninsured motorist 
provision in policy issued in the name of 
the corporate entity, where the employees 
or officers are not expressly named as in-
sureds under the policy. 
5. Insurance <3=»467.51(3) 
Where automobile liability policy con-
taining "family member" terminology has 
HAGER v. AMERICAN WEST INS. CO. 
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been issued to a closely held corporation, it 
is legitimate to conclude that the readily 
identifiable officers and shareholders of the 
corporate entity fall within the purview of 
the term "family member," in determining 
insured status. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Insurance ©=>146.7(1) 
Under Montana law, ambiguities in an 
insurance policy must be construed against 
the insurer in favor of the insured. 
7. Insurance <S=>467.51(3) 
Under Montana law, a minority share-
holder of an insured closely held family 
corporation was an additional insured enti-
tled to uninsured motorist coverage under 
automobile policy issued to the corporation, 
with respect to injuries sustained as a pe-
destrian, under uninsured motorist provi-
sions defining insured as "You or any 
family member." MCA 33-23-201. 
Michael W. Cotter, Cotter & Cotter, 
Great Falls, Mont., for plaintiff. 
Paul Haffeman and Edward W. Borer, 
Cure, Borer & Davis, Great Falls, Mont, 
for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
HATFIELD, Chief Judge. 
The plaintiff, Colleen Hager, instituted 
the present diversity action seeking com-
pensatory damages under the Uninsured 
Motorist provision of a general liability 
automobile insurance policy issued by the 
defendant, American West Insurance Com-
pany ("American West") to the closely held 
family corporation, Hager's, Inc. Hager 
1. Because the court finds that Hager is properly 
considered an insured under the subject policy 
and entitled to the protection afforded insureds 
by the uninsured motorist provision of the poli-
cy, the court need not address the correlative 
issue regarding Hager's entitlement to coverage 
: as a permissive user of a covered vehicle. In 
that regard, Hager argues in general that cover-
age under the uninsured motorist provisions 
must be coextensive with coverage under the 
, liability section of the policy. Restated, Hager 
asserts that persons covered under the liability 
seeks coverage under the uninsured motor-
ist provision of the policy for injuries she 
sustained after being struck by a hit and 
run vehicle as she was walking in a parking 
lot in Bozeman, Montana. The matter is 
presently before the court on the parties' 
cross motions for summary judgment. 
In denying coverage to Hager, American 
West maintains Hager was neither a 
named insured under the policy, nor was 
she entitled to coverage as a family mem-
ber of Hager's, Inc., the policy's sole 
named insured. Additionally, American 
West, contending that, at best, Hager was 
a permissive user of a covered vehicle at 
some point in time during the term of the 
subject policy, submits that as a non-in-
sured under the policy, Hager cannot be 
afforded coverage under the uninsured mo-
torist provision in that she was a pedestri-
an and not "an occupant" of a covered 
vehicle at the time of the mishap. 
The determinative issue is whether or 
not Hager was an insured within the mean-
ing of the subject policy. Because the 
court finds the answer to this query to be 
in the affirmative, Hager is clearly entitled 
to coverage under the uninsured motorist 
provisions of the policy. This point can 
hardly be disputed by the defendant in 
light of the Montana Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Jacobson v. Implement Dealers 
Mutual Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 542, 640 P.2d 
908, 911 (1982).1 Hager concedes that she 
was not a "named" insured under the sub-
ject policy, since the policy was issued to 
Hager's, Inc., a corporate entity. Hager 
contends, however, that even though she is 
not a named insured under the subject poli-
cy, as a minority shareholder of Hager's, 
Inc., she is an additional insured under the 
liability provisions of the policy and is cov-
provisions of the policy are also covered under 
the uninsured motorist provisions. Implicit in 
Hager's position is the conclusion that all per-
missive users would be entitled to coverage un-
der the uninsured motorist provisions of the 
policy regardless of their status at the time of 
injury. The court expressly declines to address 
this contention and expresses no opinion as to 
the validity of Hager's position since the court 
concludes Hager was an insured under the 
terms of the subject policy. 
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ered as an insured under the uninsured 
motorist provision of the policy. In sup-
port of her position, Hager emphasizes the 
undisputed fact that she consistently paid a 
premium to insure a vehicle she owned 
under the subject policy. 
The operative provisions of pertinence to 
the issue sub judice are as follows: 
First, at Part 1, Words and Phrases, "in-
sured" is defined: 
"Insured" means any person or organiza-
tion qualifying as an insured in the " Who 
is Insured " section of the applicable in-
surance. 
Second, the "Who is Insured" section of 
the policy defines insured as follows: 
1. You are an insured for any covered 
auto. 
2. Anyone else is an insured while us-
ing with your permission a covered auto 
you own, hire or borrow. . . . 
Third, the uninsured motorist provisions 
define an insured as follows: 
1. You or any family member. 
2. Anyone else occupying a covered 
auto or a temporary substitute for a 
covered auto. 
The thrust of the defendant's position is 
that Hager is not the named insured or a 
"family member" of the named insured, 
i.e., Hager's, Inc., and consequently, is not 
entitled to coverage under the uninsured 
motorist provisions of the policy. The de-
fendant acknowledges that Hager is a 
shareholder in Hager's, Inc., a closely held 
family corporation, but reasons a priori 
from the fact that Hager's, Inc., is a corpo-
rate entity, that it cannot have any "family 
member" in the literal sense. 
[1-3] The provisions of the subject poli-
cy affording protection against uninsured 
motorists define the term "insured" in the 
acknowledged standard form to mean the 
named insured, and any relative of the 
2. Public policy considerations aside, the intent 
of the parties to the insurance contract is of 
paramount significance in determining whether 
an uninsured motorist provision is properly ex-
tended to a particular individual. See, United 
Services Auto Assn. v. Akers, 102 Nev. 598, 729 
P.2d 495 (1986). In that regard, the court notes 
that the defendant, in moving for summary 
named insured while a resident in the samegS 
household as the insured. The definitional 
also includes any other person while occu-*$| 
pying an insured vehicle. The first of the»£i 
two classes of insured claimants consists of Sj3 
the named insured, and any member of thevffl 
named insured residing in that individual's^ 
household. As noted, Jacobson establishes^ 
that members of the first class need not be M 
occupying an automobile in order to be §1 
afforded coverage under the uninsured mo- M 
torist provisions. Jacobson, 640 P.2d at'1*! 
911-912. See also, Lopez v. Foundaiioifm 
Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.Mex. 166, 646 P.2dfl 
1230 (1982). Any attempt to exclude per-
sons falling within the purview of the classj 
created by the provisions of the policy arejS 
appropriately rejected in favor of a con-M 
struction of policy provisions consistent^ 
with the remedial nature of uninsured men 
torist statutes. See, e.g., Hulsey v. Ameri-fi 
can Family Mutual Ins. Co., 142 Wis.2d 
639, 419 N.W.2d 288 (1987); Cadillac Mu^ 
tual Ins. Co. v. Bell, 50 Mich.App. 144, 212^ 
N.W.2d 816 (1973); California Casualty 
Indemnity Exchange v. Stevens, 5 CaL 
App.3d 304, 85 Cal.Rptr. 82 (1970). This; 
conclusion is consistent with the generally, 
accepted principle that the uninsured r h o - ^ 
torist coverage of an insurance policy may 
not limit the class of persons covered under 
the endorsement to a group smaller than 
that covered under the liability provisions_ 
of the same policy. See, e.g., Girrens y£ 
Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 238 Kan; 
670, 715 P.2d 389 (1986); Welch by Rich-, 
ards v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Caljj 
122 Wis.2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985)M| 
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Jackj^ 
son, 462 So.2d 346 (Ala. 1984); Abshere v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 38 Wash.App. 1, 683! 
P.2d 625 (Wash.Ct.App.1984); Anderson v. 
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 471 
N.E.2d 1170 (Ind.App.1984).2 
judgment, has failed to establish by affidavit, orj 
otherwise, its intent in issuing the subject poli-^  
cy, and utilizing the language ordinarily utilized 
in an individual automobile liability insurance 
policy. Rather, defendant's motion is based, 
upon what it perceives to be an unequivocal 
expression of the parties' intent as reflected-lrf 
the language utilized in the policy itself. ^ 
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[4, 5] With the foregoing general obser-
vations in mind, the court turns to consider 
the present situation where a corporate 
entity is the named insured under an auto-
mobile liability policy providing uninsured 
motorist coverage. At first blush, it would 
appear reasonable to accept the proposition 
offered by the defendant to the effect that 
where a corporate entity is the named in-
sured, a particular individual would be cov-
ered under the uninsured motorist provi-
sions of a liability policy only if separately 
named as an insured. In fact, as the defen-
dant accurately notes, a number of courts 
have accepted this proposition. See, e.g., 
Berry v. Aetna Casualty and Ins. Co., 607 
F.Supp. 397 (S.D.Miss.1985); General Ins. 
Co. of America v. Icelandic Builders, Inc., 
24 Wash.App. 656, 604 P.2d 966 (1979). 
The court has no quarrel with the general 
rule that the employees or officers of a 
corporate entity are not entitled to claim 
coverage under an uninsured motorist pro-
vision contained in a policy issued in the 
name of the corporate entity, where the 
employees or officers are not expressly 
named as insureds under the subject policy. 
However, the defendant cannot simply ig-
nore the fact that the corporate entity in 
the case at bar is a closely held corporation 
with limited and clearly identifiable officers 
and shareholders. Where an automobile 
liability policy containing the "family mem-
ber" terminology has been issued to a 
closely held corporation, it is entirely legit-
imate to conclude the readily identifiable 
officers and shareholders of that corporate 
entity fall within the purview of that termi-
nology.3 The construction of a policy in 
this manner is consistent with the remedial 
nature of uninsured motorist statutes. 
See, Kay sen v. Federal Ins. Co., 268 
N.W.2d 920 (Minn.1978). 
[6, 7] The court's conclusion is not only 
consistent with the remedial nature of Mon-
3. The court is cognizant of the fact that a defini-
tive ruling on the precise issue presented for 
determination has not been rendered by the 
Montana Supreme Court. However, when 
presented with an issue of substantive state law 
as to which there has not been a definitive 
ruling by the Montana Supreme Court, this 
court, guided by all available sources of Mon-
tana law, must undertake to predict how the 
tana's uninsured motorist statute, Mont. 
Code Ann. § 33-23-201, but, under the cir-
cumstances of the case at bar, is compelled 
by the law of Montana recognizing that 
ambiguities in an insurance policy must be 
construed against the insurer and in favor 
of the insured. See, State Farm v. Taylor, 
223 Mont. 215, 725 P.2d 821, 823 (1986) 
{citing, Bauer Ranch v. Mountain West 
Farm Bureau Mutual Ins., 215 Mont. 153, 
695 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1985). The ambiguity 
in the subject policy is created by utiliza-
tion of the term "family member" in a 
policy issued to a closely held family corpo-
ration. A construction of the term based 
upon the conclusion that a corporation can-
not have "family members" in the literal 
sense, would directly contravene the man-
date of Montana law requiring the ambi-
guity to be construed against the defen-
dant. Consequently, the court finds that 
coverage under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision of the automobile liability policy is-
sued by the defendant to Hager's, Inc., is 
appropriately extended to the plaintiff, Col-
leen L. Hager, as a shareholder of that 
closely held corporation for the injuries she 
sustained in the hit and run accident of 
October, 1985. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the 
court concludes the plaintiffs nfotion for 
partial summary judgment bewand the 
same hereby is, GRANTED; lm the mo-
tion for summary judgment of ihe defen-
dant is appropriately DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
| KIYNUMBIR SYSTEM > 
Montana Supreme Court would rule if confront-
ed with that issue of law. See, Meredith v. 
Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 
(1943); Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 
1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1985); cert, dismissed, 473 
U.S. 934, 106 S.Ct. 30, 87 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985); 
Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Service, 625 
F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.1980). 
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e that Rosack represents the better 
neuter, decided by division three of 
court, and Morrissey, decided by divi-
one of this court, both involved ap-
s after final judgment challenging or-
of the trial court denying class certifi-
m and dismissing the class allegations. 
ri cases, relying on the holding in Daar 
'ellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, 
. 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732, that the 
er was appealable when made, held the 
eals untimely. In Hogya the court ap-
ently assumed without deciding that an 
mediate appeal from the order dismiss-
the suit as a class action was not avail-
'3. That court found that under the 
ts of the case an appeal after final judg-
at was not a practical remedy and that 
•ellate intervention by way of writ of 
ndate was warranted because the issue 
sed was substantial and one of first im-
ssion. {Hogya v. Superior Court, su-
% 75 Cal.App.3d at pp. 130-132, 142 Cal. 
tr. 325.) In Rosack, the court deter-
ned an order denying class certification 
d dismissing the class action was not an 
pealable order and that "[a] party seek-
* an earlier appellate review of an order 
class certification must rely on a writ of 
uidate as provided in Code of Civil Proce-
re sections 1085 and 1086." (Rosack v. 
Hvo of America Corp., supra, 131 Cal. 
Dp.3d at p. 749, 182 Cal.Rptr. 800.) 
We determine plaintiffs' appeal from this 
termediate order certifying a statewide 
assr action against General Motors vio-
tes the "final judgment rule" set forth in 
ode of Civil Procedure section 904.1. The 
rder certifyjng25i the class defined the 
lass members as "each entity that was an 
riginal purchaser of a 1981 Cadillac V8-
-4 automobile within the State of Califor-
ia." The class numbered 21,000 entities, 
he class action was certified as to all 
auses of action against General Motors 
rated in the first amended complaint. 
This order does not have what has come 
o be known as the "death knell" effect of 
mking further proceedings in the action 
^practical because of denial of class action 
tatus. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 
1978) 437 U.S. 463, 469-470, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 
2458-59, 57 L.Ed.2d 351, the Court stated: 
"The 'death knell' doctrine assumes that 
without the incentive of a possible group 
recovery the individual plaintiff may find it 
economically imprudent to pursue his law-
suit to a final judgment and then seek 
appellate review of an adverse class deter-
mination." Without challenging the as-
sumption, the Court held class certification 
orders were not independently appealable 
prior to judgment. Our Supreme Court, 
however, has held that where an order has 
the "death knell" effect of making further 
proceedings in the action impractical, the 
order is appealable. In Daar v. Yellow 
Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, 63 Cal.Rptr. 
724, 433 P.2d 732, the court held that an 
order sustaining a demurrer to class action 
allegations and transferring the action 
from superior court to municipal court was 
an appealable order. The court stated: 
"[Hjere the order under examination not 
only sustains the demurrer, but also directs 
the transfer of the cause from the superior 
court, where it was commenced as a class 
action, to the municipal court. We must 
assay the total substance of the order. It 
determines the legal insufficiency of the 
complaint as a class suit and preserves for 
the plaintiff alone his cause of action for 
damages. In 'its legal effect' the order is 
tantamount to a dismissal of the action as 
to all members of the class other than 
plaintiff. It has virtually demolished the 
action as a class action. If the propriety of 
such disposition could not now be reviewed, 
it can never be reviewed." (Id. at p. 699, 
63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732, citations 
omitted.) 
Where a trial court has certified a class 
of 21,000 members, although of lesser 
scope than requested, and denied a class 
action status to two causes of action 
against the automobile dealers, appealabili-
ty of the order is governed by the holding 
of our Supreme Court in Vasquez v. Supe-
rior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d 800, 806-807, 
94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964, which deter-
mined that an order dismissing one of two 
causes of action as class actions was not an 
appealable order. This decision was re-
cently affirmed in Green v. Obledo (1981) 
29 Cal.3d 126, 149, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 
P.2d 256, footnote 18. 
COLOKATHIS v. HARTFORD ACC. AND INDEM. CO. 
199 C a l . A p p . 3 d 2 5 2 Cite a* 244 Cal.Rptr. 779 (Cal.App. 1 DUt. 1988) 
We are aware that this decision is con-
trary to the recent decision of the Fourth 
Appellate District in Clothesrigger, Inc. v. 
GTE Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605, 236 
Cal.Rptr. 605. That court reversed a trial 
court order i252denying plaintiffs' motion to 
modify the class definition and amend the 
complaint to state a nationwide class with-
out any discussion of whether the order 
was an appealable order. We disagree 
with that opinion because we believe the 
issue of appealability is governed by the 
above-cited holdings of our Supreme Court 
and because we believe experience has 
shown it unwise to allow multiple appeals 
in a single action. To allow an appeal as a 
matter of right from each detail of a class 
certification order would delay trials and 
vex litigants with multiple proceedings. 
The detriment of delay and increased costs 
in pursuing the litigation far outweigh any 
benefit to the parties of an early determi-
nation of a minor correction in a certifica-
tion order. Allowing such appeals would 
also have a debilitating effect on judicial 
administration by injecting appellate courts 
into the day to day proceedings of trial 
court law and motion departments and by 
causing delay in determination of appeals 
from final judgments in the appellate 
courts. 
Ill*** 
IV 
Disposition 
The alternate writ of mandate is dis-
charged. The petition for writ of mandate 
is denied. The stay of proceedings in the 
trial court is lifted. Plaintiffs' appeal is 
dismissed. Each party is to bear his or its 
own costs in the appeal. 
KLINE, P.J., and ROUSE, J., 
concur. 
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Bertha COLOKATHIS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEM-
NITY COMPANY, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
A035183. 
Court of Appeal, First District, 
Division 5. 
March 4, 1988. 
Review Denied May 19, 1988.* 
President and sole shareholder of com-
pany sued insurer claiming coverage under 
uninsured motorist provision of commercial 
automobile policy issued to company. The 
Superior Court, San Francisco County, 
Thomas Dandurand, J., found that policy 
did not cover president, and appeal fol-
lowed. The Court of Appeal, Low, P.J., 
held that president was entitled to recover 
under uninsured motorist provision, as lit-
eral enforcement of provision would render 
uninsured motorist provision a nullity 
which was against public policy. 
Reversed. 
Insurance <s=467.51(3) 
President and sole shareholder of com-
pany was entitled to recover under unin-
sured motorist provision of commercial 
automobile policy that designated only com-
pany as named insured; literal enforce-
ment of policy provisions would render 
uninsured motorist provision a nullity 
which was against public policy. 
O |K£rNUMKRSVSTfM> 
***See footnote *, ante. 
244 Cal.Rptr.—18 
Richard J. Idell, San Francisco, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Larry D. Langley, Langley & Haigh, 
Palo Alto, for defendant and respondent. 
* In denying review, the Supreme Court ordered 
that the opinion be not officially published. 
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LOW, Presiding Justice. 
In this declaratory relief action, we de-
cide whether the president and sole share-
holder of a company can recover for inju-
ries under the uninsured motorists provi-
sion of a commercial automobile insurance 
policy which designates only the company 
as the named insured. The trial court 
found that the policy did not cover the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, contending, in-
ter alia, her reasonable expectation re-
quires that she be provided coverage. We 
conclude that since the corporation paid a 
premium for total uninsured motorist cov-
erage, and under certain instances it cannot 
hope to collect, public policy requires that 
coverage be provided to plaintiff as the 
most likely beneficiary under the policy. 
We reverse the judgment. 
Plaintiff Bertha Colokathis, a Massachu-
setts resident, was injured in a head-on 
collision with another vehicle on the Golden 
Gate Bridge. Plaintiff is founder, presi-
dent and sole stockholder of Chem-o-matic, 
Inc., a Massachusetts corporation. The 
company had three full-time employees, in-
cluding plaintiff, and several part-time em-
ployees. In addition, she owns a small 
metal-plating concern called Exotic Plating. 
Both of these entities are run from a labo-
ratory in plaintiff's house. At the time of 
the accident she was in San Francisco for a 
combined business and pleasure trip. The 
business purpose was the convention of the 
National Federation of Business Women's 
Club. 
The day of the accident she was touring 
the wine country with friends and did not 
attend the convention. She was driving a 
rental car. The driver of the other car 
involved in the accident was underinsured 
and plaintiff made a claim against the unin-
sured motorists endorsement of the compa-
ny's automobile policy, issued by defendant 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 
(Hartford).1 
1. The policy coverage applies to claims against 
uninsured and underinsured motorists. 
Hartford also insured plaintiffs 1972 Ford 
Galaxy for which she was the registered owner. 
Plaintiff was the named insured under that poli-
The policy was issued to a 1979 Oldsmo-
bile Cutlass, title to which was in the name 
of the company. The "named insured" des-
ignated on the policy was Chem-o-matic, 
Inc. Plaintiff was noted to be the principal 
driver of the vehicle in defendant's records. 
The policy is a standard comprehensive pol-
icy available in Massachusetts which con-
tains both compulsory and optional cover-
ages. The uninsured motorists coverage 
(Coverage U), upon which plaintiff's claim 
is based, is compulsory in that state. Cov-
erage U provides that Hartford will pay 
"such sums as the insured or his legal 
representative shall be legally entitled to 
recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured automobile or 
underinsured automobile because of bodily 
injury " 
"Insured" is defined as: "(1) the named 
insured as stated in Item 1 of the declara-
tions (herein also referred to as the 'princi-
pal named insured') and, while residents of 
the same household, the spouse of any such 
named insured and relatives of either; [fl] 
(2) any other person while occupying an 
insured automobile; and " 
"Insured Automobile" means: "(1) an 
automobile for which a specific coverage U 
(uninsured motorists) premium has been 
charged under this policy, and includes any 
newly acquired motor vehicle with respect 
to which the bodily injury liability insur-
ance of this policy applies; or [11] (2) an 
automobile while temporarily used as a 
substitute for an insured automobile as de-
scribed in subparagraph (1) above, when 
withdrawn from normal use because of its 
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or de-
struction; or [fl] (3) an automobile, other 
than an insured automobile as described in 
subparagraph (1) above, while being oper-
ated by the named insured, or by his 
spouse if a resident of the same house-
ho ld . . . ." 
Hartford denied coverage on the ground 
that plaintiff had not purchased any "hired 
cy. Hartford paid plaintiff the policy limits 
under the uninsured motorists provision of this 
policy. Plaintiffs rights under this policy were 
not at issue in the court below and are not 
implicated on appeal. 
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auto" insurance and that she was not a 
named insured under the policy. Plaintiff 
sued for declaratory relief, and at trial she 
argued that the agent who sold her the 
policy led her to believe she was covered. 
Alternatively, she claimed the rental car 
was a substitute for the Oldsmobile listed 
under the policy as defined in subpara-
graph (2) above. The trial court rejected 
all her claims and entered judgment for 
Hartford. 
At the outset, we note that the parties 
have indicated this case presents a choice 
of law problem and they have agreed that 
Massachusetts law should apply. Simply 
because two states are involved does not 
present a "conflict of laws" or a "choice of 
law" problem. "There is obviously no 
problem where the laws of the two states 
are identical. [Citations.]" (Hurtado v. 
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 580, 
114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666.) Here, the 
laws of California and Massachusetts con-
cerning the interpretation of insurance con-
tracts are the same. (See Cody v. Con-
necticut General Life Ins. Co. (1982) 387 
Mass. 142, 439 N.E.2d 234, 237.) The par-
ties concede as much. As the forum state, 
we will apply California law. 
Plaintiff contends that as president, sole 
stockholder and principal user of the in-
sured vehicle, she should be considered a 
"named insured" under the policy. The 
argument goes that a corporation cannot 
sustain bodily injury, and that unless she 
can recover under these provisions the con-
tract would be a nullity. In support of this 
interpretation, she points to the family cov-
erage provision which insures spouses and 
other relatives of the named insured who 
reside in the same household. She reasons 
that the inclusion of a "spouse" indicates 
the intent to insure others than simply the 
"named insured" as designated on the dec-
larations page. 
The rules on interpretation of insurance 
contracts are familiar. Each clause of the 
insurance contract must be interpreted to-
gether with the other clauses to which it is 
related and they must be construed togeth-
er to determine the intent of the contract-
ing parties. (Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co. 
(1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 804, 809, 26 Cal. 
231.) The words used in an insurance 
cy are to be interpreted according t< 
meaning which an insured would re 
ably expect. Courts will not ado 
strained or absurd interpretation in < 
to create an ambiguity where none e 
(Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta { 
30 Cal.3d 800, 807, 180 Cal.Rptr. 628 
P.2d 764; Gray v. Zurich Insurance 
(1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 270-271, 54 Cal. 
104, 419 P.2d 168.) If by applying 
principles we find an ambiguity to t 
the insurance policy is construed st 
against the insurer and most liberal 
favor of the insured. (Reserve Insiu 
Co. v. Pisciotta, supra, 30 Cal.3d a 
807-808, 180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 
California State Auto. Assn. Inter 
Bureau v. Antonelli (1979) 94 CaLA] 
113, 118, 156 Cal.Rptr. 369.) But whe 
ambiguity exists and the terms of the 
cy are clear, the courts will not indulg* 
forced construction to fasten liabilit 
the insurance company where none 
been assumed. (Jarrett v. Allstate 
Co., supra, 209 Cal.App.2d at p. 81 
Cal.Rptr. 231.) 
The language of the policy limiting 
sured motorists coverage to the "n 
insured," i.e., Chem-o-matic, is cleai 
unambiguous and is not susceptible t 
broad interpretation advanced by pla 
This is a commercial policy issued i 
name of the corporation. Only the coi 
tion is the named insured. Compare 
son v. United States Fire his. Co. ( 
259 Cal.App.2d 248, 66 Cal.Rptr. 115, 
by Hartford. The corporate policy ii 
case specifically listed the organiza 
board of directors as additional nam< 
sureds; but see, Polzin v. Phoen 
Hartford Insurance Companies (19 
Ill.App.3d 84, 283 N.E.2d 324, 327; B 
v. State Farm Mutual AutomobiU 
Co. (Mo.1971) 466 S.W.2d 696, 699; ( 
antee Ins. Co. v. Anderson (E.D.Pa 
585 F.Supp. 408, 411; O'Hanlon v. 
ford Ace. & Indem. Co. (D.Del. 1977 
F.Supp. 377, 387-388. But this doe 
end our inquiry. 
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In response to questioning by the court 
at oral argument, defendant conceded that 
paragraph (3) in the definition of "Insured 
Automobile" has no effect when the named 
insured is a corporation. An insured is 
entitled to no more than what he paid for 
(Oakland Stad. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd's (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 292, 296, 313 
P.2d 602), but he should not receive less. 
Here, the corporation paid for coverage 
under which it could never hope to collect. 
It is a violation of public policy to collect a 
premium for coverage which turns out to 
be nonexistent. Accordingly, we cannot 
enforce an interpretation which renders the 
coverage illusory. Instead, it is our duty 
to interpret that provision in a manner con-
sistent with public policy. It has long been 
the public policy of this state that where it 
is semantically permissible the contract will 
be interpreted to effect coverage for losses 
to which the insurance relates. (See State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnston 
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 270, 273-274, 107 Cal.Rptr. 
149, 507 P.2d 1357; Otter v. General Ins. 
Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 940, 949, 109 Cal. 
Rptr. 831.) This is especially true for unin-
sured motorist claims. (See State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Im. Co. v. Crockett (1980) 103 
Cal.App.3d 652, 655, 163 Cal.Rptr. 206.) 
Colokathis is the principal officer and 
employee of the company and also she is 
the primary user of the insured vehicle. 
This provision is designed to protect an 
insured from the misery and hardship expe-
rienced when injured by an uninsured or 
financially irresponsible motorist (See 
Waite v. Godfrey (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 
760, 770-771, 163 Cal.Rptr. 881.) Since the 
corporation cannot collect for personal inju-
ries, the most likely person that should 
benefit from the paid-for coverage is plain-
tiff. Accordingly, we conclude that this 
clause should be interpreted to provide 
uninsured motorist coverage to plaintiff. 
Hartford could have avoided this result 
simply by modifying the boilerplate lan-
guage to eliminate this clause in corporate 
policies and to reduce the premium charged 
for uninsured motorist coverage propor-
tionally. This would have the dual effect 
of removing the underlying ambiguity and 
alerting plaintiff, as the insured, that she 
must decide whether she wants to pay an 
additional premium for personal coverage. 
The declaratory judgment is reversed. 
The trial court is directed to enter judg-
ment for plaintiff declaring coverage and is 
further directed to determine the extent of 
her recovery under the policy. 
KING and HANING, JJ., concur. 
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J^sThe PEOPLE of the State of 
California, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Steven James HOLDSWORTH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. A036921. 
Court of Appeal, First District, 
Division 3. 
March 4, 1988. 
As Modified March 29, 1988. 
Defendant, who was in county jail af-
ter being sentenced for assault with deadly 
weapon, was convicted in the Contra Costa 
County Superior Court, Michael J. Phelan, 
J., of destroying jail property, for acts com-
mitted after sentence had been imposed, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeal, 
White, P.J., held that section providing for 
different sentencing treatment of felonies 
committed while person is confined in state 
prison did not apply to defendant lodged in 
county jail at time he committed offense, 
even though defendant was parolee in cus-
tody, and even if defendant were subject to 
parole hold at time he committed offense. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
with directions. 
199 Cal.App.3d 256 PEOPLE v. 1 
Cite as 244 Cal.Rptr. 7 
Barry-Deal, J., filed opinion concurring 
in reasoning and judgment. 
1. Criminal Law <&=>1208.6(1) 
Section providing for different sentenc-
ing treatment for felonies committed while 
person is confined in state prison did not 
apply to defendant who had been sentenced 
for felony and was in county jail, not hav-
ing been delivered to state prison. West's 
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 1170.1(c). 
2. Criminal Law <^1208.6(1) 
Section providing for different sentenc-
ing treatment of felonies committed while 
person is confined in state prison did not 
apply to defendant who was parolee in cus-
tody at time of offense on theory defend-
ant's parole status made him state prison-
er; constructive or legal custody of defend-
ant was not the issue, for it was place of 
confinement, rather than status of person 
confined, that was decisive for purposes of 
sentencing statute. West's Ann.Cal.Penal 
Code § 1170.1(c). 
3. Criminal Law 0=1208.6(1) 
Section providing for different sentenc-
ing treatment for felonies committed while 
person is confined in state prison did not 
apply based on parole hold applicable to 
defendant located in county jail, even if 
defendant were subject to parole hold; pa-
role hold could not be equated with delivery 
of convicted felon to state prison. West's 
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 1170.1(c). 
4. Criminal Law <s=*1208.6(l) 
"Parole hold" is temporary measure to 
restrain parolee suspected of violating pa-
role; parole hold is not prison sentence, nor 
does it transform parolee into state prison-
er, for purposes of statute authorizing dif-
ferent sentencing treatment for those com-
mitting offenses while state prisoners. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Pardon and Parole «=>80 
Parole agent has no power to confine 
parolee in state prison in first instance; 
rather, parole agent's power is limited to 
1. All further statutory references are to the Pe-
(CaLApp. 1 Dlit. 198S) 
booking parolee into local jail, and o 
later may parolee be transferred to st 
prison, if such transfer is warranted. 
6. Criminal Law <3=*1208.6(1) 
Whether person who commits cr 
after his parole is revoked can be senten 
under section providing for different t 
tencing treatment of felonies commit 
while person is confined in state pri 
depends on whether parolee is physic 
confined in state prison within meaning 
statutes. West's Ann.Cal.Penal C 
§ 1170.1(a, c). 
7. Criminal Law <s=>1192 
Trial court was directed to strike 
hancements imposed in sentencing deft 
ant for destruction of jail property com1 
ted while defendant was confined in con 
jail, as prior prison term enhancenu 
could be imposed only once in single J 
tencing package; defendant who 
lodged in county jail could not be senter 
under section providing for different 
tencing treatment for felonies commi 
while person is confined in state pri 
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code §§ 1170. 
4600. 
l255Robert J. Calhoun, Executive 
rector, Matthew Zwerling, Staff Atty., 
Francisco, for defendant and appellan 
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., S 
White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. 
giyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. f 
man, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., D 
H. Rose, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Franc 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
WHITE, Presiding Justice. 
Appellant Steven Holdsworth was 
Contra Costa County jail after being 
tenced for assault with a deadly wea 
(Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) Four ( 
after sentence was imposed, 
1256destroyed jail property. He was 1 
convicted of this crime. (Pen.C 
§ 4600.)1 The trial court determined 
the crime should be sentenced as an in-' 
on offense under section 1170.1, sub 
nal Code. 
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N.E.2d 333, 336-337, citing Posin, supra, it 
was stated: 
" 'The test to be applied by a trial court 
in ruling on a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is the same test to be 
applied on a motion for a directed verdict. 
The evidence adduced at trial and the facts 
established by admissions in the pleadings 
and in the record must be construed most 
strongly in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is made, and, where there 
is substantial evidence to support his side 
of the case, upon which reasonable minds 
may reach different conclusions, the mo-
tion must be denied.' " 
In the instant case, there is believable 
evidence which would permit reasonable 
minds to come to different conclusions. 
TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Service Bolt & Nut 
Co. (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 142, 143, 16 
OBR 149, 151, 474 N.E.2d 1223, 1225, 
states: 
" * * * [T]he trial court must not consid-
er the weight of the evidence or the credi-
bility of the witnesses when ruling upon a 
motion for a directed verdict. * * * There-
fore, the trial court must submit an issue 
to the jury if there is evidence which, if 
believed, would permit reasonable minds to 
come to different conclusions." 
As to appellant's argument based on the 
Statute of Frauds, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 is a 
sufficient memorandum in writing to meet 
the requirement of that statute. In the 
case of Soteriades v. Wendy's of Ft. 
Wayne, Inc. (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 222, 
517 N.E.2d 1011, the court states in para-
graph two of the syllabus: 
"When an individual has a contract of 
employment for more than one year, the 
memorandum in writing satisfying the re-
quirement of the Statute of Frauds may 
consist of several related writings, even 
though only one such writing is signed if 
the signed writing refers to the unsigned 
writing or if it appears by inspection and 
comparison of the writings that they logi-
cally relate to or form part of the same 
transaction." 
* Reporter's Note: An appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Ohio was dismissed as having been 
In that case there were unsigned corpo-
rate minutes together with a signed agree-
ment, neither of which made direct refer-
ence to the terms of the employment con-
tract; but, nevertheless, the court found 
those two documents were a sufficient 
memorandum in writing to meet the re-
quirement of the Statute of Frauds. In the 
instant case, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and the 
oral statement by appellant, as a matter of 
law, were sufficient to overcome a motion 
for a directed verdict. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would af-
firm the judgment of the trial court. 
J^\ , 
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j576DECKER, Exrx., et al., Appellants, 
v. 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY 
et al., Appellees.* 
No. 89-P-2106. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, 
Portage County. 
Decided June 4, 1990. 
Executrix of employee's estate com-
menced declaratory judgment action 
against employer's insurer, seeking deter-
mination that employee was "insured" pur-
suant to uninsured motorist provisions of 
automobile policy issued to employer. The 
Common Pleas Court, Portage County, en-
tered summary judgment in favor of insur-
er, and executrix appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Ford, J., held that: (1) policy pro-
vision defining insured as "you" or any 
"family member" was ambiguous and pro-
vided coverage for employee, and (2) insur-
ance coverage was not precluded by facts 
that employee was not within scope of his 
improvidently allowed in (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 
1201, 572 N.E.2d 689. 
DECKER v. 
Cite as 585 N.EJ2d 884 
employment and that employee was pedes-
trian at time of accident. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Christley, P.J., filed concurring opin-
ion. 
Jurisdictional motion allowed, 56 Ohio 
St.3d 712, 565 N.E.2d 836. 
Appeal dismissed, 61 Ohio St.3d 1201, 
572 N.E.2d 689. 
1. Judgment <s=*185(4) 
Insured's provision of insurance policy 
in response to motion for summary judg-
ment in declaratory judgment action by 
insurer was sufficient response to motion, 
where provisions of insurance policy con-
tradicted insurer's assertions and demon-
strated genuine issues for trial. 
2. Insurance <®='467.5l(3) 
Uninsured motorist provision of auto-
mobile policy issued to corporation that 
provided employee with company car under 
policy, under which insured was defined as 
"you" or any "family member," which was 
nonsensical as ^applied to corporation, 
was ambiguous and was to be interpreted 
as providing uninsured motorist coverage 
to employee. 
3. Insurance ^467.51(3) 
Fact that corporate employee was out-
side scope of his employment at time he 
was killed in accident while jogging did not 
preclude uninsured motorist coverage un-
der automobile policy issued to corporation 
on vehicle which corporation had issued to 
him, where policy did not limit coverage to 
persons within scope of their employment; 
nor did fact that employee was pedestrian 
at time of accident bar him from coverage 
under uninsured motorist provisions. 
CNA INS. CO. Ohio 885 
(OhloApp. HDist . 1990) 
automobile was driven by Christopher R. 
Albert who, at the time of the accident, 
was insured by Federal Kemper Insurance 
Company, under a policy of insurance 
which carried a bodily injury liability limit 
of $25,000 for each person and $50,000 
each occurrence. 
The decedent had been employed by ap-
pellee, Envirodyne Industries. Envirodyne 
had provided the decedent with a company 
car, as well as insurance on the car, 
through the appellee, CNA Insurance Com-
pany. 
Appellant, Laurie Decker, the executrix 
of decedent's estate, accepted $25,000 in 
full settlement from Federal Kemper In-
surance Company. Further, appellant en-
deavored to make a claim against the 
underinsured provisions of Envirodyne's in-
surance policy with appellee. When appel-
lee refused to recognize the claim, appel-
lant commenced a declaratory judgment, on 
September 21, 1988, requesting a determi-
nation as to whether the decedent was an 
"insured," pursuant to the "unin-
sured/underinsured motorist" provisions 
contained in the appellee's policy. 
Under the terms of the uninsured motor-
ist policy drafted by appellee, the following 
persons/entities were insured yonder the 
policy: 
"D. WHO IS INSURED 
member. 
Ralph Oates, Kent, for appellants. 
Gary L. Nicholson and John B. Robert-
son, Cleveland, for appellees. 
FORD, Judge. 
On May 2, 1987, Robert L. Decker was 
struck and killed by an automobile while 
jogging in Portage County, Ohio. The 
•ea /un h 
"1. You or any family 
\ 578"2. Anyone etee occupying a covered 
auto or a temporary substitute for a cover-
ed auto. The covered auto must be out of 
service because of breakdown, repair, ser-
vicing, loss or destruction. ; 
"3. Anyone for damages he is entitled 
to recover because of bodily injury sus-
tained by another insured." (Emphasis 
sic.) 
Appellee's policy contains a provision de-
fining certain terms of art contained in the 
policy. "You" or "your" is defined by the 
policy to be "the person or organization 
shown as the named insured * * *." The 
named insured in the policy in question was 
Envirodyne. The policy further defines 
"family member" as "a person related to 
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you by blood, marriage or adoption who is 
a resident of your household * * *." The 
uninsured motorist provision does not con-
tain any special definitional wording which 
would limit the applicability of the policy to 
persons or family members in the scope of 
their employment. Instead, it would ap-
pear as if appellee utilized the same form 
for both corporate and personal automobile 
insurance policies. 
Appellee, along with Envirodyne, filed a 
joint motion for summary judgment on 
April 3, 1989. Attached to this motion for 
summary judgment was an affidavit from 
an officer of Envirodyne which stated that 
it was not the intent of either Envirodyne 
or appellee that the decedent be covered 
for the accident at issue. On July 11, 1989, 
appellant filed a brief in support of declara-
tory judgment and in opposition to sum-
mary judgment. This brief did not dispute 
appellees' affidavit; instead, the brief as-
serted that the decedent was covered by 
the insurance company as a matter of law. 
After oral arguments on the motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court, on July 
28, 1989, issued an order stating: 
"The Court finds that neither the Plain-
tiff, the Decedent nor the Decedent's Es-
tate are insured under the Defendant's In-
surance Policy, and that there is no dispute 
of material fact that the decedent was not 
in the scope of his employment at the time 
of his injury and death and was not operat-
ing a company owned vehicle." 
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal 
from this order and raises the following 
assignment of error: 
''The trial court erred in sustaining the 
defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment." 
[1] Prior to any consideration of the 
merits of appellant's assignment, however, 
this court must first consider the threshold 
issue of whether appellant's assignment is 
properly cognizable by this court. Appel-
lees argue that the grant of summary judg-
ment is proper because appellant failed to 
contradict, in any way, the allegations in 
their motion. 
1579*' * * * When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provid-
ed in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him." 
Civ.R. 56(E). 
Appellees' argument is traditionally very 
compelling and would prevail in the case 
sub judice except that it assumes that ap-
pellant relied solely on a paper refutation 
of appellees' contentions. However, appel-
lant also provided the court with the insur-
ance policy in question. The provisions of 
the insurance policy itself contradict appel-
lees' assertions and demonstrate genuine 
issues for trial. This court is, therefore, 
capable of considering appellant's argu-
ment. 
[2] The underlying issue in this case, 
which is the construction of an ambiguous 
insurance provision, has been the subject of 
considerable judicial scrutiny of late. Sev-
eral courts, including this one, have ad-
dressed the question of who the insured 
party is in policies of uninsured/underin-
sured motorist coverage, where the form in 
question is used for both corporate and 
personal use. The interpretive difficulty in 
construing these provisions (which are all 
very similar to that in the case sub judice) 
is in construing phrases such as "you" or 
"a family member." The dilemma that one 
reaches when interpreting these provisions 
was set forth in Aetna Cos. & Surety Co. 
v. Borden, Inc. (Sept. 15, 1989), Lake App. 
No. 8&-Lr-13-163, unreported, at 8, 1989 
WL 107031, as follows: 
" * * * '[Y]ou,' in the quoted language, 
indicates the named insured, the corpora-
tion; [a family member] becomes a nonsen-
sical phrase when describing a relative of a 
corporation; a second possible interpreta-
tion of 'a relative* or 'you' could be 'an 
employee.' Thus, the court [is] faced with 
ambiguous language." 
The starting point for the investigation 
of the question of whether decedent was 
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covered by the appellee's insurance policy 
is King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 
Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380. In King, 
the Ohio Supreme Court heard a case in 
which the named insured was a community 
action agency and the injured party was 
one of the agency's employees. This em-
ployee was driving a co-worker's car (rath-
er than the agency's) in the scope of his 
employment. The policy in question de-
fined "you" exclusively in terms of the 
agency and also contained language defin-
ing "family member" in the same manner 
as the policy in the case sub judice. 
At trial, the insurance company argued 
that the word "relatives" in the form was a 
nullity, resulting solely from the cross-polli-
nation of insurance 158oforms for individuals 
and business entities. The Ohio Supreme 
Court, however, held that "[w]here provi-
sions of a contract of insurance are reason-
ably susceptible of more than one interpre-
tation, they will be construed strictly 
against the insurer and liberally in favor of 
the insured." Id. at syllabus; Faruque v. 
Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co. (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 34, 31 OBR 83, 508 N.E.2d 949, 
at syllabus. The King court noted that 
interpreting phrases such as "[r]eiatives 
living in your household" as relatives of 
the corporation was "manifestly absurd." 
King, supra, 35 Ohio St.3d at 212, 519 
N.E.2d at 1384. The "relatives" phrase 
could also mean "the employees of the cor-
poration," "the relatives of the employees 
of the corporation," or simply be construed 
as a nullity. Consequently, the court held 
that the phrase "a relative living in your 
household," in the business entity context, 
was inherently ambiguous and must be 
construed in such a way as to include the 
insured. 
Five months after the release of King, 
the Ninth District Court of Appeals, in 
Simon v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (Aug. 
31, 1988), Lorain App. No. 4346, unreport-
ed, 1988 WL 93220, had occasion to con-
strue an insurance policy similar to the one 
found in King. In Simon, the injured par-
ty, not within the scope of his employment, 
was struck and killed by an uninsured mo-
torist. The decedent's employers had tak-
en out uninsured motorist insurance, with 
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the company designated as the named in-
sured and with provisions in the policy ex-
tending coverage to the "relatives" of the 
named insured. The Simon court, apply-
ing King, held that the decedent was cover-
ed by the company's uninsured motorist 
policy, even though he had not been within 
the scope of his employment at the time of 
the accident. Since "[t]he automotive poli-
cy in controversy [did] not specifically pro-
vide that 'insureds' were only covered if 
they [were] acting within the scope of their 
employment at the time they [were] in-
jured[,]" the Simon court found the trial 
court's construction of the policy in favor 
of the insurers to be clearly contrary to 
law. Simon, supra, at 5. 
This court also had occasion to hear a 
case involving an uninsured motorist policy 
similar to the case sub judice, in Aetna, 
supra. In Aetna, the company in question, 
Carroll Glass, was designated as the named 
insured on the insurance policy, a policy 
which also contained language covering the 
"relatives of the same household." The 
daughter of one of the employees of Car-
roll Glass, who was not an employee of the 
company, was injured while driving in a 
car, not owned by the company and outside 
of any company business. 
This court, examining the insurance poli-
cy in Aetna, and applying the lo/gfc of King 
and Simon, stated that the Employee of 
Carroll Glass was covered }581i/nder the pro-
visions of the uninsured motorists' policy 
and, "as [the insurer] has seen fit to ampli-
fy its coverage via the residential relative 
clause [the daughter] is also covered under 
the auspices of the policy." Aetna, supr^a, 
at 7-8. Further, in Aetna, this court took 
exception to Professor Widiss's treatise, 
Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Mo-
torists Insurance (1985) 60, Section 4.4, 
quoted in Aetna, at 10. Widiss had opined 
that courts tend to limit analysis such as 
that found in King to situations in which 
the employee was engaged in the scope of 
his or her employment. This court noted, 
however, that Ohio law, as set forth in 
King, required that ambiguous provisions 
were to be construed liberally in favor of 
the insured. Acceptance of Widiss's posi-
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tion, therefore, would require the adoption 
of a provision which did not encompass the 
full scope of persons who could be insured 
under the policy. Such a reading, the court 
felt, would scarcely comport with the lib-
eral construction of the insurance provi-
sions mandated by King. 
In conclusion this court, in Aetna, ob-
served: 
"A reading of the insurance policy in the 
way advocated by the trial court may well 
extend appellant's liability beyond what 
[the insurer] had originally intended. How-
ever, appellant had the opportunity, when 
drafting the policy provisions, to formulate 
specific exclusions from coverage. 'Where 
exceptions, qualifications or exemptions are 
introduced into an insurance contract, a 
general presumption arises to the effect 
that that which is not clearly excluded from 
the operation of such contract is included in 
the operation thereof.' Home Indemnity 
Co. v. Plymouth (1945), 146 Ohio St. 96 [32 
O.O. 30, 64 N.E.2d 248], paragraph two of 
the syllabus. (Further citations omitted.) 
Having drafted the insurance policy provi-
sions and dictated its terms to its insureds 
[the insurer] must now accept the conse-
quences of its own overinclusive drafting." 
Aetna, supra, at 11-12. 
Appellees argue that the language of 
their policy does not cause the ambiguities 
inherent in King and Aetna. Appellees 
support this contention by stating that the 
terms "you" and "family member" are de-
fined in the policy itself. Appellees' policy 
defines "you" as the "person or organiza-
tion shown as the named insured in the 
policy." The named insured of the policy is 
Envirodyne. Appellees further note that 
"family member" is defined by the policy 
as "a person related to you [the named 
insured] by blood, marriage or adoption 
who is a resident of your household * * *." 
Appellees conclude that, since decedent 
was clearly not a relative of Envirodyne, he 
was not covered by the insurance policy. 
This conclusion is incorrect as a matter 
of law. Appellees' contention essentially 
states: " * * * that language, which is 
nonconforming or ambiguous, is simply the 
by-product of the cross pollination of insur-
ance forms for 1532varying purposes. This 
contention is contrary to law. Each word 
in an insurance contract is presumed to 
have been included for a purpose and must 
be given some meaning. National Life 
and Accident Ins. Co. v. Ray (1927), 117 
Ohio St. 13, 22 [158 N.E. 179, 182]. When 
an insurance company provides an insured 
with a policy, which it has drafted, contain-
ing terms with which it intends to bind the 
insured, the insurance company must ex-
pect to be held to the obligations which it, 
through its own drafting, has subjected 
itself." Aetna, supra, at 10. 
In the case sub judice, like Aetna, King, 
and Simon, this court is faced with at-
tempting to interpret a provision which 
could easily insure several different per-
sons or no person at all. As a matter of 
law, in the interpretation of these provi-
sions, courts have construed the language 
to include the employee under the protec-
tion of the policy. 
Appellees direct this court's attention to 
Troy Model Laundry, Inc. v. Robinson 
(Nov. 17, 1989), Sandusky App. No. S-88-
41, 1989 WL 138117, urging that the case is 
directly on point and should be considered 
dispositive of the issue. Troy Model 
Laundry case, in which the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals held that a pedestrian, 
not in the scope of his employment, was 
not covered by his company's uninsured 
motorist policy is in contravention not only 
of Aetna, but also of King. As the Troy 
Model Laundry case is not binding on this 
court, and as it fails to apply King and its 
progeny, we decline to follow it. 
[3] Appellees further contend that ap-
pellant should be precluded from coverage 
because the decedent was outside the scope 
of his employment at the time of the acci-
dent. This argument is without merit for 
several reasons. First, examination of the 
insurance policy in question indicates that 
nowhere in the policy is there any restric-
tion which limits coverage to persons with-
in the scope of their employment. As not-
ed, it has long been a governing rule of 
contractual interpretation that what "is not 
clearly excluded from the operation of such 
contract is included in the operation there-
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of." Home Indemn. Co., supra, at para-
graph two of the syllabus. 
Moreover, appellees point to no case law 
which indicates that underinsured motorist 
coverage is only available to persons within 
the scope of their employment. In fact, in 
Simon, the Ninth District, construing an 
insurance policy remarkably like the one at 
bar, found that the employee was protected 
by the uninsured motorist protections of 
his company's policy, despite not being 
within the scope of his employment at the 
time of his death. Similarly, this court, in 
Aetna, extended the ambit of the policy in 
question to cover a woman who was not 
only not within the scope of her employ-
ment, but was not even an employee of the 
corporation at all. Nor does the fact that 
the |583decedent was a pedestrian bar him 
from the protection of the insurance policy. 
Ohio law is replete with instances where 
courts have found a litigant to be entitled 
to benefits, arising from uninsured/under-
insured motorist insurance, despite having 
been pedestrians at the time of the acci-
dent. See, e.g., Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 
Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789; Shear v. 
West American Ins. Co. (1984), 11 Ohio 
St.3d 162, 11 OBR 478, 464 N.E.2d 545. 
Appellant's assignment has merit. 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth in 
this opinion, the judgment of the trial court 
is reversed and this case remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed and cause remand-
ed. 
CHRISTLEY, P.J., and JOSEPH E. 
MAHONEY, J., concur. 
CHRISTLEY, Presiding Judge, concur-
ring. 
I concur with the well-written opinion of 
the majority. That opinion comes to the 
only legal conclusion possible despite the 
absurdity of that conclusion from a com-
mon-sense viewpoint. 
Nevertheless, this court is duty bound to 
follow the legal principles, precepts and 
case law presently existing in Ohio until 
such time as the legislature or the Ohio 
Supreme Court sees fit to change those 
guidelines. 
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